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This book was written as a consequence of a discussion that I overheard at a 
conference reception in Kadoma just outside Harare, Zimbabwe. The con­
ference was organised by the World Bank as part of their efforts to instigate 
water sector reforms throughout Africa based on the international regime 
of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). IWRM had been 
developed by leading international experts and was identified by United 
Nations as a vital step in achieving the Millennium Development Goals for 
eradicating poverty. Leading civil servants and water resources specialists 
from all over Africa had come to Kadoma to be inspired and share experi­
ences of water sector reforms in their respective home countries.
After the first day of the meeting, we all gathered by the pool to cool off 
before dinner. As a junior researcher with an odd accent, I tried to keep a 
low profile and made conversation with a group of younger civil servants. 
As I enjoyed the refreshments and nodded along with the conversation of 
my peer group, I overheard a senior official from the Department of Water 
Development in Harare telling colleges from West Africa about problems 
getting local support for IWRM. After dinner I got a chance to talk to this 
Zimbabwean official in private. He told me that when Zimbabwe began 
its water sector reform in the early 1990’s it was one of the first countries 
in Africa to actively engage IWRM as a policy platform. He had person­
ally been involved in supporting the review of the legal and institutional 
structures, and been engaged in extensive campaigns to get public and 
private actors to change the way they dealt with water resources. Despite 
these efforts, he was disappointed by poor results. Attempting to explain 
this, he said:
You know, for many people water is not just water. It is part 
of their lives, their worlds. So what we have seen with IWRM 
here is like a clash of worlds, a clash of water worlds.
This conversation is the root of the focus of this book. International regimes 
are developed at the international level with the aim of creating behavioural 
changes at domestic levels. During the implementation process the inter­
national regime can be transformed in relation to existing constructions 
of reality in the targeted domestic context in a way that redirects the origi­
nally intended behavioural changes. With the aim to both understand and 
promote the implementation of international regimes—such as IWRM—I 
present an analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes.
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1. DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
Conservative estimates hold that the lack of clean water causes the death 
of five million people worldwide every year (UN 2002).1 To grasp the 
magnitude of this horrendous figure, we can translate it into 12,500 jumbo 
jets each carrying 400 passengers. Thought of in this way, the death toll 
from lack of clean water is equivalent to 34 full jumbo jets crashing every 
day of the year.
1 Researchers at John Hopkins School of Public Health put the death toll at 12 million 
(Hinrichsen, Robey, et al. 1997). For a comment on the methodological problems arriving 
at such estimate, see Gleich (2002).
Moreover, competition for water resources and water pollution is in­
creasing on a global scale. The resulting soil degradation, destruction of 
ecosystems, and loss of productive land has serious effects for sustainable 
social and economic development, as well as political stability. Among the 
problems faced are water pollution, uneven geographic and seasonal distri­
bution of water resources, and, perhaps most challenging, the distribution 
of water resources and related services between social groups and countries 
(UN 2003; Elliott 2004; Jonch-Clausen 2004; UN 2005a).
Over the last thirty years, a wide variety of concerned actors and experts 
have been engaged with advancing the understanding about, and coop­
eration on, water resources management. The need for sustainable water 
management has been at the top of the agenda at international meetings 
such as the UN conferences for sustainable development in Stockholm 
(1972), Rio de Janeiro (1992), and Johannesburg (2002). From these meet­
ings there has grown a generally accepted understanding that the global 
water crisis is mainly a problem of management. The water crisis is not the 
result of lack of natural supply of water, nor is it primarily an engineering 
problem (i.e. stemming from the lack of technical solutions). Instead, as 
a group of experts under the UN Millennium Project recently put it, the 
problem is “the lack of appropriate institutions at all levels, and chronic 
dysfunction of existing institutional arrangements” (UN 2005a:27). The 
water crisis—causing the death and underdevelopment of millions of people 
each year—is thus not primarily constituted by over-demand for water or 
lack of technical know-how. It derives from under-supply of knowledge 
and institutions for sustainable water resources management.
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The recognition of the need for improved water resources management 
has lead to the formation of the international regime of Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM). The international regime of IWRM con­
sists of “norms, rules, and decision-making procedures” (Krasner 1983b: 1) 
that leading international experts see as paramount to foster sustainable 
water resources management.2 Recognising the need to accommodate to 
local conditions in terms of water availability and needs, IWRM does not 
provide detailed prescriptions for every aspect of water resources manage­
ment. However, IWRM builds on a distinct set of core ideas and values that 
are different from previously recognised approaches to water management 
in several regards. Most notably, whereas water resources management used 
to be seen as an engineering practice with the goal to optimise the output 
supply of water from nature, IWRM propose an approach based on water 
as part of the ecosystem, the economic value of water, and the need for 
stakeholder participation (Global Water Partnership 2000; Jonch-Clausen 
2004).
2 For further definition of “international regime” see chapter three. Note here that I, apart 
from Krasner, focus on the role of international regimes to regulate social interaction at 
domestic levels. For a review on the role of international regimes to foster behaviour between 
actors at the international level such as state-to-stat relations, see e.g. Young (1989a); Roman 
(1998); Hasenclever, Mayer, et al. (2000); Little (2001).
The delegates at the 2002 UN Summit in Johannesburg recommended 
that all countries worldwide should adopt IWRM as the basis for their water 
management policies as this is deemed necessary to arrive at the Millennium 
Development Goals set out to curb global underdevelopment (UN 2005b). 
To date, more than one hundred countries have embarked on IWRM-based 
reforms of their water management policies. The empirical material for this 
book was collected during the implementation process in Zimbabwe, which 
was one of the first countries to actively engage IWRM as a platform for a 
national water management policy. Current reforms in China, Brazil, and 
Uganda are mapped on IWRM, as is the EU’s Water Framework Directive 
which encourages the member states to reform their water management in 
accordance with IWRM. All major international development agencies and 
institutes, including the World Bank and United Nations, as well as bilateral 
agencies from countries like the UK, Sweden, and Germany use IWRM as 
the platform for their engagements with sustainable water management in 
the developing world (UN 2003; Global Water Partnership 2004).
At a general level, IWRM thus has a high degree of acceptance and legiti­
macy throughout the world and represents a widely endorsed platform for 
sustainable water management. It has substantial backing from scientific 
experts and international policy institutions, and it already serves as the 
foundation for national water sector reforms in all parts of the world.
12
The analytic point of departure for this book is that despite of the general 
acceptance of IWRM at a global level, the understanding of it may vary 
across different targeted domestic actors whose practices IWRM sets out 
to change. In the case under review this implies variations between the 
understandings of IWRM held by, on the one hand, development agencies 
and scientific experts at the international level, and, on the other hand, the 
targeted domestic actors in Zimbabwe whose water related practices were 
up for reform (e.g. policy makers, scientific experts in government depart­
ments, farmers of different sorts, and rain-makers).3
3 As an analytic category, “targeted domestic actors” is distinct from advocacy groups in 
civil society, the private sector, or elsewhere, engaged in promoting the adoption of an 
international regime or norm see Checkel (1997a); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Risse, Ropp, 
et al. (1999).
4 The underlying assumption—that agency derives from actors’ understandings of reality—is 
addressed in chapter four.
The reason for these variations, I suggest, is that in the process of imple­
menting IWRM it becomes part of evolving domestic practices and politics. 
More specifically, IWRM is transformed in relation to domestic construc­
tions of reality. An international regime is transformed if different actors 
internalise it in conjunction with their existing constructions of reality and 
subsequently ascribe it new meanings. The transformed understanding that 
is eventually held by targeted domestic actors is thus made up of a mixture of 
the original formulation of IWRM and prevailing constructions of reality at 
the domestic level. An international regime which is transformed should be 
distinguished from a regime which is rejected or accepted. Rejected regimes 
are in no way internalised or turned into practice while accepted regimes are 
wholly internalised and practised as a result of the implementation process 
(for further definitions, see chapter three).
My interest in domestic transformations of international regimes is based 
on the assumption that they may decrease the usefulness of international 
regimes as a tool to obtain specific changes in domestic policy and practice.4 
The actual impact of IWRM to meet the global water crisis is contingent 
on how targeted water users at domestic levels transform IWRM and turn 
it into concrete politics and practices. Consider two examples from the em­
pirical study presented below. Key actors in the Zimbabwean government 
subscribed to a construction of reality where water resources management 
was of great importance in the post-colonial project of nation building 
in Zimbabwe. For them, gaining control over water resources was part of 
breaking with a history in which white men have made a habit of providing 
ready-made solutions to how they should manage their natural resources. 
Thus in relation to this conception of 'Water as Zimbabwe’, I'MRM was 
transformed into yet another instrument by imperialistic forces to interfere 
in Zimbabwe’s domestic politics. As a consequence of this transformation,
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the water sector reform in Zimbabwe was obstructed and delayed for several 
years during which the incumbent political and economic elites continued 
to enjoy their privileged position and existing inequalities in the water sec­
tor were further entrenched. When IWRM was eventually endorsed by the 
government as the platform for the water sector, its meaning was coloured 
by the construction of ‘Water as Zimbabwe’ in a way that substantially 
redirected its behavioural implications (see chapter five). Similarly, the 
concept of ‘Water as a Gift from the Gods’ is widespread among Zimbab­
weans and places jurisdiction over water resources in the hands of the 
ancestral gods. In this construction of reality, IWRM calls for economic 
and scientific means to direct the use of water were seen as tantamount to 
rebellion against the gods. While IWRM, for example, favoured putting a 
price on water to deal with water scarcity, such a policy was seen as a lack 
of trust in the abilities of the gods and their right to distribute water in 
accordance with their will. To accommodate this view, a policy was eventu­
ally developed where the price for water consumption was related to the 
use of the infrastructure needed to manage water (e.g. pumps and pipes) 
rather than on the amount of consumed water. While this policy avoided 
‘pricing the gift from the gods’, it also made the price for water insensitive 
to the supply and demand for water and thus the use of market incentives 
to regulate consumption (see chapter eight).
These examples illustrate that targeted domestic actors in Zimbabwe 
transformed the original meaning of IWRM in relation to domestic con­
structions of reality in a way that redirected its behavioural implications. 
The targeted domestic actors’ understandings of IWRM are made up of a 
mixture of the original formulation of IWRM and prevailing social, politi­
cal, religious, and scientific practices surrounding water. To the extent that 
targeted domestic actors base their actions on transformed understandings 
of the international regime, rather than its original formulation, the trans­
formation process should concern both students of international regimes 
and parties concerned with using international regimes as an instrument 
to effect domestic practices.
In order to both understand and promote the implementation of IWRM 
in particular, and international regimes for sustainable development in 
general, in this book I will present a theory of domestic transformations 
of international regimes. This theory seeks to explain how international 
regimes are transformed in the process of implementation into domestic 
contexts. More specifically, I ask the following questions:
1. How and why do targeted domestic actors arrive at transformed understand­
ings of the international regime?
2. How do these transformed understandings affect the behavioural implication 
of the international regime?
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With reference to the case-study conducted for this book, the focus is on 
what IWRM meant to the people in Zimbabwe whose water practices it 
sought to influence. How was IWRM transformed by targeted domestic 
actors engaged in the struggle for water resources in Zimbabwe? How did 
these transformed understandings affect the policies and practices around 
water in Zimbabwe?
Domestic transformations of international regimes 
and theories on international relations
My study is placed in the midst of a literature on international relations 
that is concerned with how politics and practices at domestic levels can be 
effected by policies developed at the international level (e.g. Krasner 1983a; 
Haas 1989; Klotz 1995; Clapham 1996; Finnemore 1996; Keohane and 
Levy 1996; Cortell and Davis 2000; Checkel 1997b; Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999; Meyer 2000; Checkel 2001; Miles, Underdal 
et al. 2002; Acharya 2004). The common denominator of this literature 
is the realisation that in a world with increasing global interdependence, 
the need for effective instruments to foster domestic behavioural change is 
eminent. Many of the challenges of global sustainable development derive 
from politics and practices at domestic levels. Global warming, HIV/AIDS, 
and small arms proliferation are but a few examples of policy areas that have 
motivated scholars to find out how developments at the international level 
can contribute to increased levels of cooperation at domestic levels.
The theoretical literature on international relations provides three main 
approaches to understand international regime implementation: realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism.5 In chapter three, I argue that independ­
ent of theoretical orientation, scholars on domestic effects of international 
policy development have typically treated international regimes as entities 
that have a fixed social and political meaning throughout the implementa­
tion process. The analytical point of departure of existing theories is that 
actors at the international level ascribe the same meaning to an international 
regime as do the targeted domestic actors. The assumption is, for example, 
that the meaning of “human rights” or “environmental sustainability” is the 
same for actors at the targeted domestic levels as it is at the international 
level where the regime was first developed and formulated, e.g. the UN 
or the World Bank. While dominant theories of international relations
5 Depending on which theory of international relations that is applied, scholars have studied 
domestic effects of international policies under the banner of “implementation of interna­
tional regimes (realists and liberalists) or as a process of “norm diffusion” (constructivists). 
For reasons that I elaborate in chapter three, I will henceforth use “implementation of 
international regimes”.
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shed light on different components of the complex puzzle of international 
regime implementation, my main critique of these theories is that they do 
not acknowledge that international regimes can be transformed and take on 
new meanings with new behavioural consequences during the implementa­
tion process. In contrast to the existing literature, I propose a theory that 
considers the meaning of international regimes during the implementation 
as constructed rather than constant.
Figure 1.1 presents the focus of my study (lower section) in contrast to the 
dominant focus of studies of international regime implementation (upper 
section).























Figure 1.1 Contrasting the theory of domestic transformations of inter­
national regimes with the dominant view in theories on international 
relations.
The value added from the theory of domestic trans­
formations of international regimes
The theory of domestic transformations of international regimes is an 
attempt to complement existing theories on international regime imple­
mentation. A detailed critique of existing theories is found in chapter 
three. Chapter four provides a comprehensive presentation of the theory
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of domestic transformations. Byway of introduction, three aspects of how 
this theory complements existing views can be outlined as follows:
Targeted domestic actors as subjects of change
The theory of domestic transformations of international regimes focuses 
on the relations between international regimes and domestic actors’ con­
structions of reality. As stated above, the analytic point of departure is that 
this relationship is constructed rather than constant. More specifically, this 
relationship is analysed as a strategic process in which targeted domestic 
actors try to transform and establish as legitimate their understandings of 
the international regime.6
6 By labelling a process as “strategic” I mean to emphasise that it is characterised by pur­
poseful actors applying a carefully worked out plan or method to achieve specific goals. I 
do not make a priori assumptions about the (material or non-material) nature of the means 
used, nor the goals aspired to.
Dominant theories of international relations tend to regard the targeted 
domestic actors as passive recipients of international regimes. Recent schol­
arship has elucidated how domestic advocacy groups engage strategically 
to get the targeted domestic actors to adhere to an international regime. A 
typical example is how human rights groups pressure oppressing govern­
ments to respect international standards on human rights (Risse, Ropp et al. 
1999, cf. Risse-Kappen 1995; Price 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). These 
scholars focus on the domestic actors who are advocating change, while the 
domestic actors who are the prime target for change are largely left out of the 
analysis. They are ‘black-boxed’, i.e. seen as a passive entity into which the 
international regime is inserted, and from which certain behaviour comes 
out. Scant interest is paid to what goes on ‘inside the black box’: how the 
targeted domestic actors receive and interpret the international regime. 
The targeted domestic actors are theorised as subjected to change rather 
than subjects of change. By contrast, the analysis that I propose focuses on 
the targeted domestic actors as subjects of change who actively engage to 
transform the meaning and implications of the international regime (see 
also Checkel 2000; Acharya 2004)
Transformed understandings of international regimes as 
proxies for action
International regimes aim to change the pattern of domestic social interac­
tion. To assess the degree to which this is achieved, dominant theories on 
international regimes focus on changes in formal institutional structures, 
material power relations, and economic pay-offs at domestic levels (Victor, 
Raustiala et al. 1998; Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 2000; Miles, Underdal er al. 
2002). There is, however, much research to support the argument that such
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indications are poor proxies for how targeted domestic actors will adapt to 
the behavioural imperatives of international regimes. The argument is that 
action is influenced by actors’ internally imposed constructions of reality 
(March and Olsen 1989; North 1990; Ostrom 1991; Bates, de Figueiredo 
et al. 1998; Rothstein 2000; Wendt 1999). Oran Young, a leading researcher 
on international regimes, has called for explorations of how nonutilitar­
ian forces play as drivers of behaviour associated with the operation of 
international regimes” (Young 1999:206). The need to expand theories on 
international regimes in this direction was also recently emphasised by Miles 
et al. (2002) in the conclusion to their major study of the implementation 
of fourteen international regimes. To assess the behavioural implications of 
international regimes, they argue that the implementation process should be 
analysed as a “conflict over values' rather than the establishment of formal 
regulative arrangements (p. 474, emphasis in original).
My analytic point of departure is that for an international regime to have 
a long term impact on domestic politics and practices, its propositions must 
have an impact on the targeted domestic actors’ constructions of reality. The 
behavioural impact of an international regime at domestic levels is largely 
contingent on how the targeted domestic actors transform the international 
regime during the implementation process. A focus on the targeted domestic 
actors’ subjectively held (but socially constructed) understandings of the 
international regime is therefore a better indicator of long term compliance 
than changes in formal regulative arrangements.
Domestic heterogeneity around international regimes
Students of international relations tend to regard the implementation of 
international regimes as a process leading to increased global homogeneity. 
The idea is that as institutions and norms spread from one country and 
society to the next, this leads to an increased level of similarity in the organi­
sation and behaviour within these states. This is perhaps most evident in 
the work by John Meyer who analyses how “common models of social order 
become authoritative in many different social settings” (Meyer 2000:233; 
cf. Krasner 1983a; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Katzenstein 1996; Keohane 
and Levy 1996; Lafferty and Medowcroft 2000; Bauhr 2005). A similar 
focus on processes of homogeneity dominates the work by scholars in the 
constructivist turn of international relations theory (Klotz 1995; Finnemore 
1996; Price 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
When constructivists set out to study the implementation of international 
regimes—or similarly, “the diffusion of norms”—their analysis leaves little 
or no room for the targeted domestic actors’ understandings and reconstruc­
tions of these external impetus. As noted by Landolt (2004) the change that 
constructivists examine is often change in the direction of isomorphism;
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i.e. the successful adoption of common international norms by states with 
a variety of material and cultural endowments.
Focusing on domestic transformations of international regimes, I argue 
that the global spread of international regimes is compatible with sustained 
domestic heterogeneity. This can be described as a process taking place on 
two levels: At a formal level, domestic actors may adopt the policies rec­
ommended by the international regime and make adjustments in formal 
regulatory arrangements (e.g. laws and institutions). Simultaneously, but 
at the level of subjectively held understandings of the international regime, 
these actors may transform the meaning of the international regime in rela­
tion to their constructions of reality. Consequently, the implementation of 
an international regime may lead to a situation in which different groups 
of domestic actors ascribe different meanings and behavioural implications 
to the same formal set of regulatory arrangements.
Outline of the book
Chapter two provides an introduction of the international regime of 
IWRM. The presentation is organised around the three ‘pillars’ of IWRM- 
environmental sustainability, economic efficiency, and democratic partici­
patio n-that structures the subsequent empirical chapters (see table 1.1.). 
Furthermore, chapter two provides an introduction to the agenda for water 
management in Zimbabwe and how this was related to IWRM at the outset 
of the water sector reform analysed for this book.
Chapter three positions the focus on domestic transformations of interna­
tional regimes in the context of dominant theories on international relations. 
Attention is given to the three dominant theories on international relations: 
the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches. I detail my critique of this 
literature, and argue for how a theory of domestic transformations will add 
to the understanding of international cooperation.
Chapter four presents the theory of domestic transformations of interna­
tional regimes. Drawing on theories in political science, social psychology 
and sociology, I outline how transformations of international regimes take 
place in the interaction of political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic re­
interpretations of the international regime against the backdrop of domestic 
constructions of realities.
Chapters five through eight contain the empirical analysis. The analysis is 
organised around four constructions of realities around water in Zimbabwe 
and the three pillars of IWRM (see table 1.1). In chapter five, I analyse 
the transformation of IWRM in relation to political entrepreneurs acting 
out of the construction of ‘Water as Zimbabwe’. Here, the main player is 
the political elite of Zimbabwe and the role of water in their post-colonial
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project of nation building. The transformation of IWRM in relation to 
Water as Zimbabwe is marked by strategic considerations to strengthen 
the legitimacy of the nation-state and the government by placing them in 
the nexus of water distribution.
Chapter six is labelled ‘Water as Gold’ and focuses on the role of water for 
the white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. The organisation of their real­
ity centres around the collective memory of successful water management, 
and their constructions of racial social identities serves as background for 
an analysis of positions and politics during the water sector reform.
The focus of chapter seven is on the construction of water management 
as a scientific practice: ‘Water as Science’. This construction is nurtured 
by water professionals within the Zimbabwe public administration who 
see themselves as the avant-garde in modern water management in Zim­
babwe.
Chapter eight analyses the transformation of IWRM in relation to the 
construction of reality in which water is interlinked with the spiritual world: 
‘Water as a Gift from the Gods’. This construction of reality assumes the 
existence of an invisible world inhabited by actors that engage with people’s 
lives in the material world. Actors in the spiritual world are in control of 
many of the events in the material world, including the allocation of water. 
The analysis of the transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift 
from the Gods places particular focus on how this reality construct provides 
a basis for legitimate rule in many rural societies. The transformation of 
IWRM thus becomes part of the post-colonial struggle between centralised 
and local rule in Zimbabwe; i.e. between proponents ofWater as Zimbabwe 
and Water as a Gift from the Gods.





























2. IWRM AND POLITICS AROUND WATER 
IN ZIMABWE
This book does not present a case-study of the implementation of IWRM 
in Zimbabwe in the sense of setting out to account for the implementation 
per se. I use the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe to illustrate and 
elaborate the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. 
This case has been selected with the aim of arriving at a more general un­
derstanding of the transformation of international regimes.
The international community is growing dense with international regimes 
relating to a wide spectrum of policy areas, including gender equality, 
education, human rights, international trade, and small arms proliferation. 
In the environmental sector alone there are more than one hundred and 
thirty international regimes (Keohane and Levy 1996; Hasenclever, Mayer 
et al. 2000; Lafferty and Medowcroft 2000). While IWRM is only one of 
this increasing number of international regimes, it was selected for this 
study because it is built around norms and ideas that are widely shared by 
international regimes concerned with a diverse set of policy areas. There is 
a common core connecting IWRM and many other international regimes. 
This core consists of the call for environmental sustainability, economic ef­
ficiency, and democratic participation (e.g. Young 1982; Risse, Ropp et al. 
1999; Little 2001; Miles, Underdal et al. 2002; Young 2002). Due to this 
similarity, an analysis of the transformation of IWRM may provide useful 
insights for better understanding and promoting the realisation of interna­
tional regimes in policy areas beyond water resources management.
The Zimbabwe case has both potential and limitations for generating 
general knowledge. Since the turn of the millennium, the politics of land 
distribution in Zimbabwe has made world-wide news in a way that implies 
that Zimbabwe is a highly unique case. During the land reform process, the 
Government of Zimbabwe has shown striking disrespect for the country’s 
own legal traditions and systematically broken any number of internationally 
established norms on human rights and rule of law (Worby 2001; Derman 
and Helium 2004). Therefore it needs saying that the bulk of the water 
sector reform that was analysed for this study took place before the recent 
debacle in the country. My primary focus is on the water sector reform from 
the early 1990’s until 2001. Nevertheless, while the politics surrounding 
natural resources in Zimbabwe may at times be extreme, it also provides 
an unusually clear and rich example of politics in Africa. The predicament
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of the Zimbabwean government claiming sovereignty in a society with 
strong competing social forces (be they ethnic, geographic, religious, or 
economic) is shared with a large number of developing governments in 
Africa and elsewhere which adds to the general value of this study. In ad­
dition, many African states share the Zimbabwean predicament of stark 
social inequalities in the distribution of land and water, and are faced with 
increasing strains from pollution and unsustainable use of natural resources 
(Blair 2003; Chan 2003).
The remainder of this chapter provides (i) an introduction to IWRM, (ii) 
a description of the pre-reform system for water resources management in 
Zimbabwe, (iii) a description of the major components of the water sector 
reform in Zimbabwe and their relation to IWRM (see table 2.2 for a sum­
mary), and (iv) an introduction to the political context in Zimbabwe.
The three pillars of IWRM
IWRM is based on norms and ideas about environmental sustainability, 
economic efficiency, and democratic rule. Together these norms and ideas 
make up what can be referred to as the three pillars of IWRM. The three 
pillars of IWRM have been elaborated in numerous policy documents 
prepared by development institutions and they have been the subject of 
debate among scholarly experts for more than a decade.7 The immense 
interest in IWRM, as well as the ambiguity of the ideas and values mak­
ing up the three pillars, has lead to a number of nuances and variations 
in its définition. Today some presentations of IWRM emphasis the need 
for economic efficiency, while others may, for example, focus on aspects 
of the environmental pillar. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate among 
international experts about how to understand each of the respective pillars. 
There is, for example, no clear cut consensus on how to define and measure 
“environmental sustainability”, “economic efficiency”, or how to handle the 
potential trade-off between democratic rule around local water resources 
and national and regional democratic processes (Saleth and Dinar 1999; 
Global Water Partnership 2000; Arntzen 2003; Jonch-Clausen 2004).
7 The three pillars mirror the four so called Dublin Principles from 1992—widely seen as 
the main reference point in defining IWRM—with the exception that the Dublin Principles 
contain a special section stressing the rights and roles of women in water management.
8 Why did the reform take off at this time? Prior analysts present no consensus, but point 
to the significance of the droughts during the late 1980’s/1990’s, and the mounting interest 
in water resources management among international development agencies, particularly the 
World Bank. This is discussed further in chapter five.
I take as the point of departure the definition of IWRM prevailing in and 
around Zimbabwe during the early 1990’s, when the water sector reform 
started to gain momentum.8 At the time, Zimbabwean officials specialising
22
in water resources management went abroad on study-trips to take stock of 
the international state-of-the art, and related ministries and departments 
initiated a series of investigations to assess current and future supply and 
demands for water resources (Interview 16, 5B, 6B). In July 1993 the Gov­
ernment of Zimbabwe hosted a workshop at the Victoria Falls on “Water 
Resources Management in Southern Africa”. Several of my interviewees 
in Zimbabwe pointed to the Victoria Falls workshop as an eye-opener 
and a major source of inspiration for how to proceed with the reforms in 
Zimbabwe (Interview 4, 16, 5B, 6B, 19B). The workshop was sponsored 
by a large number of international development agencies, in particular 
the United Nations and Canada (Cida). The dominant actor behind the 
workshop was the World Bank, however, which saw the workshop as its 
platform to launch IWRM-based reforms through Southern Africa (World 
Bank, UNDP et al. 1993; Interview 23B, 24).
The leading role of the World Bank makes its views on IWRM a suit­
able point of reference for the empirical analysis of the transformations of 
IWRM in Zimbabwe. In 1993—the same year as the workshop at Victoria 
Falls—the Board of the World Bank endorsed a Water Resources Manage­
ment Policy Paper that outlined a policy and strategy for IWRM-based 
reforms thought the world (World Bank 1993). The policy paper explicitly 
aims to reflect the broad global consensus that emerged during the series 
of UN Conferences on sustainable development from Stockholm (1972) 
to Rio de Janeiro (1992). The Paper presents a comprehensive approach 
for IWRM and has implications for the institutional framework for water 
resources management (legal, regulatory, and formal institutions), manage­
ment instruments (regulatory and financial instruments), and the devel­
opment, maintenance, and operation of infrastructure (including water 
storage structures and conveyance, wastewater treatment, and watershed 
protection).
According to the 1993 World Bank’s policy paper, the ecosystem pillar of 
IWRM implies that water should be seen as part of integrated ecological 
and social systems.9 The policy paper stresses that the effects of any use 
of water resources—e.g. wetlands, irrigation, mining, sanitation—spills 
over on other water users all through the ecosystem. Water use has, as the 
economists put it, “externalities” that affect the potentials for other actors 
to access water. IWRM emphasise that the management of water resources 
should consider the externalities of water use not only on human actors, 
but also animals and other biological systems. The natural environment
9 While the 1993 World Bank paper does not explicitly use the pillar-metaphor, its content 
can effectively be organised around them.
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is a water user in its own right and the need for water in the ecosystem 
should be considered.10
10 The World Bank’s rationale for emphasising environmental protection is clearly anthro­
pocentric: “Protection of the environment and the resource base are essential for sustain­
able development. The protection, enhancement, and restoration of water quality and 
the abatement of water pollution will therefore be a focus of Bank-supported operations, 
particularly since providing safe drinking water is so critical to maintaining and improving 
human health” (World Bank 1993:16).
To insure an integrated management of water in écologie and social sys­
tems, the World Bank paper states that water should be managed within 
the confinements of river catchments (henceforth catchment). A catch­
ment is the geographic area connected through the natural flow of water. 
For example, if all the waters in a valley naturally flow into the same river 
or ground water reservoir, this valley constitutes a catchment. All human 
and non-human activities that effect or are affected by the waters within 
a catchment should be taken into account in the management of water. 
Water demand and pollution from all the different sector activities in a 
catchment, such as agricultural, industrial, and domestic use, should be 
integrated in the management of water. Consequently, the independent 
management of water by different water-using sectors—a so called “sector 
specific approach”—is deemed as inferior to “a sector wide approach” by 
proponents of IWRM.
The economic pillar of IWRM is based on the assessment that water is 
a scarce resource, and that greater use needs to be made of incentives and 
economic principles in improving allocation and enhancing quality. Water 
should be regarded as “an economic good” and market economic principles 
and institutions should be used to guide the aggregation and allocation of 
water. The call to regard water as an economic good is perhaps the most 
contested aspect of IWRM among policy makers at the international level, 
and the World Bank is often associated with a programmatic reliance on 
market forces as the remedy to resource management. In the 1993 policy 
paper, water as an economic good is presented as the “the core” of the Bank’s 
policy (p. 10). A closer reading of the 1993 paper also points to a more 
pragmatic position, which was the position presented to the Zimbabwean 
officials by the World Bank at the Victoria Falls Conference in 1993. As the 
World Bank presented the idea of water as an economic good to national 
policy makers from Zimbabwe, they did, for example, address issues on how 
to balance economic efficiency with direct measures to support the poor who 
cannot pay for water (World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993:15; cf. Garn 1998, 
who presented the Bank’s position at the Victoria Falls Conference). The 
economic pillar thus does not exclude the need for government involvement 
and subsidies, but it does take a sceptical view on the efficiency and equity
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of state regulation and control in favour of private sector involvement and 
economic pricing of water use and pollution rights.
Finally, the democratic pillar of IWRM states that water resources manage­
ment should involve all people with a stake in the management of water. 
Water is an essential element of life, and the IWRM democratic pillar is a 
reflection of the general democratic idea of peoples’ right to self-determi­
nation. Proponents of the democratic pillar of IWRM—be they from the 
World Bank or other institutions—see stakeholder participation not only 
as a basic right, but also as a means to achieve resource efficiency. The idea 
is that participation will create a sense of‘ownership’ which will commit ac­
tors to effective resource use. The 1993 World Bank document stresses that 
“As communities increase their participation in managing water resources, 
project selection, service delivery, and cost recovery will likely improve” (p. 
16; World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993p. 20-25; Jonch-Clausen 2004). This 
call for democratic water management is a call for inclusive institutions 
and processes engaging actors from the state, the private sector, and civil 
society. Emphasis is given to the participation of traditionally marginalised 
groups such as women and small land-holding farmers.
Table 2.1. Summary of the original formulation of the three pillars of 
IWRM at the international level at the outset of the reform in Zimbabwe 
(early 1990’s).
Pillar of 
IWRM IWRM at international level
Original meaning Behavioural implication
Catchment 
management
Water is integral to ecological 
and social systems.
Management of water resources 
should consider the externalities 
of water use for human actors 
and biological systems.
Sector-wide approach to manage­
ment systems within catchments.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Water is a scarce resource with 
an economic value.
Market economic principles and 
institutions should be used to 




Water is an essential component 
of life. Stakeholder participation 
gives people the right to self-de­
termination and creates a sense 
of ownership, thus providing 
incentives for sustainable use.
Water resources management 
should involve all people with 
a stake in the management of 
water.
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Water management in Zimbabwe
Water management in Zimbabwe has centered on the problem of who 
should access water, as well as how to handle the large variations in when 
and where water is available. The concern with who should access water 
has strong racial connotations rooted in the system of inequality set up 
during the colonial period. Todays Zimbabwe experienced different forms 
of colonial rule from the late 1800’s until Independence in 1980. This 
period was initiated under the conquests of Cecil Rhodes who provided 
the foundation for the settler state in what was soon to be called Rhodesia. 
During a period of some eighty years, the white settlers set up a system of 
rule for the benefit of their fellow whites with little or no regard for the 
majority of blacks (Herbst 1990; Moyo 1992; cf Smith 1997). Following 
a period of disagreements with the government in London on the need to 
accommodate the growing demands for comprehensive reform from the 
black majority, the white settlers in 1965 issued a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence whereby the white community in Rhodesia abandoned the 
historical tie with the UK in an attempt to maintain their privileges.
In comparison with other colonies, Zimbabwe had a fairly large com­
munity of white settlers who engaged mainly in large scale agricultural 
production and the mining sector. These sectors were in great need of secure 
access to water, and the legal and institutional system set up by the white­
minority state was designed to meet this need (Mumbengegwi 1987). For 
reasons that I shall explore in detail in chapter five and six, this system was 
kept largely intact from Independence in 1980 until the water sector reform 
under review. When the water sector reform set off in the early 1990’s, the 
white farmers, who by then made up less than a half of one percent of the 
population, controlled eighty-five percent of water used for agricultural. 
The remaining fifteen percent of agricultural water was used by black farm­
ers to sustain seventy percent of the population (Derman 1998b; van der 
Zaag and Savenije 2000).
The colonial system thus granted the white minority population control 
over Zimbabwe’s water resources. The system of control over water was 
intertwined with the ownership of land. Simply put, access to water presup­
posed ownership of land that, in turn, was largely restricted to whites. The 
only exception to the rule of connecting water and land ownership was that 
of waters stored in government owned dams and known as “public water”. 
The right to use public water depended on the date on which an application 
to extract water was filed at the Water Court. The distribution of public 
water thus followed the principle of ‘first come, first served’. Those who 
had the earliest legally recognised rights took precedence of later claimants. 
In effect, however, this meant that the overwhelming majority of public 
water was controlled by the white farmers because at the time when the legal 
court system was put in place—during the colonial period—white farmers
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were the first to file their applications. The black farmers were typically not 
informed about how the system worked, nor did they have the financial 
resources to properly file a claim with the Water Court (Derman 1998a; 
van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).
A right granted to use public water was not a private property but reg­
istered against the title of the property to which it related. However, since 
land was owned almost exclusively by whites, the racial imbalance of water 
access was maintained. In addition, the rights to use public water were 
granted in perpetuity which cemented the inequalities of who controlled 
water in Zimbabwe up until the IWRM-based water sector reform (Der­
man 1998b; Derman, Ferguson et al. 2000b).
Despite the stark social inequalities in the water sector, this was not the 
immediate trigger of the reform. The reform only gained its momentum 
after the 1991—1992 drought which cut Zimbabwe’s agricultural production 
by half and raised secure access to water to the top of the political agenda. 
The question here is thus when water is available. Although unusual in its 
proportions, the 1991—1992 drought was only one in a series of droughts 
that have plagued the region. Zimbabwe is a sub-tropical country with high 
temporal variations in rainfall. The annual cycle consists of a dry season 
interrupted by rain from November to March. In addition to this annual 
cycle, Zimbabwe is plagued by longer periods of droughts, lasting for several 
years, that usually hit the region at least once every seventh or eight year 
(Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Manzungu 2002; Jonch-Clausen 2004). Thus 
along with the need to deal with inequalities in who has access to water, 
water management in Zimbabwe is also preoccupied with overlapping cycles 
of droughts determining when there is access to water.
The third major concern for water management in Zimbabwe is where it 
rains. For example, the Eastern part of the country, with its high mountains, 
receives five times as much rain as the lowlands in the Southwest regions. 
Adding to the challenge for water management, the Southwest holds some 
of the richest soils for agricultural production. To address these spatial 
variations in access to water, governments and private investors have been 
occupied with constructing infrastructure for water management. Today 
Zimbabwe has more than eight thousand dams to balance the temporal 
variations in water access. More than thirty five thousand boreholes have 
been sunk to access ground water reserves in areas with scant rains (Nilsson 
and Hammar 1996).
The agenda of Zimbabwe’s water sector reform
The main components of Zimbabwe’s water sector reform can be related 
to the three pillars of IWRM. While a single component on the agenda 
for reform can relate to more than one of IWRM’s pillars, the structure 
in table 2.2. gives an overview of the major relationships. The overview is 
elaborated in the text below the table.
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Water is integral 






of water use for 







Envisage water as part 
of the ecosystem, e.g. 
recognise the legitimate 
demand for water by 
different species and the 
maintenance of wetlands. 
Introduce the idea of 
catchments as opposed 
to provinces being the 






Water is a scarce 





should be used 





economic incentives for 
aggregations and alloca­
tion of water, including 




Water is an essen­
tial component of 
life. Stakeholder 
participation 
gives people the 
right to self- 
determination 
and creates a 
sense of owner­
ship, thus provid­





all people with 
a stake in the 
management of 
water.
Devolve power and deci­
sion making capabilities to 
stakeholders.
Introduce institutions for 
stakeholder management 
at lowest possible level; 
catchment, sub-catch­
ment, and if needed a 
third level.
Address social inequalities 
through specific attention 
to marginalised groups.
On the part of the official administration of water, the reform inferred 
(i) the passing of two legal documents for the regulation of water (Water 
Act and ZINWA Act); (ii) the introduction of a new administrative unit 
(catchments); (iii) the setting up of a new organisational structure for the 
management of water at the basis of catchments under the supervision 
of a newly inaugurated national organisation, Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority (ZINWA).
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The new Water Act of 1998 replaces the old water legislation, which had 
been only marginally revised since its inauguration in 1976, i.e. under the 
colonial period. The Water Act of 1998 contains the legal framework for 
institutional development and water management in the country. A key 
element was to address the historical injustices and “promote equal access 
to water for all Zimbabweans” (Government of Zimbabwe 2001:12).
The Water Act of 1998 further stipulates that Zimbabwe be divided 
into catchment areas managed by catchment councils and sub-catchment 
councils. There is also provision for a third, voluntary and more local level 
of stakeholder participation. As I will explore in detail in chapter five, 
introducing catchments as an administrative level was a significant break 
with the provincial system around which most other public administration 
was organised and which constituted the back-bone of the organisation of 
Zimbabwe as a unified nation-state.
The stated intention behind these new institutions was to provide for 
democratic stakeholder influence as well as environmental sustainability 
in the management of water. According to the Water Act, the aim was to 
promote an integrated approach at catchment level that would recognise 
that “water is a finite and vulnerable resource” part of the interdependent 
ecosystem (Government of Zimbabwe 2001:12f.). The terms of reference for 
the catchment and sub-catchment councils give them many of the key func­
tions previously held by the central government, including the development 
of plans to determine future water management in the catchments, issuing 
and revision of permits and rights to use water, instruments to regulate and 
sanction water use in the catchment. In addition, steps to facilitate local, 
democratic elections of stakeholder representatives to catchment and sub­
catchment bodies are outlined (Government of Zimbabwe 1998a).
The second legal instrument introduced during the reform aimed to 
regulate the new administrative body for water management, Zimbabwe 
National Water Authority (ZINWA) (Government of Zimbabwe 1998c). 
The administration of water had previously rested with the Department of 
Water Development (DWD). With the inauguration of ZINWA, only the 
development of water policy in the form of legal instruments was to be left 
with DWD while all other functions were put under ZINWA. ZINWA was 
to guarantee increasing levels of market based management and take overall 
responsibility for water affairs throughout the country. It was to recognize 
“the economic value of water by ensuring cost-recovery through appropri­
ate pricing structures and more efficient water use methods.” (Chikozho 
2002:9; Government of Zimbabwe 2001:12f).
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The political context in Zimbabwe
As IWRM was introduced as the basis for water resources management 
in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean government was engaged in a process of 
establishing itself as a viable and legitimate actor in society, and indeed, to 
manifest the nation-state of Zimbabwe as a relevant political unit. Both the 
government and its post-colonial project of nation-building were contested 
by influential political actors proposing alternative political systems of rule. 
IWRM was, in other words, introduced into a weak-state structure that is 
well known in many parts of Africa (Herbst 1990; Clapham 1996).
Three main sources can be identified behind the contestation of the Zim­
babwean government and its political project of establishing Zimbabwe as 
unified nation state.11 One source of fragility in the construction of this 
nation-state derived from the intricate dynamic of ethnic divisions in the 
country. Shona and Ndebele make up the two biggest ethnic constructs in 
Zimbabwe. About eighty percent of the population are Shona, including 
President Robert Mugabe and much of his power elite. The more mar­
ginalised Ndebele make up about fifteen percent of the population, while 
the remaining five percent is divided on a number of smaller groups. The 
Shona and Ndebele hold quite separate historical origins with the Shona 
descending from the Bantu peoples in Central Africa. The Ndebele travelled 
north into what is presently Zimbabwe only some hundred and fifty or two 
hundred years ago and many Ndebele still nurture their ties to relatives in 
what today is South Africa (Douglas 1984; Herbst 1990).
11 The animosity with the international regime in South Africa constituted an additional— 
forth—source of fragility for Zimbabwe during the first decade after Independence. Political 
scientist Jonathan Moyo (1992) argues that “the Government headed by Robert Mugabe, 
constantly feared real and imagined South African destabilisation (p.314). Since the water 
sector reform in Zimbabwe took off after the end of apartheid in South Africa, the threat 
from South Africa did not have any direct effect on the implementation of IWRM, hence 
my lack of elaboration on the issue.
Despite increasing social interaction and urbanisation, the Shona and 
Ndebele maintain a high level of geographic separation with the Shona 
dominating the central, western and eastern part of the country, while the 
Ndebele populate the south, and parts of the north. Moreover, each group 
respectively dominates what was for a long time Zimbabwe’s two main 
political parties. ZANU-PF was mobilised around the Shona, while ZAPU 
was based on Ndebele support (Sylvester 1991; Munro 1998).
Zimbabwe has not experienced a fully fledged movement for ethnically 
based federalism, or secession. Nevertheless, the question of ethnic divi­
sions has continuously contributed to the fragility of the nation building
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project.12 As political analyst Lloyd M. Sachikonye puts it, “The post­
independent government of Zimbabwe views the inculcation of national 
consciousness and the dilution of ethnic or regional particularism as a major 
challenge to its project of nation-building” (Sachikonye 1996:136).
12 Indicating how real and severe the threat of ethnic and regional division was to the govern­
ment, President Mugabe engaged special forces, the so-called Fifth Brigade, in a civil war to 
manifest control in the Matabele Provinces during the early 1980’s. The death-toll of this 
attempt to maintain power in Harare has not yet been established due to the government’s 
obstruction of independent investigations.
The second source of fragility for Zimbabwe was encapsulated in the 
racial divide of whites and blacks in Zimbabwe. Reflecting the racial 
segregation during the colonial period, Zimbabwe at independence was 
marked by striking economic inequalities along racial lines. Sixty percent 
of the income was earned by four percent of the population of whom the 
majority was white; agricultural land was divided equally between the black 
and the white farmers while these groups encompassed 800 000 and 4 000 
families respectively. In particular, while the majority of the population 
lacked access to basic water facilities, the white community controlled great 
water resources (estimated to about half of water reserves in dams) used for 
irrigation of crops for export markets (Moyo S. 1993; Moyo J. 1995; van 
der Zaag and Savenije 2000).
The new government of Zimbabwe thus found itself in the peculiar 
situation of being, at best, representatives of the second most powerful 
group in Zimbabwe. The history of the post-independent debacles in most 
neighboring countries suggested that the prospects for the future thrived 
on the ability to balance the expectations of the blacks and the animosity 
of the few, but very powerful whites. As much as the new government was 
dependent on the powers of the white community, its own political project 
was constantly challenged by the same community (Smith 1997; Stiff 
2000; cf. chapter six below). As shown by political scientist Jeffrey Herbst 
(1990) this challenge to the governments’ agenda led the government to 
initiate an implicit agreement with the former white rulers. The govern­
ment gave the white population permission to remain in the country on 
condition that they stayed out of the political sphere and did not challenge 
the agenda of the new black political elite. Herbst shows that this implicit 
agreement was—in the main—honoured during much of the first decade 
after Independence. As I show in chapter six, by the time that IWRM was 
introduced in Zimbabwe during the late 1990’s the amicable agreement 
no longer regulated the relations between the former white rulers and the 
incumbent black government. On the contrary there were increasing hos­
tilities between the groups including, interestingly enough, attempts by the 
strongest organisation of whites in Zimbabwe (Commercial Farmers Union,
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CFU) to use IWRM as a means to further its own political agenda against 
the governments’ post-colonial agenda of nation building.
The third and perhaps most potent threat to the government’s post-colo­
nial project of nation building came from Zimbabwe’s vibrant civil society 
made up of labour unions, media, churches, local community organisations 
and so on. Political scientist Munro shows how the Zimbabwean govern­
ment tried to gain control over civil society, which was frequently perceived 
by the government as a real danger to its own viability as a political actor 
(Munro 1998; Raftopoulos 2000). Reviewing the history of state-society 
relations in Zimbabwe during a public meeting in Göteborg, Sweden, the 
Zimbabwean ambassador to Sweden, Mrs Mubi stated that “The political 
authority of the government was compromised by a strong civil society”.13 
Indicating the severity of this threat at the introduction of IWRM, critical 
actors in the government even questioned if the post-colonial government 
under Robert Mugabe was better grounded in civil society than the pre­
Independence government under Ian Smith (Munro 1998:268). In the 
middle of the water sector reform in 1997, many representatives of civil 
society formed the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) with the 
objective of engaging civil society in a nation-wide discussion about the 
role of the government and the need for a new constitution. In the eyes 
of the government, this mounted to a direct attack on the post-colonial 
project of nation building. Commenting on the NCA initiative, President 
Mugabe argued that it was “bent on ruining the national unity and loyalty 
of our people and their institutions” (cited in Raftopoulos 2000:39). In 
other words, at the time of the water sector reform, the political establish­
ment of the state sensed a distinct threat towards their project of nation 
building in Zimbabwe.
13 Official presentation by the Ambassador, Göteborg 13 Nov, 2004.
The three factors outlined above made the government’s agenda of nation­
building after Independence very fragile. The government found itself in a 
context of political struggle where the national project per se was at stake. 
As I will show in chapters five through eight, the fragility of nation build­
ing in Zimbabwe and the role of the state is pivotal to understanding the 
transformation of IWRM by the government and other actors in society. 
Control of the management of water was one of the government’s most 
important strategic resources for securing its relevance as a political actor. As 
IWRM was introduced and mandated specific requirements for the legiti­
mate distribution of water resources in Zimbabwe, political entrepreneurs 
in the government perceived this as a yet another source of fragility to their 
construction of Zimbabwe as a political platform. To them, IWRM and 
its prescriptions for water management was potentially a threat not only 
to the government’s control over water, but to the political project of the
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nation. At the same time, IWRM provided opportunities for other actors 
in society who shared the government’s view of water as a source of power 
and legitimacy, but differed with the government concerning the construc­
tion of reality and agendas for legitimate rule. These competing views and 
interests set the stage for the transformation of IWRM in Zimbabwe which 
I present in chapter five to eight.
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3. EXISTING THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE
In chapter one I argued for the need to analyse the implementation of inter­
national regimes as a process of transformation in which the international 
regimes becomes part of domestic politics and consequently subjected to 
strategic reinterpretations reflecting domestic contexts. My analytic point 
of departure is that the ability of an international regime to influence 
domestic patterns of behaviour is contingent on the understanding of the 
international regime held by actors in the targeted domestic policy area.
In this chapter, I will situate the theory on domestic transformations of 
international regimes within the context of existing theories on interna­
tional relations. Attention will be given to the three bodies of work—realist, 
liberalist, and constructivist—that together represent the main theoretical 
perspectives on domestic implementation of international regimes. The 
focus on domestic transformations of international regimes presented in 
this book is developed to complement these existing theories by elucidating 
how targeted domestic actors reinterpret an international regime so that it 
becomes part of their domestic politics and practices.
Before I proceed, two definitional points are in order. Both are intended 
to distinguish the concept of a “transformed international regime” from 
similar concepts in the theoretical literature of international regime im­
plementation. First, what distinguishes a “transformed” international 
regime from the more established concepts of “changed” and “localised” 
international regimes? Second, how does the study of the implementation 




To distinguish the concept of “transformed” international regime from the 
established concept of “changed” international regime we need to start with 
a definition of “international regime”. As Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) 
points out, “international regime” is a “contestable concept” for students 
of international relations and despite a vast literature, there is no consen­
sual definition (p. 764). However, Stephen Krasner’s (1983b) definition 
of international regimes is a frequently cited point of departure and is
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instrumental as a baseline for my definition of “transformed” international 
regime. Krasner defines international regimes as “principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge 
in a given issue area” (p. 1). He goes on to specify the four components 
that make up an international regime: “Principles are beliefs of facts, causa­
tion, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for 
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making 
and implementing collective choice.” (Krasner 1983b:2).
While Krasner’s meticulous hierarchy of international regime components 
seems analytically attractive, critics have pointed out that the components 
are neither analytically distinct nor easily operationalised. Concerning the 
distinctiveness of the components, Haggard and Simmons (1987) point 
out that Krasner’s specification of “principles” (in which Krasner includes 
“rectitude”) is not clearly separated from “norms”. “Norms”, in turn, shade 
into Krasner’s specification of “rules” (“specific prescriptions or proscriptions 
for action”). The problems multiply when one tries to operationalize the 
principles for empirical analysis. How do we empirically separate a principle 
from a norm? Similarly, how do we know that what we see is a “norm” and 
not a “rule”? (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Haggard and Simmons 1987; 
Roman 1998, ch 4).
Despite this criticism, I find Krasner’s definition useful in as much as 
it helps us to think of international regimes as composed of an ideational 
core (principles and norms) with certain behavioural practices (rules and 
decision-making procedures). A distinction between an ideational core and 
its behavioural practices is instrumental for defining a “transformed” inter­
national regime. The aim of this concept is to focus on the possibility that 
when an international regime spreads from one social context to the next 
it can be given a different social meaning by the actors in the new context. 
For the purposes of my analysis, an international regime is transformed 
when a substantial part of the ideational core of the international regime has 
been reinterpreted in relation to a construction of reality that differs from 
the construction of reality in which the international regime was originally 
developed. An international regime is not transformed when changes occurs 
only in its behavioural practices. Changes in the behavioural practices in the 
targeted policy area can be based on reasons that do not relate to changes 
in the ideational core of the policy area (e.g. technical or practical adjust­
ments). As I will soon elaborate further, a change in behavioural practices 
can, however, be an indication of a transformation of the ideational core. 
The concept “transformed” international regime is intended for the analysis 
of situations in which the same international regime has different social 
meanings depending on the reality construct of the individuals who are 
involved with it. (See below for a discussion on why we should consider
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something as being the same international regime even if it has different 
meanings to different people).14
14 The concept of a transformed international regime advanced here should not be confused with 
the meaning ascribed to it by Young (1982). He use the concept of “transformation” to denote 
changes in an international regime that pertain to internal contradictions in the international 
regime, changes in the underlying structure of power in the international system, or from 
exogenous factors such as technological innovations or increases in demand on the good that 
the international regime is concerned with. Young’s understanding of “transformation” is thus 
not related to the implementation of international regimes between actors endorsing different 
reality constructs. Likewise, the use of the concept here is clearly distinguished from Krasner 
(1981) who sees “transformations” of international regimes as changes in the structure of the 
international system and in particular the distribution of rights and obligations between the 
Third World and the rest of the world within international organisations such as the UN.
Krasner’s idea of “change” in an international regime is similar to the 
concept of “transformation” in as much as he argues that the changes oc­
cur at the level of the ideational core (principles and norms) as opposed 
to the behavioural practices related to the international regime (Krasner 
1983b). However, for Krasner, international regime change is a process in 
which “norms and principles are abandoned” (1983b:4, my emphasis). In 
contrast, my concept of international regime transformation focuses on how 
the ideational core is given new meanings as it is taken up by new actors 
during the process of implementation in domestic contexts. A transformed 
international regime is an amalgamation of the original international regime 
and domestically held constructions of reality. Borrowing an expression 
from the sociologist Richard Rorty, an international regime is transformed 
by “reweaving the web of beliefs” that make up the international regime 
(Rorty cited in Czarniawska and Joerges 1996:28).
A concept neighbouring the idea of a transformed international regime 
is that of a “localized” international regime. This concept was recently 
suggested by Arnitov Acharya (2004) as a tool to examine domestic imple­
mentations of international regimes. Acharya’s point of departure is similar 
to mine in as much as he develops this concept as a critique of existing con­
structivist literature that works under the assumption that the understanding 
of the international regime is constant throughout the implementation to 
domestic levels. This is, as Acharya puts it, an overtly “static” view that fails 
to account for the strategic role of targeted domestic actors as agenda-setting 
agents who reinterpret the international regime. Acharya defines a localized 
international regime as the result of an “active construction (...) of foreign 
ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant 
congruence with local believes and practices” (p. 245).
While I am sympathetic with Acharya’s ambition to develop a more dy­
namic analysis of domestic implementation of international regimes, my 
concept of transformed international regimes differs form the idea of lo-
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calization in one important respect. Acharya’s idea of localized international 
regime carries with it an idea of the direction of change in the interface with 
domestic contexts. As cited above, Acharya sees localization as a process 
“which results in the former developing significant congruence with local 
believes and practices”. That is to say, the international regime changes in 
the direction of domestic contexts which, in turn, remain constant. By 
this definition, Acharya repeats the fallacy of the constructivists that he 
sets out to criticise: While existing constructivists regard the international 
regime (norm) as constant and expect domestic actors to adjust in its di­
rection, Acharya focuses on changes in the international regime under the 
assumption that the domestic context is constant. In contrast to Acharya’s 
idea of localization, the concept of “transformation” does not pre-empt the 
possibility that the implementation is a process in which both the inter­
national regime and domestic contexts are subject to change. Rather than 
determining the direction of change at the conceptual level, this should be 
an empirical question.
As noted above, a change in the behavioural pattern in the policy area tar­
geted by the international regime is not sufficient to constitute international 
regime transformation. The change must pertain to the ideational core of 
the international regime. However, at an empirical level, the transformation 
of an international regime can be manifested in behavioural patterns, as well 
as in institutional and judicial arrangements associated with the targeted 
policy area. In operational terms this means that to trace international re­
gime transformations, we need to look beyond changes in the behavioural 
patterns by the targeted domestic actors. We must look at these actors’ 
motivations and meanings associated with behavioural changes provoked 
by the international regime, as well as the domestic actors’ justifications of 
institutional and judicial arrangements within the targeted policy area. To 
count as indications of a transformation of the international regime, the 
targeted domestic actors’ behavioural practices must derive from transfor­
mations in the ideational core of the international regime.
If the ideational core of an international regime is transformed, is it 
correct to say that it is still the same international regime as was origi­
nally developed? If the answer to this question is “no”, we should not talk 
about the transformation of an international regime but perhaps about its 
abandonment or of the development of a new local regime. To answer this 
question in the affirmative, I argue that there must be a common ideational 
core that unites, on the one hand, the original international regime, and, 
on the other hand, the transformed international regime. Independent of 
individual opinions and positions, the ideational core provides a common 
point of reference in interactions between advocates of the original and 
transformed international regime respectively. To clarify, let me give an 
example. IWRM originally developed the call for stakeholder participation
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along democratic ideals (see chapter two). As I will show in the empirical 
chapters, the call for stakeholder participation did not go down well with 
different groups of actors engaged with water in Zimbabwe. Parts of the 
political elite saw control over water management as a vital step in the 
process of post-colonial nation building. Acting out of this construction 
of water (which I have labelled ‘Water as Zimbabwe’) part of the political 
elite saw IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation as a threat to their po­
litical project of nation building and indeed to their own raison d’etre as a 
national political leadership (see chapter five). By contrast, another group 
in Zimbabwe endorsed a construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods’ 
(see chapter eight). For them, the call for stakeholders to be engaged in 
water management was a revolt against the divine order where anointed 
actors—the rain-makers—had exclusive right to issues of water manage­
ment. Based on these different views of who should be engaged in the 
management of water, political entrepreneurs representing IWRM, Water 
as Zimbabwe, and Water as a Gift from the Gods negotiated new mean­
ings of the idea of stakeholder participation. These new meanings differed 
substantially from the IWRM’s original connection between stakeholder 
participation and democratic ideals. Nevertheless, the new meanings all 
relate to a common ideational core of democratic stakeholder participa­
tion in the sense of individuals’ right to self determination. Despite the 
fact that the targeted domestic groups did not support or internalise this 
ideal, they had a strong relation to it and an intellectual understanding of 
IWRM’s call for democratic stakeholder participation. They all developed 
their positions in relation to, rather than as substitute for, IWRM’s call for 
stakeholder participation.
“International regimes” as opposed to “norms”
I turn now distinguishing my focus on the implementation of “international 
regimes” in relation to the study of implementation of “norms”. Constructi­
vist scholars, some of whom I will review in more detail later in this chapter, 
have recently invigorated the latter area of study. Why not follow suit rather 
than use the concept of international regimes? My first reason is empirical. 
Many of the international initiatives developed to facilitate cooperation at 
domestic levels are simply more aptly described as international regimes than 
norms. Recall Stephen Krasner’s classic definition of an international regime 
as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures” (1983b: 1). 
This comprehensive definition can be used to describe international initia­
tives to address, for example, air pollution, small arms proliferation, and 
the global water crisis, better than the notion of norms. Such international 
initiatives are frequently based on a strong commitment to norms such 
as sustainable development and democracy. Nevertheless, international 
initiatives to obtain domestic policy change typically comprise more than
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norms. "When developed into initiatives to address concrete policy problems 
in domestic contexts, the normative commitments of international initia­
tives are associated with concrete instructions regarding the favoured rules 
and decision-making procedures. Consequently, the more comprehensive 
concept of “international regime” as opposed to norms is more apt to 
capture the implementation of international initiatives for cooperation 
between actors in specific domestic policy areas.
The second reason for using the concept of international regimes as op­
posed to norms is analytical. The constructivist scholars who have invigor­
ated the agenda of norms studies have been occupied with investigations 
into how norms that have supposedly universal legitimacy are adopted in 
domestic contexts (Acharya 2004:242). Consequently, constructivists have 
focused on cases such as implementation of human rights (Risse, Ropp 
et al. 1999), bans on chemical weapons (Price 1997), struggles against 
racism (Klotz 1995) and so on. Whereas the normative foundation of 
each one of these examples is easy to embrace, it is analytically unsatisfy­
ing to systematically select empirical cases with a strong normative agenda 
suggesting that the implementation process should entail a development 
from local practices and standards towards the international norms. Such a 
selection bias runs the risk of downplaying the significance of local know­
ledge and norms structures. If we only concern ourselves with empirical 
cases in which we can all agree that it would be better for everybody if the 
domestic practices were abandoned, why should we develop a theoretical 
framework to understand how the domestic practices influence domestic 
actors’ understandings of the norm? If we limit our area of study to such 
universal norms we should, it can be argued, focus on how we can get the 
domestic actors to abandon their norms and adopt new ones. In fact, many 
of the constructivist researchers of norm implementation present analyses in 
which the targeted domestic actors are not given any agenda-setting power 
of their own but are rather portrayed as passive recipients of internationally 
favoured norms. In my attempt to move beyond such biases, I have opted 
to use the concept of “international regime”.
Dominant theories on Domestic Implementation 
of International regimes
The lion’s share of the academic literature on international regimes can be 
related to realist, liberal, and constructivist theories.15 As I argue in this 
section, my objections to these theories centre around three points. First,
15 The academic field of international relations can be divided into quite a large number of 
theories and sub-theories, each with its own label. Despite the usefulness of such distinctions, 
the broad categories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism serve the purpose of position­
ing the theory of domestic transformations of international relations within the field.
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Contemporary theories of how international regimes are implemented 
in domestic contexts typically do not include an analysis of the targeted 
domestic actors’ understandings of the international regime. The targeted 
domestic actors’ understandings of the international regime are exogenous 
to the analysis and no account is made of how they will have an input into 
the meaning of the international regime. By contrast, contemporary theories 
work under the assumption that the understanding of the international 
regime remains fixed throughout the implementation process.
Second, contemporary theories of international regime implementation 
regard the targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of external impetus 
for change. They provide scant insights into how targeted domestic actors 
strategically reconstitute the international regime in relation to domestic 
constructions of realities. The targeted domestic actors are subjected to 
change, but not subjects of change.
Third, existing theories downplay the role of power at the level of the 
targeted domestic actors. This criticism is geared primarily towards con­
structivist theories that tend to regard the implementation of international 
regimes (or norms) as a knowledge-based process with domestic actors as 
“willing students”, or as a process of socialisation around universal norms 
in which the targeted domestic actors are powerless recipients without an 
agenda-setting capacity in their own right. By contrast, realists, and to 
some extent liberalism, put great emphasis on power, but place the power 
in the hands of international and national states rather than in the hands 
of the different domestic actors whose daily practices are targeted by the 
international regime.
Realist and liberal theories on implementation of 
international regimes
Below, I elaborate my critique of realist and liberal perspective on domestic 
implementation of international regimes. The section is organised around 
three explanations why these theories typically do not include an analysis 
of targeted domestic actors’ understandings of international regimes, and 
why the targeted domestic actors are conceptualised as passive and powerless 
recipients of change rather than empowered agenda-setting actors.
The construction of the international system and the motivations for action 
Realists assume that the pursuit of relative power is the prime explanation 
of state action. States may abide by international regimes but this is not 
explained by the content or structure of the international regime. The 
reason for compliance is that the international regime is favoured by a 
strong—“hegemonic”—power in the international system. From a realist 
perspective, the pursuit of relative power under hegemonic pressure is the 
likely explanations for states’ compliance, not the international regime per
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se (Strange 1983).16 17Based on this view, realists develop their analyses of 
the implementation of international regimes against the backdrop of the 
prevailing power distributions in the international system (Krasner 1981; 
Krasner 1983b; Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 1997:ch.4).
16 For a realist defence against Strange’s critique, see Krasner (1983b)
17 In an attempt to expand on the realist tradition, Puchala and Hopkins (1983) aim to describe 
how the ideational context and content of the international regimes—not just the distribution 
of power—influence its dissemination. Their ambition thus resembles that behind the theory 
of domestic transformations of international regimes. Drawing on colonialism as an example, 
they show how the normative presumption of the superiority of “western values” and institutions 
was at the core of the spread of colonial rule throughout the world. “It was this overriding sense 
of legitimacy, the convictions that imperialism and colonialism were right... that contributed 
to the durability of the system.” (p.70). Whereas Puchala and Hopkins analysis includes an ac­
count of the power of ideational factors, it is telling that their analysis places this power in the 
hands of the hegemonic powers and not in the hands of the domestic actors subjected to the 
international regime. Portraying the subjects of colonialism as passive recipients, Puchala and 
Hopkin thus perpetuate the realist tradition identified above. Illustrating this lack of attention 
to the domestic subjects of colonialism, the analysis suggests that the system of colonial rule 
eroded because the material power of the hegemonic powers in Europe—the “international 
regime managers”—eroded. There was also growing concern over anti-colonial movements in 
Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union, calling into question the moral legitimacy of 
colonialism. Scant account, however, is made of the domestic actors’ reactions to the international 
regime and of their political resistance and social mobilisation for independence; cf. Davidson 
(1992); Pakenham (1993).
Little (2001) exemplifies the realist view of processes by which Third 
World states are forced to open up to “unfair competition” and “malign” 
international regimes developed in the West (p. 310). He point out that 
Third World states adhere to the western hegemony’s call for international 
regime compliance because they operate in a situation in which failing to 
comply will put them in an even less advantageous position than before. If 
we borrow vocabulary from game theory, which is much favoured in this 
literature, realists liken international regime implementation to a “zero-sum 
game”. In such a game, the process of international regime implementation
15 a power-struggle in which the hegemony will use its power to further 
advance its position by forcing weaker states to adopt international regimes. 
The Third World states subjected to coercion have only two alternatives: 
compliance or non-compliance. The former choice implies that they un­
derwrite international regimes against their true interests, while the latter 
directly leads to increased marginalisation in the global system.
Based on this view of the role of hegemonic power in the implementation 
of international regimes, realists do not see states’ compliance as deriva­
tive of targeted domestic actors’ understandings of the international regime 
but as a function of the state’s relative power position in the international 
system. Consequently, the realist analytic framework does not call on an 
analysis of domestic actors’ transformed understandings of the international 
17regime.
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I turn now to the liberal tradition of international relations (in particular 
neo-liberal institutionalism). The fundamental difference between liberal 
and realist theories is that liberals base their analysis on an assumption that 
states seek absolute (economic) gains and hold the view that increased global 
interdependence calls for international collective action. In this context, 
international regimes are seen as mutually beneficial institutions adopted 
by actors pursuing their individual interests. The realist focus on the imple­
mentation of international regimes as an effect of hegemonic power in the 
international system is thus in contrast to the liberal view of international 
regime adherence as the result of voluntary agreements (Keohane 1984; 
Keohane 1986; Young 1989a; Young 1989b; Young 1997; Roman 1998).
Above I likened the realist view of international regime implementation 
to a zero-sum game in which the outcome of the game is determined by the 
strongest player in the game: the hegemon. Using another metaphor from 
game theory, liberalists tend to conceptualise the process of international 
regime implementation as a “plus-sum game”. In this game everyone stands 
to win by adhering to the international regime. Analysing international 
regime implementation as a process of voluntary agreements for mutual 
benefits, liberalists see the degree of implementation as contingent on the 
construction of the international regime. If the international regime offers 
effective solutions to problems of collective action, the chances for domestic 
implementation are good. However, liberals see no reason to engage in an 
analysis of the domestic actors’ subjective interpretations of international 
regimes. As political scientist Robert Keohane has put it: “the norms and 
rules of international regimes can exert an effect on behaviour even if they 
do not embody common ideas but are used by self-interested states and cor­
porations engaged in a process of mutual adjustment.” (Keohane 1984:64). 
The explanation to the implementation of international regimes is thus to be 
found in how the international regime appeals to self-interested actors who 
act on the basis of pre-constituted preferences, not in the degree to which 
the international regime “embodies the actors’ common ideas”. Together 
with the optimistic assumption of international regime implementation 
as a process beneficial to all engaged actors, liberalists have shown scant 
interest in the domestic recipients’ understandings of the implemented 
international regimes.18
18 Little (2001) argues that as liberalists fail to acknowledge the role of hegemonic power, 
they give their implicit support to the hegemony’s abuse of weak states. The liberalists turn a 
blind eye to the asymmetric power relations under which international regime implementa­
tion typically takes place, cf. Krasner (1981); Clapham (1996).
The constructed demarcation of knowledge production in academia
The second explanation for why realists and liberalists shy away from an 
analysis of targeted domestic actors’ understandings of international regimes
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and domestic politics surrounding the implementation process pertains to 
the academic distinction between the study of international and national 
politics. There is, as political scientist Bruce Russett recently argued, an 
artificial boundary between students of domestic and international politics 
respectively (Russet 2003:11). By tradition, students of each respective field 
have worked within separate university institutions, read and written dif­
ferent literatures, and travelled to separate conferences and workshops.
Because domestic and international politics are traditionally treated as 
separate fields of study, the process by which international regimes become 
domestic has largely been left out of theories of international relations de­
spite the fact that international regimes aim to obtain behavioural change 
at domestic levels (Simmons 1998; cf. e.g. Putnam 1988; Held, McGrew 
et al. 1999). The academic distinction between the study of domestic and 
international politics has produced international political theories where the 
domestic level is largely left out of the analysis. The domestic level is ‘black 
boxed’ and domestic actors are conceptualised simply as passive recipients 
of international regimes. As we have seen above, the realist literature regards 
states subjected to hegemonic pressure as victims of the power structures 
constituted by the international system. By contrast, liberalists analyse 
international regime compliance as an incremental process towards solv­
ing the underlying problems of collective action. However, as in the realist 
tradition, domestic actors are treated as passive recipients of international 
regimes and the process of domestic interest formation is kept exogenous 
to the analysis. This separation of the study of domestic and international 
politics is rationalised by leading theorists in the field who tend to con­
ceptualise the domestic and international as quite distinct political fields. 
Oran Young, a prominent scholar on international regimes recently argued 
that “membership [in international regimes] will not have significant effects 
on the overall identity or the basic goals of states whose existence not only 
predates the formation of specific international regimes but also rests on a 
variety of considerations that extend well beyond the purview of interna­
tional regimes dealing with specific problems” (Young 2001:12). Working 
under such an assumption, students of international regimes can safely 
maintain the academic demarcation between international and national 
politics and stay away from an analysis of domestic understandings of the 
implementation of international regimes.
The confinements of rational choice theory
The third reason why realists and liberalists typically do not include an analy­
sis of how domestic actors come to understand implemented international 
regimes derives from the rational choice models used by these traditions. 
Rational choice models presume that actors are driven by self-interest and
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that the world of these actors are objectively defined. The processes of forma­
tion of interests and perceptions are exogenous to rationalistic models. As 
constructivist critics have rightly pointed out, realists and liberalists confine 
their analysis to rationalistic models in which “structural constraints such as 
players, rules of the game and payoffs are assumed” (Klotz 1995:19 see also 
Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Keck and Sikkink 
1998; Checkel 2001). The great theoretical rigor and coherence that is the 
hallmark of rational choice theory comes at the price of excluding a notion 
of the formation of actors, their interests, and understandings of reality. 
This limitation is not confined to the use of rational choice in international 
politics theory. Robert Bates (1998), recognised for his use of rational choice 
models in comparative African politics, puts it like this (with reference to 
game theory which is much used by rational choice theorists):
Game theorists often fail to acknowledge that their approach 
requires a complete political anthropology. It requires detailed 
knowledge of the values of the individuals, of the expectations 
that individuals have of each others reactions, and of the ways 
in which these expectations have been shaped by history, 
(p. 244).
Working within the confinements of rational choice theory thus implies 
that students of international relations have deprived themselves of a con­
ceptual framework for the analysis of how domestic actors re-construct and 
internalise implemented international regimes.19 Consequently, neither 
realists nor liberalists analyse the implementation of international regimes 
as a process of domestic transformation.
19 For an analysis of how the confines of rationalistic models impede the understanding of 
states’ interest formation in state-to-state relations at the international level, see Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998).
20 Constructivists typically write about norms rather than international regimes. For a discus­
sion of the implications thereof, see the definitions at the beginning of this chapter.
Constructivist theories on the implementation of 
international regimes
Constructivism has developed over the last decade or so and can be seen as 
an explicit critique against some of the deficiencies of realism and liberal­
ism reviewed above (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Smith 2001).20 Two 
defining traits of constructivism raise hopes that constructivists would suc­
cessfully overcome some of the shortcomings in realist and liberal analysis 
on the implementation of international regimes. First, constructivists have 
explicitly set out to transcend the academic division of labour traditionally 
separating studies of domestic and international politics (Finnemore 1996;
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Checkei 1997b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999; 
Börzel and Risse 2000; Acharya 2004). As I have argued in the section 
above, integrating studies of international and national politics is central 
for an analysis of domestic transformations of international regime. Only 
by building theories that incorporate international and national politics in 
the same analysis can we begin to address questions raised as international 
regimes interface with domestic polities.
Second, constructivists explicitly set out to theorise processes whereby 
reality perceptions are formed. Constructivists have done this by break­
ing with some of the fundamental assumptions of rational choice theory 
dominating realist and liberal thinking. Rational choice theorists assume 
that actors have fixed preferences, allowing them to make rational choices 
in world that is objectively defined. By contrast, constructivists ask ques­
tions about why actors have certain values and perceptions of the world, 
and indeed set out to address the question of identity formation in which 
actors are constituted as acting subjects in the first place (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie 1986; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). 
With my focus on domestic transformations of international regimes, this 
is indeed a promising ambition. Asking questions, as I do, about how do­
mestic actors’ understand international regimes, and how domestic actors 
and contexts are affected by these international regimes, the constructivist 
ambition to theorise processes of reality formation looks like a fruitful 
point of departure.
The constructivist literature identifies two main processes presumed to 
capture the implementation of international regimes: processes of learning 
and processes of socialisation.
“Learning”from international regimes
The constructivist literature emphasising learning as the causal process driv­
ing the implementation of international regimes builds on the assumption 
that when national decision makers are faced with technically complex 
decisions, they will turn to experts for advice. As these experts typically 
form part of international, knowledge-based networks—“epistemic com­
munities”—complex decision making provides a venue for internationally 
accepted knowledge to become the foundation for policy change at the 
domestic level. Peter Haas (1992), leading author on the role of epistemic 
communities, puts it like this: “Epistemic communities are channels through 
which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from 
country to country” (p. 27).21
21 Peter Haas is sometimes seen as belonging to the neo-liberal institutional school of in­
ternational relations, but his work has been a source of inspiration for many writers in the 
constructivist camp.
46
An epistemic community can consist of individuals with different pro­
fessional and educational backgrounds, but the common denominator 
is “their shared belief or faith in the verity and applicability of particular 
forms of knowledge or specific truths.” (Garcia 2002:20; Finnemore 1996; 
Selin 2000; Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002). The shared belief provides 
the foundation for a common definition of the problem at hand and the 
preferred policy response. Through the interaction between the epistemic 
community and national policy makers, these views become the basis of a 
new national policy.
The interaction between the epistemic community and the national 
policy makers is a learning process in which the latter adopt the knowledge 
of the former. International regimes thus come to play a part in domestic 
policymaking through a process in which members of the epistemic com­
munity ‘teach’ the content of the international regime to decision makers 
at the national level (Finnemore 1996). The national decision makers, in 
turn, recognise the relevance and validity of the international regimes and 
adjust their behaviour accordingly. Consider the description of this learn­
ing process by Lidskog and Sundqvist who both are recognised for their 
contribution to theories of epistemic communities. They argue that the 
learning process is a process in which “consensual knowledge moulds the 
interests of the [recipient] actors”. Accordingly, “consensual knowledge can 
be applied directly in the policy process” without first having to be “negoti­
ated by political parties in order to reach needed compromises” (Lidskog 
and Sundqvist 2002:81, 82).
This view can be illustrated by Martha Finnemore’s account of how a 
number of Third World countries during the 1970’s changed their eco­
nomic policies from a focus on macro-economic industrialisation to include 
poverty alleviation programs (Finnemore 1996: ch. 4). Finnemore asserts 
that this policy change should be attributed to the work of the epistemic 
community in the World Bank, and in particular to its president Robert 
McNamara. My concern with Finnemore’s work is with her view on the 
adaptation of the World Bank’s anti-poverty international regime by do­
mestic actors. She states that the Third World countries subjected to the 
new World Bank policy “subsequently endorsed ... the new policy ... in 
international forums, and quickly adopted it in their own development 
plans and policies. They accepted and accommodated the World Bank’s 
antipoverty project” (p. 118). Finnemore bases this assertion on references 
to one official statement and extracts from loan applications to the Wold 
Bank coming from two countries (Indonesia and Nigeria). Neither domestic 
actors’ understandings of the World Bank’s policy, nor the domestic political 
struggle to change this policy to accommodate domestic interests, ideals, 
and norms are included in Finnemore’s analysis.
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My objection with the attempt by constructivists to conceptualise the 
implementation of international regime at domestic levels as a process 
of learning is that it fails to account for the political and social interac­
tion involved. The implementation of international regimes is seen as an 
intellectual process, not as a political or social process. On a critical note, 
Jeffrey Checkel (2001) has described the learning process as a process in 
which “domestic agents observe, something goes on between the earlobes, 
and their values subsequently change” (p. 562).22 This description of the 
implementation as an intellectual process between the epistemic community 
and recipients at the domestic level is detached from every conception of the 
political manoeuvring and power struggles at the domestic levels that one 
would expect to be provoked by a community of experts soliciting a new 
set of perceptions and policies on how to manage a targeted policy area.
22 Jeffrey Checkel, who is a vocal and quite accurate critic of much constructivist theory, 
does not himself solve the analytic problem of changes in domestic actors’ understanding 
of international norms. He avoids it. Checkel confines his analysis to the point up until 
“a norm first becomes, through changes in discourse or behaviour, a focus of domestic 
political attention or debate” (1997b:476). By limiting his story to “how norms get on the 
domestic political agenda in the first place” (p. 480) Checkel thus excludes the process of 
internalization into domestic politics from his research.
In addition, according to the literature on learning, the knowledge base 
of epistemic communities remains fixed in relation to the targeted domestic 
contexts. The assumption is that the knowledge proclaimed by the epistemic 
community is accepted and internalised by targeted domestic actors. It is 
assumed that these actors’ understandings of the international regime do 
not differ from the knowledge base that originally made up the international 
regime. By invoking the idea of learning, this literature focuses on how epis­
temic communities teach the international regime to the targeted domestic 
actors. No account is given of how these actors understand the international 
regime. No account is thus made of the social and political re-construction 
of knowledge by the targeted domestic actors. Consequently, the norms and 
ideas carried by targeted domestic actors count for nothing in the analysis. 
Just like realists and liberalists, any eventual influence from the ideational 
context of targeted domestic actors is downplayed in the analysis.
“Socialisation”around international regimes
Parallel to the idea of learning, authors in the constructivist strand of in­
ternational relation theory have identified socialisation as a second major 
causal process driving the implementation of international regimes. Com­
pared to learning, socialization is not limited to the role of knowledge and 
cognitive changes. By contrast, the explicit ambition of the literature on 
socialisation is to include social and political processes at play during the
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implementation of international regimes (Klotz 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999).
The book The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (1999) by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink is widely seen as the state of the 
art within constructivist theory on implementation processes. The authors 
explore the conditions under which international human rights norms are 
internalized in domestic practices throughout the world. The answer they 
give is that “the process by which international norms are internalized and 
implemented domestically can be understood as a process of socialization 
(p. 5, emphasis in original). This is a process during which “instrumental 
adaptation and strategic bargaining” is engaged in a mutually reinforcing 
interaction with “moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, 
and persuasion” which leads to the endpoint of “institutionalization and 
habitualization” (p. 5).23
23 Similar to the role assigned to epistemic communities in the process of learning, Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) point to the role of “transnational advocacy networks” as vehi­
cles by which domestic policy makers are socialized into international regimes and norms. 
Transnational advocacy networks consist of state and non-state actors at the international 
level, and non-state actors at the domestic level of the country supposed to adopt the 
international norm.
Risse et. al ( 1999) assert that, in contrast with other constructivist theories, 
they want to steer away from theories on “norm-induced domestic change 
whereby power, political struggles, and instrumental interests of actors are 
somehow absent in the story” (p. 9). Ostensibly, these authors thus seem 
to share my criticism of theories of learning. Their ambition thus promises 
real advancements to prior accounts of the implementation of international 
regimes in domestic contexts.
Despite these promises, Risse and his partners perpetuate much of the 
deficiencies in earlier constructivist as well as non-constructivist literature 
on domestic implementation of international regimes. First, they give no 
account of the social construction of the international regime by the targeted 
domestic actors. Second, the targeted domestic actors are seen as passive, 
powerless recipients of change. To illustrate the first point, we should start 
by considering that according to their theory on socialization, the end point 
of the implementation process is when the international norm is “taken for 
granted” by domestic actors (p. 17). These authors thus set out to analyse 
the internalisation of international norms which potentially could provide 
away to understand the transformation of international regimes. However, 
Risse et. al. limit their analysis to a focus on the degrees of implementation 
of the original international regime. An international regime is “taken for 
granted” when targeted domestic actors internalise the international regime 
in its original form (p. 29; cf. Klotz 1995:155). By excluding an analysis of 
domestic actors’ understandings of the implemented international regime,
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these authors work under the assumption that a successful socialization 
process leads all actors to internalize the same understanding of the inter­
national regime. With regard to their empirical focus on human rights, the 
assumption of Risse et. al. is that domestic actors are socialized into “taking 
for granted” the same understanding of human rights as was proclaimed 
by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No 
account is made of the social construction of this international norm by 
the targeted domestic actors.
Second, although Risse et. al. set out to include the role of power in the 
implementation process, their analysis places no power in the hands of the 
domestic actors targeted by the international regime. In their analysis, power 
is held by the international actors advocating the international norm. It is the 
international actors and their domestic partners (such as non-governmental 
organisations and other actors in civil society) who set the agenda and en­
gage in strategic action to convey this to the targeted domestic actors. The 
targeted domestic actors, i.e. the actors whose practices the international 
regime set out to change, are limited to a repertoire of different degrees of 
compliance. They can accept the whole or parts of the agenda presented 
by proponents of the internationally defined agenda. But in the analysis 
of Risse et. al., the targeted actors are not empowered with the capacity to 
formulate an independent agenda in the interface between the international 
regime and domestic values and norms. As Checkel has put it in a review of 
Risse et al., the recipients are “portrayed as passive reactants to movement 
pressure instead of as active agenda setters in their own right” (Checkel 
2000:1339). Instead of empowering the targeted domestic actors with a 
capacity to strategically formulate their own agenda for change, they are 
portrayed as passive subjects of change.
To sum up, authors in the constructivist strand of international relations 
advance different theories and suggest that different processes drive the 
implementation of international regimes to domestic contexts. Despite 
their critique against realism and liberalism, and their explicit ambition 
to theorise about processes of actors’ reality formation, constructivists give 
no account of how international regimes are subjected to processes of real­
ity re-constructions at targeted domestic levels. International regimes are 
thought to be pre-constituted rather than socially constructed. Current 
constructivist theorists thus share with realists and liberals the assumption 
that the understanding of the international regime is constant during the 
implementation process. Whether constructivists advance a process of 
learning or one of socialization as the independent variable, they treat the 
dependent variable—actors’ understanding of the international regime—as 
constant throughout the analysis.
Second, constructivists conceptualise the targeted domestic actors as pas­
sive recipients of international regimes. The targeted actors are subjected to
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change, not subjects of change. Constructivist theory provides scant insights 
into how targeted domestic actors engage strategically to reconstitute the 
international regime in relation to domestic social, political, and religious 
realities.
Third, accounting for processes driving the implementation of interna­
tional regimes, constructivist theories downplay the role of power on the 
part of the targeted domestic actors. Processes of learning and socialisation 
have been juxtaposed as alternative independent variables to the traditional 
theories focus on international power relations. This attempt to develop 
alternative explanations of the implementation of international regimes has 
not resulted in accounts of the role of power in the targeted domestic ac­
tors’ responses to the implementation of international regimes. As Barnett 
and Duvall—both leading scholars of international relations—recently 
put it: “Mainstream constructivists, too, have pitted themselves against 
explanations in terms of power as they have attempted to demonstrate the 
causal significance of normative structures and processes of learning and 
persuasion (Barnett and Duvall 2005:4). Current constructivist scholars 
thus repeat much of the fallacy of realist and liberal theories on the role 
and power of targeted domestic actors in the interface with international 
regimes.
Taking stock of current theories on the 
implementation of international regime
The review above has shown that current theories on international relations 
fail to account for domestic transformations of international regimes. Real­
ists, liberalists, and constructivists advance different accounts of the causal 
processes of international regime implementation. However, none of these 
theories account for the targeted domestic actors’ understandings of the 
international regime, i.e. the actors whose practices the international regime 
set out to change. Working within the constraints of rational choice theory, 
realists and liberals treat the targeted domestic actors’ understanding of the 
international regime as exogenous to their models. Given the explicit ambi­
tion of constructivists to overcome this deficiency in rationalistic theories, 
it is surprising to find current constructivist writers regard international 
regimes as pre-constituted rather than re-constituted during the implemen­
tation process. Consequently, the assumption of constructivists too is that 
the targeted domestic actors’ understandings of the international regime 
remain fixed as it is implemented. In addition, although constructivists 
correctly criticise realism and liberalism for their simplified understand­
ing of agency, neither of the constructivists reviewed above have advanced 
models that account for how targeted domestic actors actively engage in
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strategic response to the implemented international regimes. Realists, lib- 
eralists, and constructivists alike thus treat the targeted domestic actors of 
international regimes as passive and powerless subjects of externally defined 
agendas for change.
The three approaches reviewed above are summarized in table 3.1.
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4. A THEORY OF DOMESTIC TRANS­
FORMATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretically based framework to 
understand and empirically analyse domestic transformations of inter­
national regimes. The chapter is structured as follows: The first section 
outlines the concept “construction of reality” and provides a theoretical 
framework to understand the formation and change of constructions 
of reality. I will divide this concept into two parts dealing with “collec­
tive memories” and “social identities” which are intersecting parts of an 
actor’s construction of reality. The second section of this chapter details 
the character and role of “political entrepreneurs”. However, since I will 
be using this concept throughout this chapter, a prima facie definition 
is in order: Political entrepreneurs are actors who actively engage in the 
domestic transformation of an international regime as it is implemented 
in domestic contexts. They are, as Checkel (1997a) puts it, “agents of 
ideas-based policy change” (p. 9). In the third section, I will develop a 
framework of analytical categories for empirical analysis of strategies used 
by political entrepreneurs during the transformation process. The forth 
and final section accounts for the research strategy and methodological 
choices during the empirical research on the transformation of IWRM in 
Zimbabwe reported in chapter five to eight.
Constructions of reality
I am using the concept of “constructions of reality” to study what is else­
where referred to as “culture”, “history”, or “world view” (Wedeen 2002; 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall J. 1993; Peterson and Anand 2004). 
Compared with these related concepts, “constructions of reality” has the 
advantage of viewing the creation of social contexts as a strategic process. 
Constructions of reality are not automatically created based on material 
needs in society, or evolving out of anonymous historical processes. They 
are deliberately created by strategically acting political entrepreneurs who 
aim to advance their goals and ambitions. The construction of reality is a 
process in which actors compete to establish particular interpretations of 
reality as legitimate in society as a means to obtain material and non-material
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resources (Swidler and Arditi 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ruggie 
1998; Rothstein 2000; Kaufman 2004).
In “construction of reality” I include actors’ “collective memories” and 
“identity constructs”. The distinction between the two is based on differ­
ences in the underlying social-psychological and political processes that 
drive their constructions (Willmott 1997). The distinction is motivated by 
the ambition to increase the analytic precision of the concept “construc­
tions of reality”.
Collective memories are analytically separated from social identities in as 
much as the former concerns the nature of the problem at hand, while the 
latter refers to the demarcation of actors to whom rights and obligations are 
attributed. Collective memories and social identities are intersecting parts 
of actors’ constructions of reality in the sense that collective memories tend 
to make certain social identities more salient than others. If, for example, 
actor A has a collective memory in which the nature of the problem of 
water scarcity is related to the lack of capacity to store rain-water for the 
dry season, then As collective memory tends to make salient the social 
identity of hydrologists trained in dam construction (see further chapter 
seven). By contrast, actor B may have collective memory of the lack of access 
to water as the gods’ way of punishing people for their wrongdoings. This 
collective memory makes salient the social identity of rain-makers with 
the capacity to perform rain-making ceremonies to appease the gods (see 
further chapter eight).
Despite this affinity between collective memories and social identities, 
the relation between them should be seen as subject of empirical investiga­
tions concerned with ongoing social construction. Both A and B’s collective 
memories are, for example, compatible with attributing salience to the 
social identity of international development agencies rather than hydrolo­
gists or rain makers. In relation to the collective memory of actor A, the 
international development agencies may be portrayed as having failed to 
provide financial means for the construction of dams. In relation to the 
collective memory of actor B, the international development agencies can 
be represented as the source of inspiration for the immoral behaviour of 
local farmers and urban water users.
The construction of both collective memories and social identities speaks 
to the question of legitimate distribution of material and non-material 
resources in society. In relation to the case study under review, collective 
memories of water contextualise water management against a backdrop of 
political, social, religious, and economic events. They define the value of 
water, historical causes of water-related problems in the present (giving the 
foundation to assign blame to someone), as well as historical events that 
constitute the basis of making claims on resources in the present. By contrast, 
the social identities clustered around water concern the strategic construc­
tion of social actors to whom rights and obligations are attributed.
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Collective memories
I define “collective memories” as representations of reality shared by a group 
of individuals for whom they provide a common frame to interpret the 
past and plot the future.24 I thus agree with Barry Schwartz—well known 
for his work on collective memories—who states that collective memories 
represent “the past as a program for the present” (Schwartz 1996:910).25 
Clarifying how collective memories embody a connection between history 
and present, Schwartz suggests a distinction between collective memories as 
a model ofsociety, and as a model for society. A collective memory is a model 
of society, as it is “a reflection of its needs, problems, fears, mentality, and 
aspirations.” A collective memory is a modeler society as it is “a program 
that defines its experience, articulates its values and goals” (p. 910).
24 Collective memories, as opposed to individual memories, are “collective” to the extent that 
several individuals hold similar memories. The linkage whereby individual understandings 
are related to collectively understandings is addressed by the sociologists Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann (1966) as they write:
Individuals perform discrete institutionalized actions within the context 
of their biography. This biography is a reflected-upon whole in which the 
discrete actions are thought of, not as isolated events, but as related parts in 
a subjectively meaningful universe whose meanings are not specific to the 
individual, but socially articulated and shared (p. 100).
25 Note that that “the past” should not be understood as some far distant history. The past, as we 
should understand it here, is a very broad temporal indication including very recent events.
Collective memories thus constitute a collective point of reference through 
which individual actions are given social meanings and behavioural guid­
ance. This definition gives rise to two questions: How do collective memories 
come to represent the pasts of a society? Addressing this question in the 
subsequent section, I focus on the role of social psychological processes in 
forgetting and remembering the past, and on the role of strategic politi­
cal entrepreneurs engaging in constructing “the past as a program for the 
present”. The second question, addressed in the subsequent section is: What 
is the scope within which collective memories can be legitimate models of 
and for society?
Forgetting, remembering, and the role of political entrepreneurs
The effects of the interface between an international regime and domes­
tically held constructions of reality appear both on a political and social 
psychological level among the targeted domestic actors. At the political level, 
the interface challenges the existing distribution of political and material 
resources. This was certainly the case in Zimbabwe’s water sector reform, 
in which the introduction of IWRM challenged, among other things, the 
strong social bias of water in favour of the white minority. Similarly, the 
government’s control over water management was called into question by 
IWRM’s emphasis on decentralisation and stakeholder participation.
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In addition to the political effects, the interface between an international 
regime and domestic constructions of reality has effects at the social psy­
chological level of the targeted domestic actors. The interface creates what 
social psychologists would call a “cognitive dissonance” in which different 
propositions related to the policy area stand against each other (Festinger 
1957, for a review see Petty and Wegener 1998). For example, IWRM 
proposed that the key to sustainable water management was primarily to 
be found in economic and social institutions (World Bank 1993). This 
proposition contested the dominant view among public officials in the 
water sector who attributed the problems in the water sector to insuf­
ficient use of scientific models for water management (see chapter seven). 
Hydrology and hydrogeology rather than politics are the solution according 
to these officials. Research in social psychology points out that individu­
als who experience a state of cognitive dissonance will find this aversive 
and subsequently engage in various activities to reduce it. Consequently, 
domestic actors who come in contact with an international regime that 
has competing propositions about reality will try to reduce this cognitive 
dissonance between the propositions of the international regime and the 
domestic constructions of reality.
The political and social psychological tension created by the introduction 
of an international regime provokes the reconstruction of propositions of 
the international regime as well as collective memories held at the targeted 
domestic levels. In response, political entrepreneurs will try to reinterpret the 
content of the international regime as well as established collective memory 
of their society. Political entrepreneurs will try to achieve a constructed 
consistency that reduce the cognitive dissonance and put their group in a 
social and materially favourable position (McGuire 1985; Kramer 1991).
How do actors reduce the cognitive dissonance provoked by an inter­
national regime? Efforts to create consistency between the competing 
propositions made by the international regime and domestic construc­
tions of reality will not be a rational process of finding the objective—or 
“real”—match between conflicting and dissonant descriptions of reality 
(cf. Cortell and Davis 2000; Cortell and Davis 2005). Actors engaged in 
reducing their cognitive dissonance and creating social legitimacy for their 
views are influenced by cognitive as well as social selection biases.26 Social 
psychologist Daniel Gilbert (1998) suggests four ways in which our limited
26 Some researchers attribute these selection biases to actors’ limited cognitive capacity which 
impedes the incorporation of relevant information in decision making, see e.g. March and Olsen 
(1989); North (1990); Kramer (1991). Human’s limited processing capacity thus makes them 
susceptible to a limited set of characteristics of reality which effects how they see the present 
and commemorate the past. Other scholars have argues that actors try to gain social legitimacy 
and reduce their cognitive dissonance by means of existing social templates that provides a 
social apparatus though which the past is reproduced, see e.g. Berger and Luckmann (1966); 
Ben-Yehuda (1995); Finnemore (1996); Petty and Wegener (1998).
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cognitive capacity and social embeddedness effects the reconstruction of 
collective memories:
Idealism: People see things as they expect them to be. A Chinese 
proverb captures this point saying that “two-thirds or what we 
see is behind our eyes”. Similarly, someone has said that “I’ll 
see it when I believe it”. The essence of these sayings is that the 
perceiver’s knowledge and assumptions of the world functions 
as information shortcuts, or hirer, to re-present the world to the 
perceiver. New knowledge is made to ht into existing percep­
tions of the person’s perceptions of reality. This new, hltered, 
reality is experienced by the person as the reality.
Egoism: In the process of making sense of a situation, people 
tend to select and interpret reality in such a way that they 
themselves come out in favourable light.
Circumstantialism: People think about only the things they 
see. And what they see tends to be close to them in time and 
space. This makes for a bias in favour of information in the 
vicinity at the expense of more remote sources notwithstand­
ing their factual grounds.
Realism: People think that they see things as they are. People 
don’t realise that egoism and idealism and circumstantialism 
effect their beliefs (from Gilbert 1998a:121ff).
Gilbert’s account implies that as proponents of an international regime try 
to have an impact on the definition of the targeted domestic policy area, 
they are up against domestic actors whose collective memories are marked 
by generic human tendencies of selective forgetting and remembering. The 
implication is that there are strong human tendencies associated with the 
perception of reality that work against efforts to achieve a certain policy 
change by means of new manifestations of reality compiled in an interna­
tional regime. More precisely, we should expect the following effects:
Idealism implies an inertia that works against dramatic changes 
at odds with actors’ current expectations and understandings.
Egoism tends to boost the actors’ own achievements and others’ 
imperfections. This works against redefinitions of the policy 
area that implies a redistribution of rights and obligations 
between actors in the targeted policy area.
57
Circumstantialism works against contextualising the targeted 
policy area in a broader political, social, and ecological con­
text in which problems in that sector are related to events in 
society at large.
Realism implies that domestic actors typically will be quite 
persistent in their views as they do not realise their own socio­
cognitive predicaments.
The overarching point in Gilbert’s account is that collective memories 
are constructed and reconstructed by actors who do not recall reality as 
“it is” but filtered through social psychological limitations in the human 
constituency. However, while Gilbert identifies generic human tendencies 
of selective forgetting and remembering, he falls short of addressing the 
political dimension of constructing collective memories. Political scientist 
Bo Rothstein (2000) argues that
Collective memories are deliberately created by strategically 
acting political entrepreneurs in order to further their political 
goals and ambitions. In other words, a group’s or a society’s 
collective memory is contested ideological terrain, where diffe­
rent actors try to establish their particular interpretation of the 
past as the collective memory for a particular group (p. 494, 
emphasis in original).
The political dimension in the construction of collective memories derives 
from the fact that collective memories have implications for the legitimate 
distribution of social and material resources in society. In an analysis of the 
role of memory and practice as vehicles for power in eighteenth century 
France, Historian Keith M. Baker (1985) puts it like this:
Politics in any society depends upon the existence of cultural 
representations that define the relationships among political 
actors, thereby allowing individuals and groups to press claims 
upon one another and upon the whole. Such claims can be 
made intelligible and binding only to the extent that political 
actors deploy symbolic resources held in common by members 
of the political society, thereby refining and redefining the 
implications of these resources for the changing purposes of 
political practice. Political contestation therefore takes the form 
of competing efforts to mobilize and control the possibilities 
of political and social discourse, efforts through which that 
discourse is extended, recast, and—on occasion—even radi­
cally transformed. (Baker 1985:134f, cf. Schwartz 1996).
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Two things stand out from this quote from Baker with regard to the study 
of domestic transformations of international regimes. First, Baker supports 
the analytic point of departure of this book, namely that the extent to which 
an international regime will effect the targeted policy area is contingent 
upon the extent to which it has an impact on the “cultural representations” 
which define the relationships of the concerned actors. Second, the content 
of these “cultural representations”, what I here call collective memories, 
stipulates social and political relationships which allows for making specific 
claims on the distribution of resources in the policy area targeted by the 
international regime. More precisely, to gain legitimacy as “intelligible and 
binding”, the propositions of the international regime must be grounded in 
commonly held “symbolic resources”. This point, to which I now turn for 
a more detailed analysis, speaks to the question of the scope within which 
resource claims can be made by political entrepreneurs hoping to construct 
legitimate collective memories for increased resource distribution.
The scope for change of collective memories: Anything does not go
The definition of collective memories that I use stipulates that collective 
memories are held by individuals in the present as a frame to interpret the 
past (above). Some authors argue that there need not be any connection 
between a constructed collective memory (the present) and real historical 
events (the past). Halbwachs—frequently cited as the father of the “collec­
tive memory” concept—states that if a collective memory
adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual 
needs of the present, then a knowledge of the origin of these 
facts must be secondary, if not altogether useless, for the real­
ity of the past is no longer in the past. (Halbwachs cited in 
Ben-Yehuda 1995:273).
Halbwachs’ view is thus that there can be a fundamental discontinuity be­
tween the past and present representations of society embodied in collective 
memories. This view suggests that collective memories can be fabricated 
out of thin air to suit the strategic and political needs of effective political 
entrepreneurs acting in the present. The inventions by political entrepre­
neurs are limited only by their imagination.
In contrast to Halbwachs I argue that collective memories are constructs 
of reality held in the present but well founded in the past (Ben-Yehuda 
1995; Rothstein 2000). As Schwartz (1991) puts it, collective memories take 
part in shaping the present by providing “a stable image upon which new 
elements are superimposed” (Schwartz 2001:234). Ultimately, of course, a 
political entrepreneur may try to invoke a collective memory without any 
foundation in real historical events and the degree to which this is successful
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is an empirical question. But the analytic point that I want to make with the 
concept of collective memories is to understand how the past can be used 
to make claims in the present. And for these claims to be legitimate, they 
must relate to events seen as real and legitimate in wide parts of society. As 
Mary Douglas (1986) puts it: “(to) acquire legitimacy, every kind of insti­
tution needs a formula that founds its rightness in reason and in nature.” 
(Douglas 1986:45; cf. Acharya 2004:244; Keck and Sikkink 1998:267f). 
As political entrepreneurs use collective memories to make resource claims 
in the present, they will thus typically draw on strategic representation of 
historical events with wide social and political acceptance.
Social identities
I now turn to the second component in constructions of reality, i.e. “social 
identities”. I define “social identities” as social constructions that place an 
individual or group in social categories of real or imagined communities 
that are socially recognised. Friends, religious groups, family, ethnic groups, 
deceased ancestors, formal organisations, and nations are but some of the 
possible social categories with which we can associate, and be associated 
with. Identification is hence to a large extent a process of social demarca­
tion. An identity is created through an ongoing social process by which 
the social space is divided into categories within which an individual or 
group is placed (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; 
Callero 2003).
This social embeddedness of social identities is clarified by using the con­
ventional distinction between the construction of the Self and the Other. 
The construction of the Self and the Other can be seen as responses to two 
questions: “Who am I?” and “Who are they?”. Defining the construction 
of social identities as social constructions implies that the construction of 
the Self takes place in relation to a wider social context. In other words, 
the actor who asks the question “Who am I?” is not the sole respondent to 
this question. The answer to the question is also provided by Others: Other 
social actors take part in the social construction of “I”.
Contrasting social identity as a social construction with rational choice theory 
and logic of appropriateness
The conceptualisation of social identities as a social construction can 
be contrasted with, on the one hand, the position advanced in rational 
choice theory and, on the other hand, the tradition following March and 
Olson’s (1989) proposition of a “logic of appropriateness”. These different 
views dominate much of the work on social identities in political science 
and international relations. I will deal with these two contrasting views 
separately with the aim to further clarify my position on social identities 
as social constructions.
60
From the perspective of rational choice theory, social identities are formed 
by individual agents strategically designing their identities to increase the 
prospects of obtaining specific goals. As Gartner and Segura (1997) put it: 
“identity is a choice, and we believe that choice to be rationally driven.... 
[Consequently ... new group identities or categories are constantly being 
constructed to serves social or political purposes.” (p 135, 133). In this per­
spective, social identities help actors to make rational predictions about the 
likely behaviour of others and the most profitable strategic behaviour (Laitin 
1998). As critics have noted, however, rational choice theory downplays the 
social embeddedness of actors while emphasising actors’ preoccupation with 
the consequences of action (Ostrom 1998; Breen 1999; Rothstein 2000; 
Eriksson 2005). These “atomistic” and “consequentialistic” assumptions 
of rational choice theory largely leave out the psychological and political 
processes that effect the way social identities are formed and inform social 
interaction. Erik Ringmar (1996) argues that while rational choice theory 
makes the assertion that agents select their identities on the basis of inter­
ests, the theory does not make “clear what ‘interests’ are or how they are 
formed, and every attempt to come up with a definition of the concept will 
inevitably become hostage to a definition of the self to whom the interest 
in question is said to belong.” (p. 87).
James G. March and Johan P. Olson have pursued this critique against 
rational choice theory, and their work has been pivotal in reintroducing 
identity studies into political science and international relations research 
(March and Olsen 1984; March and Olsen 1989; March 1994). Contrasting 
the consequencialist logic assumed by rational choice theory, March and 
Olson suggest that actors are frequently guided by a “logic of appropriat- 
ness” in which behaviour is derived from the actors’ social embeddedness. 
They argue that when an actor address the question of identity—“Who am 
I?”—that actor has little or no role in how the answer is defined. The lever­
age for individual choice is reduced by the actors’ social embeddedness. The 
process of social identity formation is a process where the individual enters 
a “prepackaged contract” stipulating obligations and expectations related 
to parties involved in an interaction (March and Olsen 1989:2Iff; March 
1994:63ff). March and Olson thus assert that social identities are socially 
embedded because they are formed in response to normative discourses on 
appropriate behaviour. The foundation of March and Olson’s argument 
is that individual-level legitimacy is not sufficient to justify an act which 
is why individuals want the legitimacy of their actions to be affirmed by 
others. This social recognition is provided through socially defined identi­
ties that supply a normative base through which the actor can infer the 
right thing to do: “social identities are templates for individual action... 
[as] they frequently come to be assertions of morality” (March 1994:65; 
Zelditch 2001).
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While I am generally sympathetic to March and Olson’s elaboration on 
the social embeddedness of social identities, I argue that this emphasis has 
come at the expense of a focus on the reciprocal relation between individual 
agents and social contexts. Regarding social identities as “prepackaged 
contracts” March and Olson conceptualise the identity carrier as a passive 
recipient of socially defined templates stipulating agency. Describing the 
process during which an actor addresses the question of identity—“Who 
am I?—March and Olson take examples from business organisations. They 
write: “The accountant asks: ‘What does an accountant do in a situation 
such as this?’ The bureau chief asks: ‘What does a bureau chief do in a 
situation such as this?”’ (March 1994:63f). Faced with these questions, 
March and Olson argue that the accountant and bureau chief enter ready 
made social identities rather that take a progressive role in an interactive 
process of identity formation. The accountant and bureau chief are given 
no role in answering the question “Who am I?” The answer is provided 
by the context—through the “prepackaged contracts”—while the identity 
carrier is seen as a passive recipient with no active part in the process of 
defining his identity.
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) provide a position on social 
identities that balances the traditions of rational choice theory and March 
and Olson’s work on the “logic of appropriateness”. They argue that iden­
tity carriers are neither atomistic designers of their identities (as in rational 
choice theory), nor passive recipients of socially defined demarcations (as 
in the logic of appropriateness). Berger and Luckmann emphasise that 
the construction of social identities is an interactive process between the 
individual and society. In this process the individual’s identity is neither 
an atomistic agent nor subsumed under society. The individual maintains 
an independent status as he has a core identity which can be seen as the 
carrier of the socially constructed identity.27 Berger and Luckmann are 
eager to distance themselves from the idea of atomistic individuals with an 
ability to freely select suitable social identities. They thus emphasise that 
the process of identity formation
27 For a discussion on the existence of a core identity, see further Mead and Morris (1934); 
Kinnvall (2003); Wendt (1999):224ff.
does not result from autonomous creations of meaning by 
isolated individuals, but begins with the individual ‘taking 
over’ the world in which others already live...[Through this 
process] we now not only understand each other’s definitions 
of shared situations, we define them reciprocally. A nexus of 
motivations is established between us and extends into the
62
future. Most importantly, there is now an ongoing mutual 
identification between us. We not only live in the same world, 
we participate in each others being. (Berger and Luckmann 
1966:150).
There are three things that we should pay attention to in this quote. First, 
it summarizes the view of social identities that I propose, i.e. social identi­
ties as social constructions emanating from an interactive social process 
in which the individual is deeply embedded in society without losing his 
distinct individuality and the ability to engage in strategic action. This 
position attempts to strike a balance between the simplistic assumptions of 
rational choice theory in which atomistic agents are seen as the creators of 
their own identities, and the overt social embeddedness of actors according 
to the logic of appropriateness. Second, it connects social identities and 
reciprocal definitions of shared situations. This reminds us of the proximity 
between identity constructions and constructions of collective memories 
which I discussed above. Third, it connects the construction of reality to 
actors motivations and behaviours in collective engagements. This con­
nection is the point of departure for my proposal to study of the domestic 
impact of international regimes as centring on the construction of social 
identities in the targeted domestic setting.
The strategic dimension of social identity formation
While Berger and Luckmann highlight the social interaction of identity 
formation, they fall short of addressing its political dimension. This becomes 
a problem with respect to applying their definition of social identities to the 
study of domestic transformations of international regimes. The formation 
of social identities is part of determining the socially legitimate distribu­
tion of resources in society, and thus social identity formation is typically 
characterised by strategic action (Callero 2003:118f; Callon 1986:216f).
I argue that the strategic dimension of social identity formation draw 
from three specific characteristics of the social-psychological processes of 
identity formation. These basic processes in the formation of social identities 
make it easy for political entrepreneurs to use social identities for strategic 
purposes. First, it is a fundamental characteristic of the formation of social 
identities that the demarcations of social identities are not fixed but rather 
subject to change, such that an individual can identify with new groups 
(Kramer 1991; Espeland 1998). This plasticity in the formation of an in­
dividuals social identities can be used by political entrepreneurs through 
the strategic inclusion and exclusion of individuals from established social 
identities. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) put it like this:
63
[Social identities are used] to persuade certain people that they 
are (for certain purposes) “identical” with one another and 
at the same time different from others, and to organize and 
justify cooperation along certain lines, (p. 4-5).
Engaging in strategic inclusion and exclusion, political entrepreneurs will 
thus work with the plasticity of social identities to try to reshape them in 
ways they regard as favourable. Specifically, political entrepreneurs may try 
to create inclusive social identities that boost the significance and rights of 
themselves and their allies. Similarly, they can try to create social identities 
that diminish the legitimacy of potential competitors for social and politi­
cal resources.
The second characteristic of social identity formation that can be used 
strategically is stereotyping. Stereotyping is an identity formation process in 
which individuals reduce the complexities of other actors and turn them 
into a homogenous group. Studying the social psychology of inter-group 
relations, Roderick Kramer (1991) shows that the diversity of individuals 
in a group is too complex to process for individuals. In the construction of 
Others, individual diversity is typically subordinated to achieve collective 
homogeneity. The homogenous Other is subsequently labelled with the 
same social identity; i.e. the Other is turned into a stereotype. The human 
tendency towards stereotyping can be used for strategic reasons because 
when an actor relates to someone using a stereotype, group characteristics 
rather than individual traits tend to determine the behavioural response 
and attitudes. Racial identities and constructions of the Other as ignorant 
and ‘narrow-minded’ are perhaps some of the most frequent examples of 
strategic use of stereotyping.
The third characteristic in the formation of social identities which is open 
to strategic manipulation is the inclination to accept a specific individual as 
representative of a larger group (Kramer 1991; Callon 1986). The accept­
ance of representatives of a group is a process based on a different even 
opposite—rationale than stereotyping. While stereotyping leads to a situa­
tion in which many individuals are counted as one, the process of accepting 
a representation of a social group is a process where one individual s voice 
counts as the voice of many. The acceptance of representatives is conducive 
for social interaction because the interaction between different group s ac­
tors can be reduced to interaction between representatives of each group. 
Group-based interactions thus often presuppose a process of accepting 
someone as the representative of the Self, while the Other is represented 
by someone from the opposing group.
The process of selection and acceptance of representatives for social groups 
is inevitably an act of reducing the complexity of social actors. This creates 
a space for manoeuvring by political entrepreneurs. The question is: Who
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will be regarded as the representatives of the Self/Other? With regard to 
this, sociologist Callon has argued that “To speak for others is to first si­
lence those in whose name we speak.” (1986:216). When someone claims 
to voice the opinion of, for example, local water stakeholders, we should 
thus recognise this as an act of power by someone whose actual interests 
may not be representative of the interests of any (significant) group of ac­
tual stakeholders. Intertwined with this process we should further note the 
power dimension of recognising someone as a representative of the Other. 
Great strategic value can be attached to recognising a specific actor as the 
legitimate representative of a group. With regard to the implementation 
of an international regime aiming to increase the influence of local stake­
holders, actors within the government may be able to claim that they have 
met this goal by pointing to the increased influence of someone who the 
government regards as a suitable “stakeholder representative”. With regard to 
the strategic recognition of representatives, I would thus like to paraphrase 
Callon (above) and state that: To accept someone as the speaker for Others 
can be to silence those in whose name that someone speaks.
Scope for social identity change and the consequences of multiple identities
How much scope is there for political entrepreneurs to recast social identi­
ties during domestic transformation of an international regime? Or, to put 
the same question in its most generic form: How much can social identities 
be changed by strategic actors? The claim that I have made—that social 
identities are socially constructed in human interaction—stands in sharp 
contrast to both the atomistic tradition of rational choice and the essentialist 
tradition of the logic of appropriateness. Regarding social identities as social 
constructions does not, however, imply that just because humans constantly 
interact social identities are constantly subject to dramatic changes. The 
impact of human interaction, including that of political entrepreneurs, on 
the construction of social identities is most often quite marginal. Without 
this inertia, social identities would lose their function as reference points 
for legitimacy and agency. In the section on collective memories above, I 
pointed to the role of cognitive dissonance as a mechanism by which ac­
tors try to maintain continuity between established and new constructions 
of reality. When actors’ established collective memories are challenged by, 
for example, an international regime, actors experience a sense of cogni­
tive dissonance that they tend to find aversive and therefore try to reduce 
(Festinger 1957). Similarly, cognitive dissonance in actors’ social identities 
impacts on the basic social-psychological function of social identities, i.e. 
to “sustain a sense of stability and predictable understanding in the world” 
(Callero 2003:124). This is reflected in the Latin root of identity, idem, 
which means “sameness and continuity”. This implies that actors try to 
maintain the stability of social identities, and when social identities change,
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the change is typically incremental and slow. Similarly, social identities can 
take on new shapes, but there is typically a strong resemblance with previ­
ous social identity demarcations (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; cf. Ringmar 
1996:ch. 3).
Actors can also oscillate between multiple social identities. Due to the 
existence of multiple identities, a change of social identities might imply 
that actors can adopt or emphasis one of several identities which they have 
carried all along. The existence of multiple identities thus increases the lever­
age of political entrepreneurs engaged in constructing social identities.28
28 The fact that actors hold multiple social identities is an analytical insight with a clear meth­
odological implication to the extent that we seek to connect social identities with behaviour. 
An analysis that connects identity with behaviour stands the risk of being over-determined 
since in a situation with a multitude of social identities there can easily be more than one 
identity which corresponds with a certain behavioural patterns. With a multitude of social 
identities available, to which identity should the observed behaviour be attributed?
There are, however, at least three generic social-psychological processes 
that work against actors holding a large number of social identities. First, 
the array of actual social identities available to an individual is limited 
by the human inability to process complex information (Kramer 1991; 
Brubaker and Cooper 2000; cf. North 1990; Ostrom 1991). Actors find 
it too demanding to hold several social identities, and thus tend to rely 
on a limited number of identities as templates for social orientation and 
action. Second, a large number of social identities would reduce the level 
of predictability in our actions. Constant change of social identities would 
thus create social instability and lead to social stigmatization (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000). Third, individuals tend to maintain a coherent self-image 
and avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Krantz Lindgren 2001). 
Constant change of social identities would make it difficult for actors to 
recognise themselves, which implies limits to the number of social identi­
ties that might be held.
In addition to these generic processes that limit the number of social iden­
tities available, I argue that with regard to the empirical focus on domestic 
transformations, the number of social identities is limited by the fact that 
an international regime is concerned with a specific policy area. Accord­
ingly, only a limited number of social identities will be seen as relevant and 
socially legitimate. A policy area is a well specified social venue which limits 
the number of legitimate social identities (March and Olsson 1989). The 
specification is manifested in, for example, its formal organization, legal 
instruments, and traditional practices.
There are thus good reasons to assume that actors engaged within the 
policy sphere targeted by an international regime will face quite a limited 
repertoire of social identities. Nevertheless there will be a certain amount 
of leverage for change between existing social identities, demarcation of
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new groups, and renegotiation of the rights and obligations attributed 
to each identity. This leverage for identity change defines the social and 
political space for the transformation of the social identities proposed by 
an international regime.
Political entrepreneurs
The process of domestic transformation is not a process in which interna­
tional regimes per se have an impact on domestic actors’ reality constructs 
(Willmott 1997:96ff). The degree to which an international regime has 
an impact on incumbent actors’ constructions of realities is determined by 
actors engaged either in advocating the international regime and bestowing 
upon it relevance and salience, or in opposing the international regime as 
illegitimate and irrelevant. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) put it in regard 
to norm change: “Norms do not appear out of thin air: they are actively built 
by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior 
in their community.” (p. 897). I use the concept “political entrepreneurs” 
to signify actors who actively engage in the domestic transformation of an 
international regime as it is implemented in domestic contexts.
Jeffrey T. Checkel (1997a) defines political entrepreneurs as “agents of 
ideas-based policy change”. They are “clever individuals with a ‘game plan’” 
and endowed with resources to bring about policy change (p. 9, cf. Hardin 
1995). A concept related to political entrepreneurs is “norm entrepreneurs” 
used by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Similar to “political entrepreneurs” 
Finnemore and Sikkink describe norm entrepreneurs as engaged in strategic 
social construction:
Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because 
they call attention to issues and even ‘create’ issues by using 
language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them...The 
construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of 
norm entrepreneurs’ political strategies since, whey they are 
successful, new frames resonate with broader public under­
standings and are adopted as a new way to talking about and 
understanding issues (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:897).
A significant difference between political entrepreneurs and their norma­
tive counterparts is that the latter is inclined to be motivated by normative 
sentiments such as empathy, altruism, and solidarity, while the motives of 
political entrepreneurs are geared towards holding power and resources. 
The political entrepreneur is not necessarily good or bad from a norma­
tive perspective. Political entrepreneurs may act to advance their in-group’s
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political position, achieve control over economic resources, or gain social 
and political legitimacy for themselves and their groups.
What determines the success of political entrepreneurs’ attempts to achieve 
policy change? This is a question only recently asked by analysts of interna­
tional relations and politics, and we still lack a satisfying answer. Checkel 
(1997a) points to the significance of certain endowments of political en­
trepreneurs, as well as the role of conducive “situational conditions”. He 
suggests that successful political entrepreneurs are endowed with “expertise 
and knowledge in their given field; substantial negotiating skills; persist­
ence; connections to relevant political actors” as well as a certain strategy 
for change, i.e. a game plan. He further suggests that an entrepreneur will 
be successful if two situational conditions are at hand: “Are there problems 
whose resolution would be assisted by the implementation of the entrepre­
neur’s ideas? Are there leaders in power who recognize that such problems 
exit?” Together the situational conditions create a “policy window” which 
successful entrepreneurs manage to enter with their game plan.
While I am sympathetic to Checkel’s assumptions about the endowments 
of political entrepreneurs I differ over keeping the situational conditions 
exogenous to the analysis. I argue that the empirical analysis should include 
how political entrepreneurs take part in the process of creating conducive 
situational conditions. Political entrepreneurs are thus not restricted to ap­
plying their game plan to a game structured by external circumstances. To 
understand the significance of these actors we should recognise their role 
in determining the rules of the game to be played. Political entrepreneurs 
do not only apply their game plan to the game, they also take part in de­
termining which game is going to be played.
Political entrepreneurs are engaged in the domestic transformation of in­
ternational regimes with the aim to create what they perceive as favourable 
matches between the international regime and incumbent actors’ under­
standing of reality. To create these matches the political entrepreneurs engage 
to negotiate the content and salience of taken-for-granted facts of life as 
well as different components of the international regime. Some components 
of the international regime and established realities will be attributed new 
meanings, others will be given new emphasis, while others simply will be 
dropped from the agenda. Political entrepreneurs attempt to negotiate an 
amalgamated reality which puts them and those they represent in a favour­
able position. The modus operandi of political entrepreneurs can be said to 
be structured by three questions: (i) What kind of a situation would I like 
this to be? (i.e. defining the collective memory); (ii) What kind of actor 
would I, and those I represent, like to be in a situation such as this? (i.e. 
demarcations of the Self); (iii) What other kinds of actors would I like to 
have present in a situation such as this (i.e. the construction of Others, cf. 
March and Olsen 1989).
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Political entrepreneurs are not atomistic strategists who stand above and 
beyond the social-psychological and contextual constraints limiting other 
actors (see above section on collective memories and social identities). As 
political entrepreneurs engage in the transformation process, they too are 
limited by their own and others collective memories and social identities 
(cf. Acharya 2004). Skilled political entrepreneurs might be aware of these 
limitations and might try to take them into account as they develop the 
game plane “to change the direction and flow of politics” (Schneider and 
Teske 1992:737). While a profound knowledge of the socio-political context 
is a necessary asset to a political entrepreneur it may also colour his under­
standing of the possibilities of change and his capacity to effect it. Political 
entrepreneurs are subject to the same political and social-psychological proc­
esses as actors in general. They are, for example, subject to selective biases 
as they recall collective memories, and to egocentric expectations based on 
social identities (Checkel 1997a; Shockley, Frank et al. 2002).
Where should we look to find political entrepreneurs? As examples of 
political entrepreneurs Checkel (1997a) counts “individuals, domestic and 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational 
coalitions.” (p. 9). In Checkel’s account of these actors, it is notable that 
all are outside what normally would be defined as “the government”. Ap­
plying the concept “political entrepreneurs” to an African context such as 
Zimbabwe calls into question the demarcation between state and non-state 
actors that is assumed by Checkel. As many scholars on African politics 
have noted, a recurrent characteristic of African politics is that there is no 
clear demarcation between the sphere of the government (the public) and 
the rest of society (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Stålgren 1997). 
African societies are typically modelled on a network of patron-client rela­
tions tying agents together with less regard to the power of official position 
than to the power obtained from socially accepted, but informal, positions. 
The logic of patron-client suggests that official positions and titles are poor 
proxies for power and actual influence. Consequently, political entrepreneurs 
should not a priori be regarded as situated outside the official government. 
In contrast to Checkel’s account of potential political entrepreneurs I 
therefore include actors outside as well as inside the government engaged 
in the domestic transformation of international regimes.
Summing up the processes of domestic 
transformations of international regimes
The question addressed in this chapter is: How do international regimes 
become part of the reality constructs held by domestic actors in the tar­
geted domestic policy area? To address this question, I have outlined the
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political and social-psychological processes at play and the role of strategic 
political entrepreneurs. Table 4.1. provides a summary of these processes. 
In the subsequent section, I turn to developing a framework for empirical 
analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes (see summary 
in table 4.4.).
Table 4.1. Political and social psychological processes during domestic 
transformations of international regimes.
Components in Con­
structions of Reality Social psychological and political processes
Collective Memories • Cognitive dissonance





Social Identities • Cognitive dissonance
• Identity plasticity
• Stereotyping
• Acceptance of representatives of the Self and Other
Empirical Analysis of Domestic Transformations 
of International Regimes
This section provides a framework of analytical categories for empirical 
analysis of strategies used by political entrepreneurs during the domestic 
transformation process. I propose a distinction between, on the one hand, 
strategies of naming, and on the other hand, strategies of claiming'AX\Å blam­
ing. I will elaborate on these strategies in detail below. In short, strategies 
of naming are concerned with descriptions of the situation at hand and 
the relevant social actors. Strategies of claiming and blaming are concerned 
with the distribution of rights, guilt, and obligations.
The concepts of collective memories and social identities can be combined 
with those of naming, claiming and blaming to obtain a general framework 
for empirical analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes. 
This framework is presented in table 4.2. The framework contains four 
sets of empirical questions (A-D) relating to the legitimate distribution 
of rights and obligation in the policy area targeted for reform. The aim of 
this framework is to analyse empirically how political entrepreneurs engage 
with transforming the international regime and evolving domestic construc­
tions of reality. For the engaged political entrepreneurs, the purpose of the
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transformation process is to manifest and obtain widespread legitimacy for 
their specific construction of reality and subsequent distribution of material 
and non-material resources in society. Consequently, at an empirical level, 
the domestic transformation of international regimes is a strategic process 
where different political entrepreneur provide their respective answers to 
the questions below.
Table 4.2. General framework for empirical analysis of domestic transfor­




A: What is the problem and 
its solution?
C: What constitutes the 
basis for making a legitimate 




B: Who has caused the 
problem;
Who can and who should 
solve it?
D: Who can make legitimate 
claims or legitimately assign 
blame?
Naming based on constructions of reality
I turn first to the role of naming during the domestic transformation proc­
ess, (see questions A and B in table 4.2.). A reform process, such as the 
reformation of Zimbabwe’s water sector, is a time when taken-for granted 
realities of life are brought into to the foreground and contested. Established 
problems and their origins are re-formulated and new solutions negotiated. 
The aim of these negotiations is to establish new matches between refor­
mulated problems and solutions. Drawing on research in Organizational 
Studies Barbara Czarniawska (1996) describes this kind of negotiation in 
this way:
[T]he match does not lie in the attributes of an idea or in the 
characteristics of the problem ...The perceived attributes of 
an idea, the perceived characteristics of a problem and the 
match between them are all created, negotiated or imposed 
during the collective translation process.. .With some exag­
geration one can claim that most ideas can be proven to fit 
most problems, assuming good will, creativity and a tendency 
to consensus, (p.25).
Czarniawska is probably right when she says that it would be an exag­
geration to assume that all characteristics of a problem and a solution are 
subject to creative renegotiations during the translation process. But the
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overarching point in her statement is that there is nothing natural neither 
in the description of the problems in the relevant policy area, the array of 
available solutions, nor in the connections between problems and solutions 
(cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Haas 1992; Acharya 2004).
Czarniawkas assertion is particularly refreshing as we are dealing with 
a policy area—water management—that is frequently described using 
complex scientific models that project an image of natural and politically 
neutral approaches. As I will show in the empirical section, proponents 
of hydrology and hydrogeology can call on sophisticated models to make 
persuasive cases for the ‘proper analysis and addressing of water-related 
problems. Naming the problem and solution in scientific parlance, these 
actors can draw on collective memories of modern civilization and the 
progress of science which gives their propositions an appearance as the 
“natural” and scientifically uncontested approach. Others, however, would 
rather name the problem and solution in terms of the role of water in the 
construction of Zimbabwe as a nation-state (chapter five), or Water as a 
Gift from the Gods (chapter eight).
As political entrepreneurs engage in naming the situation at hand they 
will seek to obtain maximum legitimacy for their view among strategic 
social groups. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) have pointed out, the prac­
tices of “renaming” a situation are not necessarily about providing new 
scientific evidence to provide a compelling case, but actors can dramatize 
situations” by using colourful language or seeking to make associations to 
specific, strategic events or ideas in established in society at large (p. 20ff). 
A case in point is the attempt by nationalistic actors in the Zimbabwean 
government to associate the implementation of the internationally defined 
regime of IWRM with the colonial tradition of white men meddling in 
how Zimbabweans handle their natural resources (chapter five).
The strategies of naming the problem and solution in the targeted policy 
area is intertwined with naming the social identities of the actors who have 
caused the problems and who ought to engage in its solutions (compare 
question A and B in table 4.2.). From propositions of the nature of the 
problem and solution (question A), there may be an implicit answer to the 
questions: Who has caused the problem? and Who should solve it? (see B 
in table 4.2.). As sociologist Michel Callon argues, actors will try to define 
the nature of a situation in a way that make themselves “indispensable to 
other actors in the drama” (Callon 1986:196). Despite this closeness, the 
distinction between questions A and B in table 4.2. comes about because 
there is no “automatic” or “natural” connection between the answers to the 
two questions. The relation between the answers to the respective questions 
should be empirically analysed with focus on strategic actions by political 
entrepreneurs. Establishing, for example, that the nature of the problem at 
hand is one of ineffective government rule does not automatically provide
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an answer to the question of who has caused this situation, nor who should 
solve it. (Is it civil society, market actors, international donors, or perhaps, 
actors within the government?)
The stakes in the naming process are high. Failure to have their positions 
accepted can render actors socially, politically, and economically irrelevant. 
If, for example, it is widely established that the problem of water manage­
ment derives from insufficient water storage capacity, this furthers the 
positions of water engineers with expert knowledge on dam constructions. 
At stake here is the social legitimacy and relevance of water engineers as a 
group (i.e. their social identity). However, the role and relevance of water 
engineers would be called into question if the reason behind the lack of 
storage capacity was established as a lack of efficient economic institutions 
and private property rights on water, as was suggested by some actors during 
the water sector reform in Zimbabwe. The latter position would increase 
the salience of economists at the expense of water engineers.
Given the above, it is possible to distinguish the following main points 
of reference in processes of naming the nature of water management in 
Zimbabwe, and the social identity of the actors with the competence and 
obligation to address it. However contested, each point of reference can be 
seen as a preferred construction of the water sector proposed by different 
political entrepreneurs:
Table 4.3. Preferred points of reference for naming the problem and rel­
evant actors.
What is the problem and its solution? 
(cf question A in table 4.2.)
Who should solve the situation? 
(cf question B in table 4.2.)
Spatial and geographic bias in distribution 
of resources
Water engineers (Hydrologists and hydro­
geologists)
Lack of market economy Expert economists and economic actors
Askewed social distribution National political elite
Lack of modern entrepreneurial skills Modern entrepreneurial farmers (white 
commercial farmers)
Lack of democratic rule Local stakeholders (black farmers)
Immoral behaviour in modern society Rain-makers and local leaders
Strategic political entrepreneurs will try to strengthen their own positions 
by building alliances with other actors. They will thus engage in naming 
the problem in a way that not only puts their own in-groups in a favourable 
position, but also appeal to other groups in hope for additional legitimacy 
(cf. the concept of “leverage politics” in Keck and Sikkink 1998:23). This
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creates a web in which proponents, drawing on different points of refer­
ence, will wind up supporting each other. As I will show in chapter seven, 
water engineers at the Department of Water Development in Harare tried 
to increase their social and political relevance by creating a connection 
between their engineering competence and the political project of nation 
building promoted by the national political elite. They consequently ad­
vocated a position of engineering science as “a tool in the development of 
the nation”. By placing the application of scientific water management in 
the service of the nation-state, the political entrepreneurs at the Depart­
ment of Water Development sought to strike an alliance with the political 
establishment advocating water as part of the post-colonial political project 
of nation building.
Claiming and blaming based on constructions of reality
I now turn to the strategies of claiming and blaming that political entrepre­
neurs can employ to gain legitimacy for their claims during the domestic 
transformation process. The focus is thus on the second column in table
4.2, which contains the empirical questions regarding claiming and blaming 
practices surrounding legitimate distribution of resources. The questions in 
the second column are: What constitutes the basis for making a legitimate 
claim or legitimately assigning blame? Who can make legitimate claims or 
legitimately assign blame?
As political entrepreneurs engage in the transformation process they will 
try to gain legitimacy for what they believe to be favourable constructions 
of claims and blames. Drawing on collective memories (question C in table
4.2. ), they will attempt to establish what kind of actions and omissions 
should be regarded as relevant for making claims on and assigning blame 
in the policy area targeted for reform. With reference to Zimbabwe, one 
contested question was if it was achievements in the commercial agricul­
tural sector, or a track record as a soldier in the war for Independence, that 
could constitute the basis for legitimate claims on water resources. The 
former position was advanced by the white commercial farmers while the 
latter was favoured by (parts of) the national government (see chapters 
five and six).
With regard to making claims and assigning blame by drawing on con­
structions of social identities (question D in table 4.2.), political entrepre­
neurs will try to identify themselves and strategic allies with positive features 
in the water sector while opponents will be blamed for the problems. In 
their efforts to manifest claims and assign blame, political entrepreneurs 
can make use of the social-psychological processes of social identity forma­
tion reviewed above: plasticity in social identities, stereotyping, and the 
inclination towards acceptance of representatives. One example of this can
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be seen in the attempts by nationalistic actors in Zimbabwe to discredit 
international development agencies proposing IWRM by associating them 
with “the other whites”, i.e. the white commercial farmers representing a 
strong special domestic interest with low social credibility in Zimbabwean 
society (chapter five). Similarly, I report in chapter seven how scientifically 
trained engineers working at the Department of Water Development in 
Harare frequently would disregard objections on the reform process coming 
from small scale rural farmers. Instead of evaluating the actual suggestions 
and views put forward, the engineers would stereotype local farmers as a 
group with unfounded, “unscientific”, views on water management.
Research in social psychology suggests that we tend to commemorate 
history by putting ourselves in a favourable light at the expense of others 
(cf. “egoism” above, Gilbert 1998). Ross and Ward (1995) argue that “dis­
putants are apt to feel that they have acted more honourably in the past, 
have been more sinned against than sinning” (p. 269; cf. March 1994:82f). 
In the negotiation of claims and blames, these biases in the recollection of 
history result in unwarrantedly high perceptions of relative entitlements 
on the resource. In their generic form these biases will lead to a situation in 
which everyone exaggerates their own relative claims and downplay those 
of others. Consequently, the degree of animosity and potential conflict is 
heightened. Roderick Kramer (1991) notes that ”Groups may find them­
selves engaged in a competition for resources that is driven by strongly 
held but mutually inconsistent convictions regarding their entitlement to 
... resources” (p 209). A combination of strategic manoeuvring by politi­
cal entrepreneurs and inherent human biases in the recollection of reality 
will thus inflate actors’ claims while downplaying others. Likewise, actors 
will be mindful to downplay any blame assigned to themselves while quite 
willingly assigning blame to others. The likely outcome is a situation with 
systematically more claims than blames on material and non-material re­
sources during the domestic transformation of international regimes.
An integrated framework for analysing domestic transformations 
of international regimes
The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretically based framework to 
understand and empirically analyse domestic transformation of interna­
tional regimes: How and why do international regimes become part of the 
reality constructs held by domestic actors in the targeted policy area? How 
do these transformed understandings affect the behavioural implications of 
the international regime? Following the analytic distinction between collec­
tive memories and social identities, I have pointed to social-psychological 
processes and the role of strategic action by political entrepreneurs. Table 
4.4 provides an overview of the framework for analysis.
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Table 4.4. An integrated framework for analysis of domestic transforma­



























• Claiming and 
blaming
• What is the pro­
blem and what 
is its solution?
• What constitutes 
the basis for 
making a legiti­









• Acceptance of 
representatives of 
the Self and 
Other
• Naming
• Claiming and 
blaming
• Who has caused 
the problem?
• Who can and 
should solve it?




Research strategy for analysing IWRM 
in Zimbabwe
The two main empirical sources for my analysis of the transformation of 
IWRM in Zimbabwe consisted of a series of ninety-one interviews with 
actors engaged in the reform process, and, second, an extensive review of 
relevant documents, such as policy reports, legal documents, protocols from 
stakeholder meetings, official correspondence between the concerned par­
ties, and Zimbabwean newspapers. My general understanding of the water 
sector in Zimbabwe was developed by direct observations as I visited various 
kinds of farmers in different part of the country and sat in on stakeholder 
meetings at different levels (from local sub-catchment meetings to central 
catchment meetings).
In the process of analysing this material I have drawn on quite extensive 
previous research on Zimbabwean politics in general and natural resources 
management in particular. During my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, I was as­
sociated with the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at University 
of Zimbabwe. At the time, CASS was conducting an research programme 
on the water sector reform which gave me direct access not only to much
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of the academic expertise available in Zimbabwe but also to un-published 
reports and material.
The bulk of the empirical material was collected during a series of fieldtrips
in Zimbabwe in the period 1997-2001, and with engaged international 
development agencies during 2002-2003.1 have subsequently kept contact 
via e-mail and telephone calls with some key interviewees in Zimbabwe. 9
This has been helpful to keep up to date with more recent developments. a
I have also kept in touch with and interviewed some of the key actors from jfl
Zimbabwe as we have jointly visited international conferences on water 
resources management in Europe.
My first entry-point into the empirical material in Zimbabwe was a fl
number of reports from conferences in Zimbabwe where actors had met 
to discuss water resources management. I used the list of participants from 
these conferences to come up with my first list of potential interviewees. S|
1'his strategy proved only partly successful as a number of the individuals ||
present at these conferences were no longer working with water manage- 
ment or did not want to be interviewed. The reason for their reluctance was ||
never spelled out, but one probable reason was the fact that at that time I ||
lacked written or verbal recommendations, which proved quite important H
working in Zimbabwe. The conference listings were nevertheless quite use­
ful as they provided me with a point of departure for developing a list of 
individuals and institutions engaged in water management. This allowed 
me to get started on the process of identifying suitable interviewees. Once I 
got started, the persons interviewed were frequently happy to help me meet 
other people of relevance in their networks of colleagues and friends (cf the 
notion of “snowball” sampling in Miles and Huberman 1994:28ff).
My second entry point into the empirical field was a series of field trips 
conducted through the research programme at CASS. Travelling with re­
searchers from CASS allowed me to benefit from their contacts with and 
trust from local water users and set me in contact with small-scale farmers, 
elected members of stakeholder boards (catchment and sub-catchment 
councils), community leaders, and spiritual mediums (rain makers). This 
broad network of contacts was invaluable in identifying and getting access 
to suitable interviewees. Similar assistance was provided though the help 
of the Swedish Embassy and Swedish experts seconded to Zimbabwean 
government institutions as experts on water management. They helped me 
identify people at international development agencies/organisations working 
to promote IWRM in Zimbabwe, and also introduced me to senior officials 
within the related Zimbabwean administration. The staff of international 
development agencies and international consultants sometimes have quite 
short contracts for their involvement with projects such as the water sector 
reform in Zimbabwe. Besides my interviews with internationals based in 
Harare during my fieldwork, I therefore travelled to meet people engaged
ÿ-
in the water sector reform in the USA (representing the World Bank), and 
to three of the four international development agencies supporting the 
reform coming out of Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK. Representa­
tives from the fourth international supporter, Germany, were interviewed 
over the telephone.
The process of data collection started quite inductively. My first series 
of interviews (twenty interviews) were intentionally rather loose, with a 
minimally structured interview guide, and included a diverse selection of 
people. The aim was to identify what a variety of water users and water 
related professionals regarded as the critical issues in the water sector reform. 
For quite some time I entertained the idea of comparing the impact of the 
water sector reform in a strategic selection of local communities. I had been 
inspired by the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990) on the role of small scale 
communities as a forum for sustainable development, and I considered 
designing my investigation to compare a strategic selection of local com­
munities impacted by the reform process. All of this had nothing to do with 
domestic understandings of international regimes but was oriented towards 
institutional factors and their effects on actor’s incentives. As I accounted 
for in the preface, my interest in domestic transformations was spurred out 
of conversations with Zimbabwean actors engaged in the implementation 
of IWRM. Based on these conversations I started to realise that different 
actors in Zimbabwe were coming up with quite different understandings of 
IWRM: IWRM was being transformed during the implementation process. 
As I decided that this was the story I was going to tell in my dissertation, I 
realised that I had to expand my sample beyond local communities. Based 
on my initial round of interviews I therefore made a first categorisation of 
interviewees that seemed central for my investigation. Six broad categories 
were determined. Table 4.5 presents the categories and the number of people 
that I eventually interviewed from each category.
A few comments are helpful in relation to table 4.5. This table excludes 
the initial round of interviews (twenty interviews) intended to give me a 
first overview of the water sector reform and to develop a relevant focus for 
my work. In addition, some of my interviewees could rightly be counted 
as belonging to more than one category, e.g. holding public office and 
conducting farming. In such cases, I have attributed them to the category 
representing the main capacity in which I interviewed them. On eight oc­
casions I returned for a second interview with people I saw as key to my 
understanding of the developments. Table 4.5 accounts for the number 
of interviewees, rather than actual interviews. All in all I have conducted 
ninety-one documented interviews as part of the field work. (20 initially, 
63 as in table 4.5, 8 repeated interviews).
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Ministers and permanent secretaries responsible for water resources and 
related areas
6
Public sector officials in institutions administrating water 
resources
Ministry of Land and Water Resources, Department of Water 




In particular from the World Bank and the four bilateral donors support­
ing the reform process (Norway, Germany, the Dutch, and the UK).
18
Large scale white commercial farmers
Including representatives from the Commercial Farmers Union.
7
Small scale local farmers and leaders




Did I conduct enough interviews with people from each category in table 
4.5? This type of question is not unusual for researchers using qualitative 
interviews because it is generically difficult to decide when enough inter­
views have been conducted. Despite this difficulty, the literature on research 
methodology does not provide any really good answers to the question of 
when to stop interviewing. “Theoretical saturation” is put up as a rule-of- 
thumb to limit the number of interviews (Esaiasson, Gilljam et al. 2002: 
ch. 14). This implies that additional interviews are made until no new 
information comes out from adding an additional interview. Esaiasson and 
colleagues suggest that when the interviewees basically repeat each other, 
this is a sign that it is time to go home and start the analysis (p. 187). 
While this gives some indication of the need for additional interviews, it is 
typically difficult to apply as there might always be some new information 
coming out of an additional interview. This problematic compounds in a 
work-process where what actually is being said by the interviewees only 
becomes clear during the in-depth analysis of the interviews (see section 
on latent meanings below). This in-depth analysis is typically done much 
later than the actual period of data collection. In my case I was also lim­
ited by need to travel to Zimbabwe. It was only when I did my in-depth 
analysis of the interviews back in Sweden that I really started to see what
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the interviewees had said, and at that stage I had quite limited resources to 
add additional interviews.
In my assessment, having reviewed all the material and finished the 
analysis, I would nevertheless say that I did conduct enough interviews 
to reach theoretical saturation in each category of interviewees with the 
exception of rain-makers. It took quite some energy and time to build up 
the connections and trust that finally allowed me to meet the two rain­
makers that I did interview. I eventually interviewed one of them twice, 
for a total period of more than three hours. The interview with the second 
rain-maker lasted about two hours. Taken together this allowed me to go 
into quite some detail on their construction of reality in which ancestral 
spirits play a major role in the management of water (see chapter eight on 
Water as a Gift from the Gods). I should also say that this construction of 
reality was supported by a number of interviewees from other categories, 
in particular public sector officials and politicians. Their statements added 
to my knowledge on this construction of reality. In addition, there is quite 
a substantial academic literature, including extensive anthropological work 
from Zimbabwe, that spells out this construction of reality. Having reviewed 
much of this literature, I think that I have been able to make up for the lack 
of additional interviews with rain-makers. With the benefit of hindsight, 
I also see that I could have limited the number of interviews with public 
officials and international donor agents, even though these interviews were 
quite useful for my overall understanding of the reform process.
The list of categories of interviewees in table 4.5 does not include repre­
sentatives from every form of water resources management in Zimbabwe. 
It does not, for example, include representatives of the mining sector, or 
urban planners involved in water supply and sanitation. My focus has been 
on actors working at a comprehensive national level and/or with agriculture. 
The reason for this focus is that these groups were identified as the most 
salient actors by the interviewees included in my initial round of interview 
(the twenty interviews mentioned above). This view was corroborated by 
my review of articles in the major Zimbabwean newspapers. This review 
confirmed that these actors were the most vocal in the reform process. In 
addition, the agricultural sector is by far the greatest user of water in Zim­
babwe, and more than eighty percent of Zimbabwe’s population depend 
on agriculture as their main source of income (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; 
Derman 2000).
Having finished my first initial round of interviews—which by intention 
were kept very open—I developed a more structured interview-guide with 
specific questions to pose to the second round of interviewees. From the 
initial round of interviews I was convinced that the three pillars of IWRM 
(sustainable development, water as an economic good, and stakeholder 
participation) were widely known and discussed among water users in Zim­
babwe, and as such I decided to let them guide my subsequent interviews.
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In his account of qualitative interviews, Steinar Kvale (1997) argues that 
an interview should be both structured and dynamic to make sure that the 
same topics are covered in all interviews while being sensitive to variations 
occurring in the meeting with individual interviewees (Kvale 1997ch. 5,7,8). 
To allow for structure, I asked all interviewees questions related to the three 
pillars of IWRM. To keep the interviews dynamic, I often adjusted the 
actual interview questions posed to a specific interviewee to accommodate 
their background and how the interview situation progressed. I thus did 
not ask the same questions to a high-level politician in Harare as I did to a 
small-scale farmer in the countryside. Nevertheless, the same themes—the 
pillars of IWRM—were covered in all interviews. In addition, each interview 
included an initial section with questions set out to capture the construc­
tion of reality of the interviewees, including how they looked at water, what 
social/political/religious/economic values that were attached to water, and 
their own role in relation to water resources management, and what other 
actors they regarded as important in the water sector.
My interviews with members of the international community were some­
what different, since I did not regard these actors as “targeted domestic 
actors” of IWRM. These interviews had more of an informant character 
(see below) with the aim of helping me understand the factual development 
of the reform process. Some of the interviewees from this category had for 
long periods of time worked very closely with people in the Zimbabwean 
water sector. Some of them were seconded as experts to the Zimbabwean 
water-related administration, others had extensive experience from nego­
tiating with the top-level political leadership, while others still had worked 
on local projects related to water resources management. I thus regarded 
this group as a source of insight into the views and considerations of the 
targeted domestic actors. Overall my interviews were kept quite open-ended 
to allow room for the interviewees to elaborate their views. The interviews 
typically lasted between forty-five minutes and three hours, with the latter 
often taking place in the home of the interviewees.
To cover the wide spectrum of views in Zimbabwe’s water sector, my 
sample of interviewees has been quite diverse. I have interviewed top-level 
Zimbabwean politicians who, in their fight to regain control over their 
lands and waters, saw their friends and family killed in the war against the 
white minority rulers. I interviewed rain-makers dressed only in animal 
skins and who granted an interview only after having asked for permission 
from, and introduced me to, their ancestral spirits in a ceremony. My sample 
also included white commercial farmers who often looked to me as a fellow 
white and were happy to take me in on their farms for a night or two. All 
this was quite different from using an interpreter to talk to a small-scale 
farmer out on his fields, or sitting in an air-conditioned office at a foreign 
Embassy in downtown Harare, or the headquarters of a development agency 
or Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, the Haag, or London.
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Moving in this diverse terrain and asking questions about the contested 
issue of water resources management I often encountered questions, and in 
some camps even suspicion, concerning the actual intentions and interests 
of a person such as myself, i.e. a white young researcher from Sweden. As 
an indication of how contested my work was in some quarters, I could 
mention that on at least two occasions, people whom I worked with or 
interviewed used spies to track my movements. In her account of doing 
qualitative interviews Helene Thomsson (2002) points out that in situa­
tions where there are strong tensions between the interview person and 
interviewers, this is likely to influence the interview situation and coun­
teract the ideal of inter-subjectivity whereby the content of an interview 
can later be corroborated (Thomsson 2002:96f, 119ff; cf Trost 1997:92f). 
I took a number of measures to deal with this problem. As mentioned 
above, interviews were often set up based on recommendations of previous 
interviewees who typically also informed the new interviewee about me 
and my project. Being able to introduce myself as an Associate Researcher 
at CASS—renowned throughout Zimbabwe’s water sector—was of great 
help in reducing the tension of interviews. I was also very concerned with 
adjusting to each interview situation by formulating the interview questions 
based on the interviewees’ every day practices, and I tried to pick up on the 
appropriate dress codes, body language, and English accents (Kvale 1997: 
ch 6, 7). In a few interviews I actually made sure not to have my eyes at a 
higher level than the interviewee since I had been informed that this could 
be interpreted as a sign of disrespect in that specific setting.
Typically, I used a tape-recorder to document my interviews. On a few 
occasions the interviewee explicitly turned down my request to use a tape­
recorder, or I felt that the dynamic of the interview would be hurt by a 
recorder. In such instances I took notes. To allow a better recollection of 
what had been said, I made a habit out of taking time to review the notes 
for myself as soon as possible with the tape-recorder on. The lion’s share 
of the recorded interviews were later transcribed in full, leaving some 
interviews to be analysed directly from the recordings and my notes (for 
economic reasons).
As water resources management is a highly charged political issue in 
Zimbabwe I have been careful to protect the anonymity of my interviewees. 
Catering for anonymity is an explicit requirement from the core financial 
contributors of this project (the Swedish Council for Research in the Hu­
manities and Social Sciences) and many interviewees were quite explicit 
that they would only allow an interview if I would guarantee anonymity. 
At such occasions, I typically would hand over a written statement signed 
by my supervisor and myself guaranteeing anonymity. On a few occasions, 
the person turned down my offer of anonymity. Reporting from the later 
interviews I have considered myself at liberty to reveal the real identity of
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the interview person, but I have only done so when this adds substantially 
to the validity of the analysis. I have taken several measures to conceal the 
real identity of the interviewees asking for anonymity. In the process of 
transcribing the interviews, I informed my assistants of the ethical rules 
guiding my project, and they all signed an agreement honouring these rules. 
I chose not to engage anyone in Zimbabwe to help me with this job as it 
was sometimes difficult to know whom to trust with such sensitive infor­
mation. Moreover, as I report from the interviews in the empirical section 
below, I have excluded all information that could be used to identify the 
interviewee. When presenting quotes in the empirical chapters, I have thus 
left out information about the person’s formal position or background. I 
have also taken out any indications of the gender of the interviewees. This 
implies that I present all my interviewees as men, even though I did in­
deed interview a substantial number of women. Not being able to disclose 
information on who is behind a citation is a real drawback. It would have 
added to the richness of my analysis if I could disclose who was behind a 
particular statement. However, instead of such personal information, I have 
systematically used neutral labels such as “senior official”, “high ranking 
politician” or “small scale farmer” to indicate what type of person is being 
quoted.
Analysing the empirical material
In table 4.2 above, I presented four questions that are based in the theory 
of domestic transformations of international regimes. The four questions 
are designed to guide the empirical analysis of the domestic transformation 
process. They read: (A) What is the problem and its solution? (B) Who has 
caused the problem?; Who can and should solve it? (C) What constitutes 
the basis for making a legitimate claim or legitimately assigning blame? (D) 
Who can make legitimate claims or legitimately assign blame?
My concern has been to understand the answers to these questions given 
by the targeted domestic actors by analysing these answers in relation to, 
on the one hand, the original formulations of IWRM, and, on the other 
hand, the targeted domestic actors’ prevailing constructions of reality. I have 
thus analysed how the targeted domestic actors answered questions A—D, 
and by comparing this with the original formulations of IWRM as well as 
the domestic actors’ constructions of reality, I have arrived at my empirical 
account of the transformation of IWRM.
This analytic strategy calls for two points of reference: the original posi­
tion of IWRM, and the domestic actors’ prevailing constructions of reality 
apart from the encounter with IWRM. Both these points of reference serve 
as the empirical baseline with which to compare the new, transformed, un­
derstandings that the targeted domestic actors developed during the reform
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process. To arrive at the original position of IWRM I set out to distinguish 
the original position of IWRM with regard to each of the three pillars of 
IWRM that were introduced in chapter two (catchment management, 
water as an economic good, stakeholder participation). These answers are 
presented in table 4.5 and cover the four questions A—D. My primary sources 
for this empirical baseline were the central policy documents outlining 
IWRM held by its proponents in and around Zimbabwe at the outset of 
the reform process around 1991. Interviews with policy makers representing 
international actors promoting IWRM in Zimbabwe served to corroborate 
the views presented in the documents. As I explained in chapter two, the 
World Bank had taken the lead role at the international level to have IWRM 
implemented throughout Africa, including in Zimbabwe. This is why I have 
given some precedence to the view on IWRM held by the World Bank. 
However, as confirmed by my interviews, no substantial difference existed 
at that time between the view of the World Bank and other international 
advocates of IWRM such as UNDP and the four bilateral donor countries 
engaged in the water sector reform in Zimbabwe (Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, and the UK).
My second empirical point of reference consisted of the targeted domestic 
actors’ prevailing constructions of reality before the introduction of IWRM. 
Ideally, I should have collected information on this before the introduction 
of IWRM to make sure that the view that transpired was indeed independ­
ent of the propositions of IWRM. Due to resource constraints this was not 
possible. I therefore used two other empirical sources. As mentioned above, 
each interview with targeted domestic actor’s in Zimbabwe included ques­
tions aiming at their general perceptions of society and the role of water. 
I asked questions to uncover what associations they made to water, what 
values were attached, and how they saw the role of themselves and others 
in relation to the management of water. The second source of informa­
tion consisted of secondary literature covering the history of Zimbabwe, 
Zimbabwean politics, natural resources management in Zimbabwe and the 
region at large, as well as literature on religious associations to water and 
perceptions about the spiritual world.
In the empirical section below there are four different constructions of 
reality presented. I have labelled these “Water as Zimbabwe”, “Water as 
Gold”, “Water as Science”, and “Water as a Gift from the Gods”. Together 
they cover what I found to be the prevailing understandings of water in 
Zimbabwe. These constructions where not in anyway self-evident as I started 
to read about water management in Zimbabwe. In the process of develop­
ing these constructions of reality I was inspired by Max Webers’ idea of 
“ideal-types” (Weber 1983). As I started to get some in-depth understand­
ing of the empirical field, I was able to draw up the basic contours of these 
constructions. Their more precise content transpired iteratively during my 
field trips and later analytic work.
84
Table 4.6. The original position of IWRM with regard to its three pillars 











- problem: fragmented manage­
ment
- solution: ecosystem, sector-wide 
approach
II. Water as an economic good
- problem: lack of economic incen­
tives
- solution: market economic 
institutions
III. Stakeholder participation:
- problem: undemocratic rule, lack 
of ownership
- solution: stakeholder democracy
Empirical question C
What constitutes the basis for 




- every kind of activity influencing 
water resources in the basin
II. Water as an economic good:
- economic achievements and 
purchasing power
III. Stakeholder participation:




Who has caused the problem;
Who can and should solve it?
IWRM’s original positions
I. Catchment management:
- problem: overusing by stakehold­
ers and water managers without 
proper training;
- solutions: trained ecosystem 
experts and water users.
II. Water as an economic good:
- problem: rational consumers 
under irrational incentive;
- solution: rational consumers 
under sustainable incentives geared 
to collective action
III. Stakeholder participation:
- problem: centralistic government;
- solution: local stakeholders.
Empirical question D




- all stakeholders including nature 
itself
II: Water as an economic good:
- all economically viable actors
III. Stakeholder participation:
- all stakeholders
On the basis of these two points of reference—the original meanings of 
IWRM, and the prevailing domestic constructions of reality—I have looked
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for how targeted domestic actors engaged in transforming the propositions 
of IWRM. What was the response of domestic political entrepreneurs to 
the propositions made by IWRM? How did the domestic political entre­
preneurs use IWRM as well as prevailing domestic constructions of reality 
to develop their transformed understanding of IWRM and to make these 
understandings socially and politically viable?
Informants and respondents
It is useful to distinguish between two types of qualitative interviews: 
informant interviews and respondent interviews (Kvale 1997; Esaiasson, 
Gilljam et al. 2002). In informant interviews, interviewees are seen as a 
source of information about factual events and this information is verified 
using standard techniques such as triangulation. If interviewees are seen 
as respondents, the information coming out of the interview is analysed 
as part of a larger perspective and the aim is to arrive at an understanding 
of what the interviewees say that makes sense from their perspectives (cf. 
Kvales’ account of hermeneutics, ch 3). In contrast to informants, respond­
ents should not be understood as being right or wrong, rather the analytic 
focus is on making sense out of what is said taking into account the larger 
perspective of the person interviewed.
The overall aim of my analysis is to arrive at how targeted domestic 
actors transformed IWRM. With this aim, I have primarily regarded my 
interviewees as respondents. Selecting my interviewees, I have consequently 
tried to get at people who were actually involved, on a daily basis, with 
water resources management in Zimbabwe. What were their constructions 
of reality? How did they perceive IWRM? Clearly, my selection is very 
limited in relation to the larger group of “targeted domestic actors”. I have, 
however, used my selection of interviewees as a source of information of 
the views and opinions of this larger group. I made a strategic selection of 
interviewees with the intention of finding people who were “information­
rich” representatives who “manifest the phenomenon [i.e. the transformed 
understandings of IWRM] intensely, but not extremely” (Miles and Huber- 
man 1994:28; cf, Kvale 1997: 197ff). In addition to regarding my inter­
viewees as respondents, I have used them as informants to get insights on 
actual developments during the water sector reform. Who did what, when, 
and with whom? Whereas interviews with all different kinds of interview­
ees typically contained some informant data, this was particularly the case 
with my interviews with members of the international donor community 
supporting the reform process.
When I had conducted and transcribed my interviews, I started the process 
of actually analysing what was being said by the interviewees. I based my 
readings of the interviews on the theoretical framework presented earlier 
in this chapter. Apart from that, my approach was quite inductive. I was
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looking for patterns in how the interviewees looked at water, IWRM, 
themselves, and others as indicated by questions A-D in table 4.2. Kvale 
(1997) points out that working with a large amounts of empirical material, 
it is useful to start by concentrating longer sections of an interview into 
more condensed quotes (1997:175ff; cf Miles and Humberman 1994:ch 
4). Afraid that I would affect the actual content of the interview, I only 
applied this technique very moderately. Instead, I started to categorise the 
utterances from the interviews in relation to a framework consisting of (i) 
the four construction of reality and, as subheadings within each construc­
tion, (ii) the three pillars of IWRM (Kvale 1997:178ff). I did not use any of 
the available computer programs designed to analyse qualitative materials. 
Instead I read the interviews repeatedly and marked different sections to 
indicate which constructions of reality and pillars of IWRM were discussed. 
For example, one section of an interview could be marked “WaZ/sp” and 
another section WaGG/price” to indicate that the first section should be 
seen in light of Water as Zimbabwe and the pillar of stakeholder participa­
tion, and the later section in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods and 
the pillar of pricing water. As a second step in the analysis, I put all quotes 
belonging to the same sections into separate computer documents.
It should be noted that my unit of analysis in this process was not in­
dividual interviewees but separate utterances made by the interviewees. 
Research in social psychology has pointed out that individuals can hold 
multiple constructions of reality and social identities. As I wanted to be 
sensitive to this, I did not a priori regard a person in relation to one par­
ticular construction of reality. For example, as I analysed my interviews 
with public officials working on water management, I did not start off 
by assuming that they would subscribe to the construction of Water as 
Science. As I analysed an interview with a person whose socio-structural 
characteristics (work place and education) indicated that he belonged to 
one group, I systematically tried to keep an open mind to the possibility 
that his utterances were better understood in the context of any of the other 
three constructions of reality that I had worked out (or even in relation 
to a fifth construction that I had not yet become aware of). As it turned 
out there were, however, quite small in-group variations in the empirical 
material. People in and around the government generally came out in sup­
port of Water as Zimbabwe; the white commercial farmers predominantly 
subscribed to Water as Gold; professional water officials looked at water 
management along the parameters of Water as Science; and local farmers 
and community leaders were typically oriented around Water as a Gift from 
the Gods. In other words, formal positions and structural variables (race, 
profession, education etc) turned out to be quite good proxies for which 
construction of reality that was supported. The only major exception to this 
result concerns the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. I found 
support for this view among all categories of interviewees, with the excep-
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tion of the white commercial farmers. I thus found support for Water as a 
Gift from the Gods not only among local farmers and traditional leaders 
but also among public officials with a doctoral degree in a natural science 
working at the Department of Water Development in Harare, as well as 
politicians in and around the government.
In his account of analysing qualitative interviews, Kvale (1997) makes the 
distinction between looking for “manifest as opposed to latent meanings 
in the material (ch 12; cf Miles and Huberman 1994:ch 10). The mani­
fest meaning of an interview is what the interview person says out right 
and explicitly. Analysing manifest meanings of an interview is typically a 
straight-forward exercise of taking serious note of what exactly is being 
said and then thinking about how this can be used to better understand 
the developments being analysed. I used this technique primarily on the 
informant data coming out of my interviews. Reading these interviews, I 
thus focused on what was being said explicitly and how this could help me 
understand the transformation process. Further, given my aim to under­
stand how targeted domestic actors came to transform IWRM I systemati­
cally looked for manifest meanings in the interviews. This implies moving 
beyond what was explicitly stated by the interviewee. I searched for more 
profound meanings that stood out as the interview was analysed from a 
broader social and cultural context.
Looking for latent meanings in an interview, what the interview person 
said was thus analysed by placing it in a larger context that added meaning to 
the specific utterance. An illustrative example comes from an interview with 
a white farmer living in a small town south of Harare. At the beginning of 
the interview I asked him how it was living in this town. He replied: “Well 
you know, there aren’t many of us in this area, but there are a few thousand 
people living here.” As I analysed this and similar statements, I took into 
account that it was made in a context in which distinctions between black 
and white was commonplace. People constantly categorised and talked about 
other people and themselves in such racial categories. When he says us I 
thus take this to mean “Us-the-whites” as opposed to “Them-the-Blacks . 
Taking this into account, I understood his statement to mean: ‘There aren’t 
many of us whites in this area, but there are a few thousand blacks living 
here’. Further analysing this statement taking into account the context in 
which it was said, I would feel quite comfortable stating that the interviewee 
meant that it was a bad thing that there are so few whites in his town as 
opposed to the blacks. This analysis draws on the stigmatisation of blacks 
that I encountered repeatedly in my interviews, and that I also found in 
much of the literature describing contemporary Zimbabwean politics and 
society (see chapter five and six). At a manifest level, this interviewee did 
not say anything about race, nor did he make any moral statements about 
blacks. Based on the context in which the statement was made, however, I 
nevertheless read in such meanings at a latent level of this statement.
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5. IWRM AND WATER AS ZIMBABWE
In this chapter, I analyse the transformation of IWRM in relation to the 
role of water in the project of nation building in Zimbabwe. The label 
“Water as Zimbabwe” denotes the reality construction of water widely 
held in government circles and characterised by the view that water is a 
strategic resource for the government to manifest itself and the nation-state 
of Zimbabwe as legitimate in the eyes of its inhabitants.
This chapter is organised as follows. First, I outline the construction of 
Water as Zimbabwe by pointing to the role of water management in the 
post-colonial project of nation building undertaken by the government 
that took office in Harare at Independence in 1980. The second section 
traces the developments around the first (failed) and second (successful) 
attempts to establish IWRM as the official platform for the water sector 
reform in Zimbabwe. Given that this official—or formal—adaptation of 
IWRM was only the first part of the implementation of IWRM in Zim­
babwe, the third section provides a detailed analysis of the transformation 
of IWRM in relation to IWRM’s call for catchment management, water as 
an economic good, and stakeholder participation. The forth section points 
to the conclusions of the analysis.
Water as Zimbabwe
At Independence in 1980, the incoming government inherited a fragile 
political construction encompassing competing claims for legitimacy and 
resources. In chapter two I pointed to three main sources of the fragility 
of the governments’ ambition to make Zimbabwe a unified political unit: 
(i) ethnic divisions between Shona and Ndebele; (ii) divisions between 
blacks and whites (former rulers and now economically powerful com­
mercial farmers); (iii) demands for political change from domestic civil 
society. Zimbabwe was, in short, a nation state in the making and the new 
government had to manifest the state as a viable platform for cooperation, 
and ‘Zimbabwe’ a natural point of reference in the formation of identities 
(Sylvester 1991; Raftopoulos 2000).
To reach these objectives, the government set out to influence the everyday 
lives of the rural population and to make the state apparatus the nexus in 
the distribution of goods and services in the rural societies (Munro 1998). 
In a country with over eighty percent of the population engaged in agrar-
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ian production, control over the management of natural resources was the 
most vital instrument to manifest the state. In practical terms, this meant 
putting the government in control over the management of land and water 
resources. At the time, more than half of the country’s capacity for storing 
water in dams was controlled by white commercial farmers widely associated 
with the former white minority international regime (Derman and Ferguson 
2000a). Moreover, traditional practices and local leaders played the key role 
in administrating water resources at the local level which constituted a chal­
lenge for the post-colonial project of manifesting Zimbabwe as unified state. 
President Robert Mugabe acknowledged the strategic role of water and the 
difficult agenda for the government in water resources management. In his 
opening speech at one of the major dams in Zimbabwe he said:
Government, having embarked on implementing the land 
reform and resettlement programme, recognises that the sur­
est way of transforming the lives of our rural population is by 
facilitating their access to water. (Government of Zimbabwe 
1998d).
The strategic role of water is further asserted in a major review undertaken 
by the government to identify obstacles to the development of the country. 
The review concludes:
Documents discussing the relationship between land and water 
conclude generally that not land but water is the limiting fac­
tor in the further development of Zimbabwe (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:8).
In chapter four, I established that different ways of naming the problem and 
solution of a policy area convey different systems of resource distribution 
and different actors as legitimate. In this chapter, I will show how, in the 
context of post-colonial Zimbabwe, the government set out to name water 
as part of the struggle to liberate the country from its former white rulers, 
and as part of the project of providing development for its population. For 
the government of Zimbabwe, water was a strategic resource around which 
the social contract of nation building was to be reached. Water manage­
ment was a means to manifest the legitimacy of the government, and it 
was at the core of the process of socialising inhabitants of the country into 
citizens of Zimbabwe.
I argue that advocates of Water as Zimbabwe regarded IWRM’s prescrip­
tions for water management as threats to their strategic role in the process 
of nation building. These actors wanted to use water management as a tool 
to manifest the project of nation building and thereby manifest the social
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identity of the government as part of the solution to underdevelopment. 
By contrast, champions of IWRM defined the problem of water manage­
ment in terms of the three pillars of IWRM, i.e. ecological management, 
economic rationality, and as a means to redistribute power from the state 
to local stakeholders. In particular, I argue that (i) IWRM’s call for catch­
ment management was seen as a threat by supporters of Water as Zimbabwe 
because it introduced a unit for cooperation—the catchment—with the 
potential to legitimise social and political mobilisation around water outside 
the control of the state. The catchment system cut across the existing pro­
vincial system which was the backbone of the government’s administrative 
apparatus for control of rural societies (Sylvester 1991; Munro 1998); (ii) 
IWRM’s call for water as an economic good placed water consumers in 
a process of socialisation into “consumers” while the government wanted 
water to be a means to socialise its subjects into “Zimbabwean citizens”; 
(iii) IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation implied a devolution of 
power and control from the central state to local communities in a political 
context where the government wanted to use water management as a way 
to increase its legitimacy as an actor in society.
Refusing and introducing IWRM to Zimbabwe
The first attempt to introduce IWRM
In the beginning of July 1993, a group of international development agen­
cies led by the World Bank organised a workshop at the Victoria Falls in 
Zimbabwe. Forty-eight senior water managers from nine southern African 
countries attended the five day session. The Zimbabwean government 
hosted the event, and fifteen senior officials from different ministries, in­
cluding Minister K. Kangai with the overarching responsibility for water 
resources management, represented Zimbabwe at the conference (World 
Bank, UNDP et al. 1993). The workshop was effectively the World 
Bank’s attempt to launch water sector reforms on the template of IWRM 
throughout Southern Africa. The impact of the workshop was confirmed 
in the document widely seen as the blueprint for the water sector reform. 
Entitled “Programme for the Development of a National Water Resources 
Management Strategy (WRMS) for Zimbabwe: Project Document”, the 
document was produced jointly by the Government of Zimbabwe and the 
development agencies of the four donors that later come to be engaged in 
the reform: Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. 
With reference to the workshop at Lake Victoria, this document states:
During this event a common understanding was reached 
among key players concerned with water development in
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Zimbabwe on what should be the form and scope of a Water 
Resources Management Strategy (WRMS) and how it should 
be developed and implemented. (Government of Zimbabwe, 
Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:1)
This assessment was sustained by several of the workshop participants 
from Zimbabwe. One of them, holding one of the most senior positions 
in Zimbabwe’s official water administration at the time, said:
I: This was really a watershed in my life, it changed my way 
of looking at water management. It was a real eye-opener for 
me.29
29 As the number of people from Zimbabwe attending the Workshop was relatively small, I 
will not disclose which interviewee made this comment, as this could reveal the persons iden­
tity. When quoting from interviews, interviewees whose identities need to be protected will 
be denoted by the acronym “I”. The researcher will always be denoted by “R”. Interviewees 
who have agreed to be named will be denoted by firstname-surname initials (e.g. AB).
Present at the workshop was also Andrew Russell from the well known 
London-based consultancy firm Sir William Halcrow & Partners. Russell 
had just been appointed team leader for a group of consultants engaged 
by the British authorities to come up with a report on how to assist in the 
reform of Zimbabwe’s water sector. The report, to which I return shortly, 
was later to be know as the “Halcrow Report”.
Minister Kangai, who had the overarching responsibility for the govern­
ment’s water policy, supported the appointment of the Halcrow team. At 
the time, Minister Kangai was one of the most pro-reformist ministers in 
the government, and his reformist agenda gained currency in some circles 
in the government and civil society. This reformist agenda also made Kangai 
one of Mugabe’s more controversial ministers, and he was not well regarded 
in circles in and around the government who supported a more nationalis­
tic agenda for the post-colonial project of nation building (Skålnäs 1995). 
When I interviewed Minister Kangai at his farm outside of Harare he said 
that the ideas presented at the Workshop at Victoria Falls had a great impact 
on his conception of the need to progress with Zimbabwe’s water sector 
reform. He said that he saw Russell’s team from Halcrow as welcome, and 
highly qualified, support in implementing IWRM in the water sector of 
Zimbabwe (Interview 19B). Russell confirms the influence of the Victoria 
Falls Workshop on the future reform process in Zimbabwe. He claims:
AR: The World Bank was certainly pushing for countries to 
adopt water resources management strategies based on IWRM,
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and the workshop at Victoria Falls was very useful for us. We 
based quite a lot of our recommendations for Zimbabwe on 
what came out of that workshop (Interview 24).
The Halcrow Report was delivered in November 1993. Summarising the 
situation at that time, the conditions for introducing IWRM to Zimbabwe 
were quite favourable. Some of the most senior officials in Zimbabwe had 
been informed and were evidently impressed by the World Bank’s presenta­
tion of IWRM at Victoria Falls. Official government documents stated that 
the Workshop resulted in “a common understanding” on the “form and 
scope” of the reform process ahead (Government of Zimbabwe 1995:1). 
In other words, the World Bank had successfully influenced key actors in 
the community of water managers in Zimbabwe with the ideas of IWRM. 
Adding to the favourable conditions, officials from the World Bank and 
other international development organisations suggest that there was a 
substantial willingness to fund the reform (Interview 23, 24, 26, 27). Add 
to that the Halcrow Report, which was authored by world-leading experts 
and contained a technical road map for how to carry reforms forward in 
accordance with IWRM.
Despite these favourable conditions in 1993, IWRM was not established 
as the foundation for Zimbabwe’s water reform process at that time. Why 
not? The answer seems to be that the Halcrow Report was perceived by 
leading actors in the Government of Zimbabwe as contradicting key ele­
ments of the post-colonial project of nation building. Consider how the 
rejection of the Halcrow Report was later commented on in an official 
government report:
The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the consultancy team (Sir 
William Halcrow and Partners), in Zimbabwe at the time of 
the Victoria Falls Workshop, stipulated: ‘in consultation with 
Government and other relevant agencies, to prepare Terms 
of Reference for a consultancy to draw up a WRMS [water 
resources management strategy, i.e. the strategic instrument for 
implementing IWRM] for Zimbabwe’. This wording created 
considerable confusion at the time, because it suggested that 
a (foreign) consultant would prepare the strategy. A workshop 
later in July 1993 in Harare changed substantially the interpre­
tation of the TOR and concluded that what specifically was not 
required was the imposition of a strategy by an outside consult­
ant. The emphasis on making the development of WRMS an 
indigenous effort has been strong ever since. (Emphasis and 
parenthesis in original). (Government of Zimbabwe, Govern­
ment of Netherlands et al. 1995).
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This citation suggests two things. First, there were divisions between dif­
ferent actors within Zimbabwe’s water administration. It is evident that there 
was one group who had written the TOR for the Halcrow Report and did 
not mind bringing in international consultants to outline the parameters 
of the water sector reform. There was also a second group who opposed the 
Halcrow Report and saw it as imposed by an outsider. This group called for 
an “indigenisation” of the reform process. The core of the contestation was 
thus the issue of who was to prepare the strategy for the water sector reform. 
The fact that foreign consultants had been entrusted with this key issue was 
not well received by actors proposing an indigenous approach. Consider­
ing this reaction, we should take into account that the team of consultants 
behind the Halcrow Report originated from the former colonial power—the 
UK—which also had a dubious record with the government under Prime 
Minister Ian Smith during the years of white minority rule (1967-1980). 
In other words, the Other—the foreigners—who now proposed a ‘solu­
tion’ to the water sector reform were the same’ foreigners who had been 
part and parcel of creating the problem in the first place. This connection 
between the Halcrow Report and the former oppressor was emphasised by 
the fact that the team leader for Halcrow—Andrew Russell—had worked 
at the Department of Water Development for five years (1967-72) before 
Zimbabwe’s independence (Interview 24).30
30 This connection was not mentioned by any of my interviewee in Zimbabwe, but it is 
highly probable that at least the senior officials at the Zimbabwean Department of Water 
Development and related Ministry engaged in the reform would have recognised Mr. Rus­
sell from his previous engagement in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).
The second and perhaps most important thing to note in the government 
report above is that there seemed to have been a significant power struggle 
between the two groups on the issue of who should draft the strategy for 
the water sector reform. The citation suggests that the group who advocated 
that the reform should be indigenous had significant strength and managed 
to place their view on the agenda ever since’. A footnote to the quote above 
says that the debate over the role of the foreign consultants had created 
“confusion” which had “lingered on until today” and called on government 
representatives to “repeatedly” explain their position. This gives the picture 
of a power struggle between two groups of actors, both with significant 
political weight: One proposing the adoption of an international regime 
presented by an international agent; the other calling for a home-grown 
approach to the water sector reform.
One month before the World Bank workshop at Victoria Falls, some ac­
tors within Zimbabwe’s administration launched “The Water Act Review 
Board” (henceforth the “Review Board”). The timing of this initiative is 
interesting since it indicates that the Review Board was an attempt to recap-
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ture the initiative in the reform process from outsiders such as the World 
Bank and the Halcrow team. It appears that the same group of political 
entrepreneurs who opposed the Halcrow report also launched the Review 
Board. The Review Board was made up of senior officials within govern­
ment departments related to water and agriculture, as well as representatives 
of some of the most established interest groups in the agricultural sector 
(Water Act Review Board 1994).31
31 The following individuals were part of the Review Board: Dr. Mlambo, Chaiman (Lands 
Agriculture and Water Development); Mr. Makadho (Agritex); Mr. Khatzo (Regional 
Water Authority); Mr. Durham (DWD); Mr Chitando (Local Government, Rural and 
Urban Development); Mr. Mawoneke (Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union); Mr. Reed, on occa- 
tion replaced by Mr. Newton (CFU); Judge Matinenga (Administrative Court); Mr. Kock 
(Retired Judge of the Water Court).
My interpretation of this is that the Review Board was an initiative to 
counter fWRM and the World Bank initiative. This argument finds sup­
port in the substantial differences between the recommendations of the 
Review Board, presented in January 1994, and the ideas presented by the 
Halcrow Report. While the Halcrow Report suggested substantial reform 
of Zimbabwe’s water sector modelled on IWRM, the Review Board advo­
cated a perpetuation of existing structures with only slight adjustments. 
In short, the two reports can be contrasted in this way: The Review Board 
suggested that the “priority date system” be “retained” and supplemented 
with “amendments” to accommodate existing inequalities. As I explained in 
chapter two, the priority date system worked on a ‘first come, first served’ 
principle where the actor who first filed a valid application to extract water 
to the appropriate officials would be given that right. That right would then 
be valid in perpetuity. While this system provided stability and predictabil­
ity of access to water, which is conducive for investments in, for example, 
agricultural techniques, critics argued that this was also a source of social 
inequalities in distribution of water (Manzungu and van der Zaag 1996). 
In contrast to the priority date system, the Halcrow Report proposed a new 
management strategy in line with market based incentives and “an effective 
pricing strategy . Further, the Review Board suggested a “supply” oriented 
view aiming at “integrating the dams and river flow in a system in such a 
way as to obtain the maximum amount of water”. In sharp contrast to this 
suggesti°n but fully in line with the original intentions of IWRM—the 
Halcrow Report suggests “demand management” whereby market incentives 
are used to determine the optimal output amount of water while taking into 
account the need for water in the ecosystem (“natural flow”). Moreover, the 
Review Board did not employ the concept of “stakeholder participation”, 
which figures prominently in the plan to reform the water sector supplied 
by Russell’s team (Russell 1993; Water Act Review Board 1994).
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My interpretation, therefore, is that there was significant opposition in 
influential government circles against attempts to exert external influence 
on the water sector. This interpretation is supported by my interviews 
with senior water officials at the Department of Water Development in 
Harare. Consider how one official at the Department viewed the attempts 
by external actors to influence the agenda for reform (for more details on 
the Department’s responds to IWRM, see chapter seven):
R: From your experience, working within the old system for 
water management, I mean the old Water Act and the old 
institutional set up, do you consider that the reform process 
was really called for?
I: The old legislation wasn’t devilish as such. No, it was work­
able, except concerning a few things, there were provisions in 
the old legislation to address the need for change./..../
R: What did you think of the consultancy—the Halcrow 
Team—coming to help find solutions for the Zimbabweans?
I: Well, I mean, without beating my chest, for starters it wasn’t 
any issue. From the start we knew what we wanted, and the 
best thing anybody can do is to come in to help us in the direc­
tion we are going already, you know. We might need financial 
assistance or technical advice, not policy. Policy wise I dont 
know of any way in which we actually ran short of ideas. No, 
usually we set the parameters what we want to do, and then 
we ask for assistance where it’s required, that’s going in the 
direction we have decided on, yes (Interview 16).
This interview supports the conclusion that there was an influential group 
of actors within the administrative system who opposed the influence of 
foreign consultants and their attempts to bring in IWRM as the basis for 
a water sector policy reform. The interviewee advocates a reform based on 
policies derived from the Zimbabwean context. Further support for this 
interpretation is found in interviews with several of the members of the 
Review Board, although none of them would go on record and say that 
their report was an attempt to counteract the attempt to introduce IWRM 
via the Halcrow Report (Interview 13, 11B, 10B, 24B). Their hesitance 
is perhaps not surprising considering that IWRM was presented as the 
guiding principle for the water sector reform just a few years later (as I will 
soon explore in detail). The members of the Water Act Review Board, in
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other words, were to a large extent on the losing side in the battle over the 
agenda for Zimbabwe’s water sector reform.
To sum up thus far, despite the favourable conditions around 1993, 
IWRM was not established as the platform for Zimbabwe’s water sector 
reform. My argument is that a substantial reason for this was opposition to 
the Halcrow Report. In the context of Water as Zimbabwe, the content of 
the Halcrow Report, i.e. IWRM, was perceived by powerful actors in and 
around the government as being at odds with their political project of na­
tion building in Zimbabwe. IWRM was seen as contradicting the political 
ambition of manifesting the government at the nexus of the distribution of 
water in Zimbabwe, and the process of making the delivery of water part 
of the socialisation process whereby Zimbabwean farmers where supposed 
to become Zimbabwean citizens. In addition, the report provoked strong 
reactions because it was presented and financed by actors with close ties 
to the former colonial rulers. It was produced by the same Other—the 
UK—who was seen as being behind many of the problems facing the post­
colonial government. The evidence presented above suggests that behind 
the opposition to the Halcrow Report was a group of political entrepreneurs 
who advocated an indigenous approach to the reform of the water sector. 
The aim of the indigenous approach was to counter the proposition from 
foreign actors such as the UK and the World Bank, including their col­
laborators in Zimbabwe, such as Minister Kangai and his reformist associ­
ates. These outsiders were seen as trying to impose an external ‘solution’ 
for the management of Zimbabwe’s strategic water resources. The bulk of 
the indigenous alternative agenda was presented in the report of the Water 
Act Review Board and implied relatively modest adjustments to the exist­
ing system of water management. That the political momentum for water 
reform along the lines of IWRM was lost after 1993 indicates the political 
strength of the group advocating the indigenous approach.
This could very well have been the end of the story for IWRM in Zim­
babwe. Strong actors in the water sector had placed a well founded alterna­
tive agenda on the table—the Water Act Review Board—that offered an 
alternative approach to the water sector reform well in line with the post­
colonial project of developing the nation state of‘Zimbabwe’. Nevertheless, 
IWRM was implemented some years later. In the next section I will argue 
that the main reason IWRM was eventually accepted as the platform for 
the water sector reform was the successful construction of a connection 
between IWRM and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
(ESAP). During a number of years at the mid 1990’s ESAP was proposed 
as the legitimate reality construct for political life in Zimbabwe. Leading 
members of government including—according to several sources—presi­
dent Robert Mugabe himself, were fully committed to ESAP (Skålnäs 
1995; Bond 1998; Bond and Manyanya 2003). Connecting IWRM with
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ESAP placed IWRM within a reality construct in which IWRM could be 
presented as a logical and necessary implication for the water sector. ESAP 
provided political entrepreneurs supportive of IWRM with a reality con­
struct sufficiently viable and legitimate to win the day from advocates of 
the indigenous approach who in 1993 blocked IWRM by connecting it to 
the post-colonial project of nation building in Zimbabwe.
If IWRM was rejected due to its exogenous nature in relation to ‘Zimba­
bwe’ how could ESAP come to be accepted? This is an important question, 
because the introduction of IWRM was a function of the establishment of 
ESAP. It is, however, beyond the scope of this book to engage in an analysis 
of how ESAP was introduced and established in Zimbabwe. What we can 
note about the situation is that researchers contend that the government’s 
commitment to ESAP was “fundamental” at the time when the Zimbabwe 
government adopted IWRM as the leading principle for the water sector 
reform, i.e. in October 1995 (Skålnäs 1995:143; Bond and Manyanya 
2003 Kanyenze 2003:83ff).
The second attempt to introduce IWRM: Connecting IWRM to the “Grand 
Design" of ESAP
The connection constructed between ESAP and IWRM is best spelled out 
in the document that I introduced above as the blueprint for the reform 
process: “Programme for the Development of a National Water Resources 
Management Strategy (WRMS) for Zimbabwe: Project Document” (Gov­
ernment of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). To quote 
the report’s ESAP proposition at length:
Since 1991 Zimbabwe is engaged in a major effort to improve 
the efficiency of the economy through a better allocation of 
production factors and natural resources. It will be achieved 
through a process named the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) which is meant to transform the ineffi­
cient command model into a more efficient market-oriented 
economic model. Key words for the new economic strategy 
are market-orientation, trade liberalisation, deregulation, 
privatisation, stakeholder participation, and decentralisa- 
tion/devolution. That is why in many areas of society activi­
ties and initiatives are going on which reflect these key words. 
Examples are what is happening in the context of the National 
Action Committee; the direction of the recommendations of 
the land Tenure Commission; and the establishment of the 
Rural District Councils. For people heavily engaged in the 
water sector it is not always easy to see how events and poli­
cies in their own sector relate to the national whole. In other
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words, some in the water sector may be under the impression 
that the drive for more efficiency in the sector through proper 
pricing for water; or the drive for improved institutional 
(ZINWA) and legal (Water Act) arrangements; or the deci­
sion to develop a comprehensive WRMS Strategy are unique 
to the water sector and can just be taken at their own pace. 
This is not so. The changes in the water sector are part of a 
Grand Design, of decisions taken at the highest level: it may 
just be that progress made in the water sector so far has been 
relatively slow. However, it means that the longer the delay 
and the more protracted the internal discussions will be, the 
more the pressure will mount, because the water sector has no 
choice but to follow the lead from the top. (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995)
This quote illustrates how the framework of ESAP was used to convince 
people “heavily engaged in the water sector” that a reform of the water 
sector in accordance with the principles of ESAP tied “their own sector” 
to “the national whole”. While the water sector was previously seen as part 
of the project of nation building as it was defined after Independence, the 
message was now that there was a new “national whole” to relate to. As 
an almost perfect parallel to the idea of water as part of the post-colonial 
project of Zimbabwe , the report states: “The changes in the water sector 
are part of a Grand Design”. This “Grand Design” was now synonymous 
with ESAP. ESAP was designed in accordance with a number of “key words”. 
Interestingly, the same key words make up the foundations of IWRM, in 
particular “market-orientation”, “stakeholder participation”, and “decentrali­
sation/devolution” (cf. the three pillars of IWRM). For anyone hesitating 
over this new project and anyone who thought that the water sector could 
adopt it at its own pace, the government now made a very clear point: “the 
water sector has no choice but to follow the lead from the top”.
The connection between ESAP and IWRM was also evident in the Par­
liamentary debates in which the Minister of Rural Resources and Water 
Development—Ms Mujuru—advocated the implications of the reform. 
Consider for example the Second Reading of the Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority Bill (ZINWA Bill), i.e. one of the two legal instruments set up as 
part of the reform. The first reason for the reform mentioned by Minister 
Mujuru is that “the formation of ZINWA is in line with the objective of the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)”. Only later in the 
speech does she state that “other objectives for the creation of ZINWA” are 
to include improved equity in access to water... improve general manage­
ment. .. strengthen environmental protection”. (Government of Zimbabwe 
1998b; cf. interviews 8, 9, 14, 4B 5B, 7B, 19B).
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ESAP thus placed IWRM in the context of a new overarching political 
project. Whereas IWRM was previously seen as conflicting with the post­
colonial project of nation building, it was now tied into a project with 
which it shared basic principles and ideas. Why did the proponents of the 
Halcrow Report not draw on ESAP in 1993 the same way as was done in 
the 1995 document cited above? ESAP was introduced in 1991 and was 
thus available as the Halcrow team was writing up their report in 1993. It 
is always difficult to assess why someone did not do something. We know, 
however, that in the Halcrow Report, the argument for IWRM was made 
solely by reference to technical data such as hydrological facts, patterns of 
urbanisation, and the need to meet demands from the growing agricultural 
sector (Russell 1993). Now, two and a half years later, the same principles 
for water management were presented with explicit reference to ESAP, the 
political project of the day. Contrary to the situation in 1993, in 1995 
IWRM was presented as the logical implication of the reality construction 
which now made up the agenda for the government of Zimbabwe. The 
connection to ESAP gave proponents of IWRM the necessary political 
leverage to make IWRM the leading principle for the reform process. From 
October 1995 onwards, IWRM became the designated platform for the 
water sector reform in Zimbabwe.
Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation 
to Water as Zimbabwe
From October 1995 IWRM was officially accepted as the template for 
the water sector reform in Zimbabwe and at the official level the country 
swiftly adopted IWRM’s key components of catchment planning, water 
as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. Legal documents 
were reviewed and revised and a process of organisational change was set 
up (Government of Zimbabwe 1998a; Government of Zimbabwe 1998c; 
Government of Zimbabwe 2001). Despite these changes, much remained 
the same in the organisation of water management in Zimbabwe. There 
were no signs that the proponents of the indigenous approach to reform had 
vanished despite the blow of not having their agenda followed. Likewise, 
for millions of water users in Zimbabwe the implications of the official 
adoption of IWRM were nil. Despite the legal and institutional changes, 
the impact on rural society was still to be determined. In short, the power 
struggle over the daily practices of water usage in Zimbabwe did not end 
with the changes at the official level.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis the power struggle 
concerning the implications of IWRM. The focus is on how the social and 
political meanings of the pillars of IWRM were transformed as they were 
moulded in the power struggle with proponents of Water as Zimbabwe.
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Catchment management
IWRM’s call for catchment management implies the introduction of catch­
ments as a new administrative unit for water management in Zimbabwe. 
For all other purposes, Zimbabwe is administered within the framework 
of the provincial system. The provincial system formed the administrative 
backbone of the Zimbabwean governments’ attempt to manifest itself in 
rural society and to maintain control of the population throughout the 
country (Sylvester 1991; Munro 1998).
IWRM’s call for catchment management implied that with regard to the 
strategic resource of water, the administrative system put in place for control 
of rural society should be replaced with a new administrative structure along 
the lines of catchments. IWRM called on the government to omit the stra­
tegic resource of water from its established system of control and organise 
the management of water within the confinements of catchments.
Adding to the challenge for the government mounted by IWRM was the 
fact that there was no geographical match between catchments and prov­
inces. The demarcation of provinces dates back to the colonial period when 
provinces were typically set up around the emerging city structure. Many 
provinces also bear resemblance to the demarcations of pre-colonial cities 
and kingdoms.32 By contrast, the demarcation of catchments is based on 
the natural flow of water through the landscape. Geographic demarcations 
along catchment lines thus had no precedence in the existing geographic 
and administrative institutional structure of Zimbabwe. Applied to the 
existing structure of provincial demarcations in Zimbabwe, IWRM’s call for 
catchments implied a systematic overlap whereby one province was divided 
into several catchments, and the institutions set to guide the catchments 
constantly crossed the administrative domains of the institutional structures 
around the provinces (Latham 2002).
32 Personal communication with the late Associate Professor Anders Närman, Department 
of Human and Economic Geography, Göteborg University, 7 Nov. 2003.
33 The words “catchments” and “catchment planning” existed in the pre-reform legal and 
professional tradition of Zimbabwe. But as the Government of Zimbabwe and supporting 
donors as they set out to instigate the reform, the implications of these concepts differed 
from what IWRM implied by catchment management. The document says that “there 
appears to be a lack of understanding about the interdependence of economic, social, and 
environmental issues in water management and the development of water resources”. The 
document further states that “an important new dimension that WRMS will bring to bear 
at Department level is the recognition that environmental factors are incorporated as deci­
sion variables in catchment planning from the very beginning” (Government of Zimbabwe, 
Government of Netherlands, et al. 1995).
At the official level, a system of catchment management was nevertheless 
introduced as part of the water sector reform.33 The geographic demarcation 
of catchments was handled by the Department of Water Development, and
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the institutional structure around catchments figured prominently in the 
two new legal instruments set up as part of the reform, the Water Act and the 
ZINWA Act. Likewise Minister Kangai, who had the overarching responsi­
bility for water resources at the beginning of the 1990’s, conveyed a picture 
in which the establishment of catchments was quite unproblematic:
KK: We discovered that the provinces were already overloaded 
so we wanted to get out of that bureaucracy. We closed our eyes 
and said: ‘There are no provinces and no local government: 
there are only catchments and basins (Interview 19B).
According to Minister Kangai, catchment management was thus introduced 
in the blink of an eye. This assessment of a swift introduction of catchment 
management is, however, contested by an analysis of the administrative 
routines of the Zimbabwean government after the official adoption of 
catchment management. Consider two interviews with officials from dif­
ferent sections of the water administration in Harare:
I: Despite the fact that the catchment boundaries are now in 
place, we still have to give our suggestions for development in 
view of the provincial boundaries. So the catchment manager 
in each of the catchments has to submit whatever he thinks is 
necessary for the coming year. And this is done in accordance 
to the catchment. This goes into the government’s system of 
public sector programme funding. But when the application 
gets there they want to know which province is this. As a result 
of this, we are asked to list each catchment based project ac­
cording to the provinces. So it is all mixed up. There is now this 
new policy in place that we are working with. But the people 
in the government who make the actual decisions on projects 
and funding, like the people in cabinet, are still making their 
decisions according to the government, province based system 
(Interview 8B).
Recalling a similar pattern, a second interviewee reported:
I: We at the Department ofWater Development management 
water according to hydrological zone, but about two years ago 
(1999/2000) we produced the State of Dams Report to the 
government and we made the presentation based on hydrologi­
cal zones [i.e. catchments]. But then they asked us to redo it 
along provincial boundaries (Interview 7B).
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These interviewees suggest that despite the official adoption of catchment 
management, the political system in Zimbabwe had not changed but was 
still run along the provincial system (cf. Latham 2002).34 According to the 
guiding legal instruments and the official government rhetoric, Zimbabwe 
had at this time acknowledged IWRM’s call for catchment management. 
These interviewees suggest, however, that for all practical purposes, the 
provincial system was still the basis for managing water at the political level 
and the government rejected information aggregated based on catchment 
basis. If the government was handed such information, they sent it back 
and demanded that it be broken down along the familiar provincial lines.
34 Nevertheless, the quotes attest that the officials who collected information did so at the 
catchment level. This is not surprising since thinking in terms of catchments is part of the 
basic professional toolbox of officials with training in hydrology or hydrogeology (see further 
chapter seven). My point is that this view was not picked up at the political level.
35 An auxiliary, or alternative, explanation is that the Zimbabwean government at the time 
faced difficult material constraints. Changing the administrative structures from the exist­
ing provincial system to a novel administrative structure is costly and might easily be given 
a low priority in the reality of budget cuts that have constantly plagued the Zimbabwean 
administration. Such material constraints should be included in a full analysis of the gov­
ernment’s lack of adaptation to IWRM’s call for catchment planning.
Based on the theoretical model outlined in chapter four, my argument is 
that the government’s reluctance to adopt catchment management should 
be understood in light of the strategic role of water in the government’s 
post-colonial project in Zimbabwe, i.e. Water as Zimbabwe.35 To manifest 
its viability as a political actor in Zimbabwe, the government wanted to 
name water management as a problem related to nation building and sup­
port its social identity as a legitimate actor in rural society. In their eyes, 
the introduction of catchments as the administrative unit for water man­
agement was not—as suggested by IWRM—an instrument of ecosystem 
management. It was an introduction of an institutional platform for social 
and political mobilization outside the control of the government and thus 
a threat to its political project of nation building.
Political conflicts around the demarcation of geographical space are not 
unique to the case of natural resource management in Zimbabwe. Many 
claim that the designation of space around natural resources has implications 
for the distribution of rights and opportunities in society and thus consti­
tutes the basis for political struggles (Folke, Pritchard et al. 1998; Ostrom 
1990; Mostert 1999). To understand the Zimbabwean case, though, we 
should recall two things. First, water management was assigned a strategic 
role as part of the post-colonial project. Second, the legitimacy of the politi­
cal project of nation-building in Zimbabwe was contested by other groups 
within and outside Zimbabwe, which arguably increased the government’s 
inclination to react negatively to initiatives that could be perceived as threats
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to its viability. As I report in subsequent sections of this book, actors among 
the white commercial farmers (chapter six) as well as rural leaders (chapter 
eight) saw IWRM’s call for catchment management as an opportunity to 
advance an alternative agenda for social and political mobilisation in op­
position to the post-colonial project of Zimbabwe.
Consequently, we should understand the government’s resistance to ac­
commodate catchment management in light of the catchment’s potential to 
function as the basis for political organisation and mobilization which could 
challenge the fragile political construct of Zimbabwe as a nation-state. In 
particular, catchment management would provide the basis for stakeholder 
participation and market mechanisms in which the nexus of the distribution 
of water was outside the control of the state. From the perspective of Water 
as Zimbabwe, the introduction of catchment management was transformed 
from IWRM’s idea of ecosystem management into a threat to the viability 
of the government and the nation-state.
Does this transformation of catchment management—from IWRM’s 
idea of ecosystem management into the government s view of a threat to 
its political project—have any implications for the actual management of 
water? Properly addressing this question requires counterfactual empiri­
cal material in which the state of the ecosystem in the factual situation is 
compared with the quality of the ecosystem that would have resulted from 
the government fully adopting catchment management along the ideas of 
IWRM. Lacking such empirical material, it is informative to recall that the 
idea behind IWRM’s call for catchment management was that the manage­
ment of water should be guided by the natural flow of water in the ecosys­
tem. The catchment should be used as the level of management to ensure 
that all aspects affecting the quality and quantity of water are considered 
in policy decisions. The potential of realising ecologically sustainable water 
management thus hinged on the adoption of catchment management. Eco­
system analysts working in other empirical fields suggest that the ecosystem 
approach to water management is not obtained if water is managed along 
provincial lines since the provinces typically do not reflect the natural flow 
of water in the ecosystem (Sexton and Szaro 1998; Folke, Pritchard et al. 
1998). In fact, some ecosystem analysts even argue that an administrative 
system in which “water management is the responsibility of provinces,” 
is in “many respects the opposite" to catchment management since it does 
not take into account the natural flow of water in the ecosystem (Mostert 
1999:32). This assessment suggests that the transformation of catchment 
management in the context of Water as Zimbabwe substantially diluted 
the prospects for ecosystem management in Zimbabwe.
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Water as an economic good
IWRM stresses that water should be treated as an economic good. The 
reason for this is explained by economist Mike Garn (1998) who also 
represented the World Bank at the 1993 workshop at Victoria Falls. Garn 
argues that treating water as an economic good will increases the efficient 
use of water by means of market economic incentives (cf. Savenije 2002). 
This idea was fully acknowledged by Minister Kangai who headed the water 
sector reform during the mid 1990’s. He maintains that:
Price water properly and people will treat it as the precious 
commodity it is (Kangai 1995).
In this section, I show that Minister Kangai’s accommodating position on 
this issue was not shared in more conservative circles of the Zimbabwean 
government. This opposition was based on the view that subjecting wa­
ter to the market would deprive the government of control of one of the 
most vital instruments for the manifestation of its post-colonial project, 
i.e. control over the distribution of water. Naming water as an economic 
good in accordance with IWRM would place water outside the realm of 
the government and make the government virtually irrelevant as an actor 
in the management of water.
Water as an economic good: From market processes to state control
The politics around IWRM’s call for introducing economic principles in 
the management of water can be studied in the paper “A National Water 
Pricing Policy and Strategy”. The paper was presented by Minister Mujuru 
who replaced Minister Kangai as responsible for water resources manage­
ment at the turn of the 20th century.36 The bulk of the paper outlines the 
historical background of water pricing in Zimbabwe. Minister Mujuru 
recognizes that “Since independence, Government has not really put to­
gether a national water pricing policy” which has created a tradition of ad 
hoc reactions in response to “changing circumstances” and various unspeci­
fied “agreements”.37 Minister Mujuru states that it “is therefore needed to 
develop a clear Government policy on water pricing” (p. 2).
36 The paper is undated, but as it includes a reference to events in August 2000 it can be 
concluded that it is of a more recent date.
37 Previously, farmers who owned their own dams did not pay for stored water, and farmers 
who used government controlled water paid for it at subsidized rates.
Outlining the government’s water pricing policy, Minister Mujuru repeat­
edly makes references to “water as an economic good”. She argues, however, 
that this principle is open to different interpretations and she offers three 
“possible strategy options” for the government’s new water pricing policy:
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Site specific prices — “in this approach, every scheme is con­
sidered separately and the price charged for water is a direct 
function of the capital cost of the scheme... [This] system 
satisfies the strict dictates of economics”.
Catchment blend price — “the price of water in this system is 
derived by dividing the total annual costs (capital redemption 
plus operation and maintenance) for all projects in the River 
Catchment Area, by the volume of water sold annually. Thus 
all the consumers within a Catchment Area will pay the same 
unit price for water.. .This system represents an improvement 
on the site specific pricing method, but would still lead to 
major differences in the price of water from one Catchment 
to another.”
National blendprice — “The price is calculated by dividing total 
annual costs for all publicly owned water, by the total volume 
of water sold annually.”
What is interesting here is the Ministers line of reasoning as she motivates 
her preference for the national blend price. She argues that the national 
blend price is the only system in which “the unit price of water would be 
uniform throughout the country”. It has “the advantage of creating uni­
formity in the price of water to all consumers, regardless of their location or 
climatic zone.” As opposed to IWRM’s call for subjecting water to market 
economic pricing reflecting supply and demand, the national blend price 
will be “calculated” by the government. The national blend price is set by 
the government who thus maintains control of the pricing system, which 
is a strategic instrument for the allocation of water.
Why did the Minister not opt for either of the other two strategy op­
tions outlined in the report? The site specific price most resembles IWRM’s 
principle of market economic pricing. In contrast to the role of water in 
Water as Zimbabwe, the site specific price placëd water in the realm of the 
market and thus outside control of the government. This option would, 
in the words of the Minister, “satisfy the strict dictates of economics”, but 
it would compromise the ambition of the government to manifest itself as 
the nexus in the distribution of natural resources.
My argument is thus that the challenge mounted by the market towards 
the post-colonial project of Zimbabwe explains why Minister Mujuru 
did not opt for a site specific price. But the challenge of the market is not 
equally evident in relation to her rejection of a catchment blend price (the 
second option above). As Minister Mujuru spells out in the quote above, 
a catchment blend price is not tied to the market but is “derived” through
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an equation in which the total cost of water management in a catchment is 
divided by the volume of water sold annually. To use the Ministers words, 
the catchment blend price is “an improvement” compared to the site spe­
cific prices. Why then did Minister Mujuru not choose a catchment blend 
price? One answer lies in recalling the analysis in the previous section of this 
chapter. I argued that catchment management was associated with political 
implications which were at odds with the ambition of the post-colonial 
project to manifest Zimbabwe as a unified nation-state. The geographic 
demarcation of catchments constituted an arena for social and political 
mobilisation potentially at odds with the ambition of national unity. This 
supports the argument that the catchment blend price was rejected due to 
its incompatibility with the political project of nation building. Additional 
support for this argument is offered by an interviewee from GtZ, the Ger­
man international donor agencies involved in the reform process:
I: When the discussion came to the guidelines and allocations, 
GtZ realised that it was not appropriate to apply the same 
principle to all catchments which are significantly different. 
So we said, let’s not try to unify something according to this 
approach that one size fits all and in the end everybody is 
happy. Let’s allow the catchments to come up with allocation 
systems that suite their level of water scarcity and intensity of 
water competition and so on. But this was a difficult hurdle 
to get around. First of all because the people at the DWD 
[Department of Water Development] and also on the legal 
side like something uniform. They said 'This is one country 
and we should have one set of rules for everybody . I was heavily 
involved in that debate and at the end we, I think, had the 
agreement that their idea was not the best way because different 
levels of scarcity and competition requires different answers, I 
mean that is also what property rights theory tells us: the level 
of effort that you invest in the definition of property rights 
is a function of the scarcity and level of competition for the 
resource. You just don’t start defining highly sophisticated 
systems if there is no competition. That is quite simply not 
the economic approach. Anyway that was another thing that 
was quite fascinating (Interview C2, emphasis added).
This quote helps to understand why Minister Mujuru did not opt for the 
second, catchment pricing, option. The interviewee discloses that the ques­
tion of catchment pricing had provoked significant discussions between GtZ 
and the government. The description of these developments as “a difficult 
hurdle which required the GtZ official to get “heavily involved” attests to
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a significant level of political interests and power struggle invested in decid­
ing the pricing strategy. There was thus a difference in opinion between 
GtZ and the representatives of the Government of Zimbabwe concerning 
the appropriate strategy for pricing water. The GtZ representative is fully 
committed to a pricing strategy derived from economic theory that allows 
the relative demand and supply to guide the pricing system. He argues that 
since Zimbabwe’s different catchments have different amount of relative 
demand and supply (due in part to difference in the climate and commer­
cial structure) the catchment is a suitable level for a common price system. 
In other words, he would have suggested that Minister Mujuru had opted 
for alternative two listed above. As is clear from the quote, the objections 
raised by people in government against this advice were based on their 
preference for “something uniform” that acknowledged the ambition to 
manifest Zimbabwe as “one country”. In other words, these people did 
not conceive of a catchment based price as supportive of the manifestation 
of a Zimbabwe as a unified state. The tension between catchment pricing 
and the reality construction of the post-colonial project of a unified state 
explains why Mujuru did not opt for this choice.38
38 An alternative explanation for Mujuru’s choice would be that she acted out of a commit­
ment to marginalised water users who, under the pure influence of the market, would stand 
the risk of being over-charged for water. The argument might thus be that a national blend 
price would allow for cross subsidies in favour of such groups. The Ministers’ choice should 
“accordingly be understood as a way to protect water users from a high water price set by 
the market. In contrast to my explanation, in terms of the Minister’s attempt to maintain 
the government’s control over water, we should thus understand the governments pricing 
policy in terms of the governments’ eagerness to cater for the needs of its population and, 
possibly, voters. There are however, two reasons why this alternative explanation does not 
hold. The first reason is that the government had already decided that primary usage of 
water”—i.e. water consumption for domestic needs and petty agricultural use—should be 
free of charge. As Minister Mujuru outlined the government’s pricing policy in the docu­
ment analysed above, she was therefore not making a choice which would have any effect 
on the primary usage of marginalised water users. Secondly, according to Zimconsult—a 
Harare-based consultancy firm entrusted by the government for economic analysis during 
the reform—the national blend price would lead to a situation in which poor water users 
would subsidise richer water users. If the Minister’s main concern was with marginalised 
farmers wanting water for irrigation, she should not have opted for the national blend price 
(Zimconsult 1999).
To sum up, proponents of IWRM’s call for water as an economic good 
motivated this principle by arguing that it would allow for market-like 
incentives to guide the use of water in more effective ways (Kangai 1995; 
Garn 1998). The rhetoric of water as an economic good was picked up in 
policy documents and official speeches by government representatives. I 
argue, however, that for actors subscribing to the construction of Water as 
Zimbabwe, IWRM’s call for water as an economic good was transformed 
from a means to obtain economic efficiency into an attempt to deprive the
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State of control of one of its most strategic resources for societal control. 
The distribution of water was part of the government’s attempt to reach an 
accord with the demos it wanted as citizens. In light of this, a policy based 
on IWRM’s call to define water as an economic good was a real threat to 
the government. Defining water in that way would make it part of a com­
munity that derived its legitimacy and control from an economic realm 
guided by economic processes out of government control.
Does this transformation have any implications in terms of behavioural 
consequences for the actual management of water? Responding to the threat 
mounted by the application of pure economic principles in the water sector, 
the government opted for a pricing system calculated by the government: 
the national blend price. This system was introduced under IWRM’s ban­
ner of water as an economic good. The stated idea behind IWRM’s call for 
water as an economic good was, however, that water should be subjected 
to market incentives by means of a pricing system that reflected supply 
and demand on the market. IWRM’s original connection between water 
and market economic processes would, however, not be maintained if a 
national blend price was to be used. A national blend price is ‘calculated’ by 
the government rather than derived from the market. The transformation 
thus implies that water consumption will not be sensitive to the market 
incentive structures that motivated IWRM’s call for treating water as an 
economic good. The national blend price disconnects the price of water 
from the forces of the market.
Stakeholder participation
Proponents of IWRM called for increased stakeholder participation in the 
management of water. The argument was that water is an essential part 
of peoples’ livelihoods which makes increased stakeholder participation a 
democratic right. Moreover, this call was motivated by the belief that involv­
ing stakeholders would increase effectiveness in the use of water resource.
In the context of Zimbabwe, this call for stakeholder participation was 
mainly a call to engage the marginalised black farmers who used water in 
their limited agricultural production. IWRM’s call for stakeholder par­
ticipation is frequently mentioned in official documents and speeches by 
government representatives. For example, at a press conference at Valley 
Dam, Minister Mujuru proclaimed that:
Stakeholders should be involved in all important decision­
making and management of water resources. (Government 
of Zimbabwe 1997).
Similarly, in the 1995 blueprint for the reform process it is stated that:
The structure of the Project is geared entirely towards maxi­
mum stakeholder participation. This development runs par-
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allel to decentralisation and devolution in other sectors and 
departments of the Government.. .The participatory approach 
is not unique to the water sector, but is very broadly based and 
it will be a lasting and integral feature of the Project. It will 
ensure that the Project is truly Zimbabwean.” (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: 39f).
These two quotes suggest that the Zimbabwean government was fully de­
voted to stakeholder participation. No reference is made to any potential 
trade-offs or power struggles between devolving power to stakeholders and 
the ambition of the state to manifest itself as the nexus in the distribution 
of goods and services. Interestingly enough, the second (1995) quote even 
suggests that the government’s commitment to stakeholder participation 
was advanced as a means to ensure that the reform process was “truly Zim­
babwean”. Stakeholder participation was legitimised by reference to the 
government’s ambition to use water management as a means to manifest 
the Zimbabwean nation-state.
Based on these quotes, it appears as if my argument—that IWRM was 
seen by political entrepreneurs in the government as a threat to their political 
project of nation building—does not hold for the question of stakeholder 
participation. Perhaps catchment management and water as an economic 
good were disavowed due to their potential to violate this project, whereas 
stakeholder participation was seen as conducive to manifest the state?
In the empirical analysis below, I argue that, contrary to the government’s 
official devotion to real stakeholder influence, the government did indeed see 
IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation as a challenge to its own ambition 
to obtain control over water management. I will show how, in response to 
this challenge, political entrepreneurs in the government strategically drew 
on established identities and collective memories to legitimise the govern­
ment’s maintained, or even increased, control of water management.
Indications of real stakeholder participation
Perhaps more than any other aspect of the reform, stakeholder participation 
has been subjected to investigations and reports by researchers. In my review 
of this literature, I have not found one assessment that would support the 
view that the reform resulted in devolution of power to local stakeholder 
(see e.g. Derman and Ferguson 2000a; Derman, Ferguson et al. 2000b; 
Manzungu 2001; Sithole 2001).39 The findings by Latham at the Centre 
for Applied Social Sciences in Harare are representative of this literature:
39 In contrast to my focus on the relationship between stakeholders and the state, most other 
analysis focus on the asymmetries between different stakeholder groups (commercial farm­
ers vs. the rest). However important and understandable, these accounts frequently fail to 
account for the role and motives of the state which consequently is portrayed as generally 
supportive to stakeholder participation.
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Amongst communal farmers, small-scale farmers, the UIM 
(Urban, Industrial and Mining sector) users and representa­
tives of RDCs (Rural District Councils) there was an almost 
complete lack of any meaningful consultation... /The stake­
holders/ all professed a complete ignorance of any water reform 
process, /A/ household survey in one area of communal land 
in Upper Guruve showed a 90% negative response /to ques­
tions about if they know about the existence of the reform/ 
(Latham 2002:910).
Existing research on stakeholder participation thus suggests that the gov­
ernment’s rhetorical devotion to stakeholder participation was not turned 
into real stakeholder participation. The legal instruments officially set up 
to achieve stakeholder participation provide a second indicator of the gov­
ernment’s action to involve the stakeholders. These legal instruments (the 
“Water Act” and the “ZINWA Act” — Zimbabwe National Water Authority 
Act) provide for establishing an institutional framework for stakeholder 
participation at the catchment level and calls for the formation of formal 
institutions for stakeholder deliberations and decisions (catchment councils 
and sub-catchment councils). In particular, the Water Act states that a large 
number of functions shall be entrusted with the stakeholders, including issue 
and cancel permits for water usage, investigate disputes over water usage, 
and initiate investigations in a wide range of water related areas.
Despite these signs of devolution of power to the stakeholders, a closer 
scrutiny of the Water Act shows that the actual control of the vital func­
tions of water management was outside the stakeholders’ reach. Section 1 
and 2 of paragraph 28 in the Water Act states:
(1) For the day to day management and administration of 
affairs of a catchment council, there shall be a catchment 
manager who shall be an employee of the National Water 
Authority.
(2) In the performance of its functions, a catchment manager 
shall act on the advice of the catchment council and be super­
vised by the National Water Authority.
This extract from the Water Act indicates two things. First, the catchment 
manager is the key actor in the actual daily management and administra­
tion of the catchment. Second, the catchment manager takes “advice” from 
the stakeholder body, but is “supervised” by ZINWA. The effects of this 
arrangement in terms of stakeholder influence is clear if we consult the 
second legal instrument introduced during the reform, the ZINWA Act.
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According to the ZINWA Act, the government controls the majority of the 
seats of the influential ZINWA board (§4:1 ZINWA Act 1998).
Consequently, much of the stakeholder influence and authority that 
seemed to be entrusted in the catchment council was in fact under the 
control of the catchment manager, who was under the control of ZINWA 
which, in turn, was controlled by the government. Even though the Water 
Act seemed to provide for stakeholder participation, the real influence over 
water management rested with the state. Despite the praise for stakeholder 
participation in the government’s rhetoric, the devolution of real power 
was curtailed by a cleaver institutional arrangement that reflected the gov­
ernment’s ambition to obtain the position of nexus in the distribution of
40water resources.
Stakeholders vs. the government
By any standards, the two examples above testify to a meagre result of a 
reform which officially aimed at the devolution of power and influence to 
stakeholders. How are we to understand this? How was IWRM’s call for 
stakeholder participation diluted from, as it said in the blueprint—what 
“the project is geared entirely towards”—to a situation in which the legal 
institutions shortcut the stakeholders who got involved, while the majority 
of stakeholders remained ignorant or found participation meaningless?
I posed these questions to Patrick Chinamassa who served as Attorney 
General when the Water Act and ZINWA Act were drafted and approved, 
and who was later appointed Minister of Justice.
PC: Will the stakeholders have enough capacity and infra­
structure? Will they have enough revenues? Are we not just 
putting up powerless institutions? Yes, these were questions 
raised, but with time I think we can start to build capacity. But 
there was a fear concerning the control of the catchments. To
40 Additional illustration of the lack of ambition to obtain stakeholder participation is 
found in the recommendations of the Water Act Review Board (1994), i.e. the group who 
successfully delayed the introduction of IWRM for several years . The Water Act Review 
Board made recommendations that would allow close to complete control of the Minister 
of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development. The Water Act Review Board stated that 
the catchment boards “could be similar to the Advisory Councils described in Section 13, 
14 and 15 of the [1976 Water] Act.” Accordingly, the suggested catchment boards shall 
not be permanent bodies but be established “whenever the Minster considers it necessary ; 
“consist of such number of members as may be appointed by the Minister to represent lo­
cal authorities and other groups and sections of the economy with an interest in the river 
system”; “hold office at the pleasure of the Minister”; “be paid such remuneration and al­
lowance as the Minster, with the consent of the Minster responsible for finance, may fix” 
(Section 13 — 15, 1976 Water Act).
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what extent will we be in control? Will they be dominated by 
the already empowered?
R: When you say that, what do you mean by “we”?
PC: Us the blacks. This is a black and white issue. We must 
discuss race at all times because this is a matter of race.
R: Is the new legal institutions then not just a way for you to 
have increased control from the government? Take for exam­
ple the ZINWA board which has a majority of government 
appointees.
PC: If you mean control of the resources: Yes. But at the end of 
the day, we have to ask if the reform has resulted in increased 
control for the whites in the catchment councils. If this is the 
case we have not done our job.
Analysing these responses in light of the framework outline in chapter four, 
it is interesting to note how the Attorney General rationalises the steps 
taken during the design of the institutions for stakeholder participation. 
For him, stakeholder participation is not an issue of the distribution of 
power between the state and stakeholders, in which “stakeholders” signify 
a group of non-state actors. The issue of stakeholder participation is a racial 
issue between “black” and “white”.41 In the context of Water as Zimbabwe, 
this stereotypical identity construction stands out as part of the govern-
41 It is clear from this response that Attorney General Chinamassa is well aware of the cri­
tique of the deficiencies of the government’s actions. In the beginning he suggests that the 
efforts taken by the government so far should be seen as only a first step in the process of 
empowering the stakeholders: “with time I think we can start to build capacity”. At face 
value, this statement fits nicely into an explanation of the demise of African states that is 
quite popular in the theoretical literature on African politics (for a review see Schraeder 
(2000): part V). According to this explanation, the government’s response to stakeholder 
participation should be understood as an effect of its lack of material resources to successfully 
reach out and empower stakeholders. People have to be made aware of how to manage water 
properly, and be given training in how to organise as stakeholders. All of this takes time and 
costs money which, the argument would be, explains the lack of real stakeholder partici­
pation in Zimbabwe. An alternative explanation to my analysis of the lack of stakeholder 
participation would thus focus on the material constraints of the government. If we adopt 
this view, we would see the Zimbabwean government as willing but not able. By contrast, 
the view that I offer portrays the government as able but not willing. Increased stakeholder 
participation would threaten the government’s project to manifest itself as a viable actor in 
the post-colonial project of nation building. In support of my account, it is instructive to 
recall the review of the structuring of the institutional structure found in the Water Act and 
ZINWA Act. Clearly, a willing government, however impotent, can at least produce laws 
that allow for real stakeholder participation. But the Zimbabwean government did not.
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ment’s endeavour to transform IWRM’s idea of stakeholder participation 
from a call to decrease the legitimate influence of the state in favour of 
non-state actors. Based on this identity construction, the government is a 
representative of “the black” stakeholders whose influence should increase. 
Consequently, increased power to the marginalised stakeholders is equiva­
lent to increased power to the state. Recall the institutional arrangement 
in which the catchment councils are deprived of actual control in favour 
of the government controlled authority for water management (ZINWA). 
Consider now this institutional set-up without taking into account the 
construction of Water as Zimbabwe. Outside of this construction of real­
ity, the institutional arrangement appears as an illegitimate arrangement 
for the government to deprive stakeholders of real influence. However, 
analysing the same institutional arrangement from within the construction 
of Water as Zimbabwe the conclusion is the opposite. Within the reality 
of this construction, the government is a representative of the blacks in a 
struggle against the whites. More power to the government is thus equiva­
lent to more power to the historically marginalised black stakeholders. In 
this light, the government’s institutional arrangement analysed above were 
legitimised as a means to increase real stakeholder participation, i.e. more 
power to the “black” government.
Furthermore, constructing the issue of stakeholder participation as a 
racial issue, the Attorney General draws on the collective memory of white 
domination over blacks in the realm of natural resources in Zimbabwe. 
Much of the post-colonial political rhetoric in Zimbabwe is concerned 
with legitimizing the incumbent government’s policies by framing it as a 
continuation of the liberation struggle in which the blacks fight the whites 
for control of land and water (Derman and Ferguson 2000a).42 In this 
construction, the blacks have a legitimate claim on increased influence in 
the water sector while the whites are to be blamed for any deficiencies and 
injustices. Placing the IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation within the 
construction of Water as Zimbabwe thus serves two purposes. First, as I 
argued above, the racial identities of “black” and “white” make the govern­
ment a legitimate caretaker of the interests of the historically marginalised 
stakeholders. Second, the distribution of claims and blames according to 
this construction provides a moral legitimacy for redistribution of control of 
water in favour of the black government. Within the construction of Water 
as Zimbabwe it is morally justified for the state to have control of water 
management under the banner of “stakeholder participation”.
42 The government’s policy to appropriate land from white commercial farmers is, for exam­
ple, frequently referred to as the “Second Chimurenga” which alludes to the “Chimurenga”, 
or “First Chimurenga” which is an established name for the Liberation War ending in 
Independence in 1990.
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Evidence shows, however, that in contrast to the government’s illusive 
version of “stakeholder participation”, black farmers at the local level in 
Zimbabwe—who were the primary target for the official efforts to increase 
stakeholder participation—were kept ignorant and alienated from increased 
influence in the water sector (see the introduction of this section on stake­
holder participation). The reality construct alluded to by the Attorney 
General was part of the post-colonial project to manifest Zimbabwe and 
to legitimise the authority of the state. In the process, the racial identities 
of ‘Us-the-Black’ and ‘Them-the-Whit’e were effective instruments to 
silence, not only the whites, but also black stakeholders at the local level 
in Zimbabwe.
Conclusions
The analysis in this chapter has focused on the transformation of IWRM 
by actors subscribing to a construction of reality in which water is seen to 
have a strategic role in the political project of nation-building and mani­
festation of the government as a viable actor in the Zimbabwean society. 
I have labelled this construction Water as Zimbabwe. It consists of a col­
lective memory in which the history of struggle and control over natural 
resources is the defining trait of a society and thus the management of water 
was part of the process of uniting the diverse communities of Zimbabwe. 
Proponents of Water as Zimbabwe wanted to establish the nation state of 
Zimbabwe as the proper forum for water management, and to promote 
the social identity of the government as the legitimate broker of rights and 
obligations related to water.
Political entrepreneurs supporting Water as Zimbabwe opposed IWRM 
for two reasons. First, they argued that IWRM s way of naming the problems 
of water management placed water beyond the control of the government 
and was thus a threat to the post-colonial political project of nation-building 
and to the legitimacy of the government as an actor. Second, opponents of 
IWRM pointed to the external, White, origin of IWRM as a way to have 
it discredited. The latter argument built on the racial stereotypes of Black 
and White which where much used by proponents of Water as Zimbabwe 
and in the political rhetoric of Zimbabwe in general (see chapter six and 
seven). In light of these stereotypes, the collective memory of Zimbabwean 
history is characterised as a struggle for control over natural resources in 
which the Blacks have tried to reclaim their resources from the White for­
eigners. Drawing on this construction of reality, opponents of IWRM in and 
around the government supported the social identity of the government as 
the legitimate representative of the Blacks: The government as the leader of 
the Blacks against the Whites and their history of oppressions in Zimbabwe.
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These opponents of IWRM pointed to the international, White, origin of 
IWRM to associate it with the historical blame of Whites in the manage­
ment of the country’s natural resources. The argument can be summarised 
like this: ‘The Whites, be they colonialists or development workers, have 
always interfered in the management of our natural resources and they are 
to blame for the current problems. We-the-Blacks have a legitimate claim 
to self-determination with regard to our natural resources why we should 
not be directed by IWRM. IWRM is a way for Them-the-Whites to once 
again interfere in how We-the-Blacks manage our natural resources.’
In the eyes of proponents of Water as Zimbabwe, IWRM was thus yet 
another attempt by White foreigners to dictate a solution to the Blacks. 
This view on IWRM constituted the background for the transformation 
of the three pillars of IWRM in relation to Water as Zimbabwe. The aim 
was to transform IWRM so that it supported, rather than challenged the 
post-colonial project of nation-state building. Table 5.1. summarises the 
transformed meanings of each pillar and points to its behavioural implica­
tions.





Transformed meaning Behavioural implication
Catchment 
management
Threat to the viability of the 
nation-state and its admin­
istrative back-bone i.e. the 
provincial system
Support formal implementation 
of catchments to appease propo­
nents of IWRM, but maintain 
the key managerial instruments 
for water management within the 
government controlled provincial 
system.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Challenge to the socialisation 
of water consumers into citi­
zens. Seen as an instrument 
against a unified nation-state.
Government calculated NBP 
detached from the control of 




Call for increased participa­
tion by representatives of the 
marginalised Blacks; i.e. the 
government.
Introduce formal institutions 
for stakeholder participation but 
maintain control by the state 
though legal arrangements and 
strategic appointments.
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6. IWRM AND WATER AS GOLD
In this chapter I turn to the construction of water within the white farming 
community in Zimbabwe and how this influenced the transformation of 
IWRM. I have labeled the construction of reality dominating this com­
munity ‘Water as Gold’ as a reflection of the historical link between this 
community and the white settlers who came to present day Zimbabwe in 
search for minerals during the early 1900’s. As I will show, the historical 
connection between present day white commercial farmers and the early 
settlers turns out to be very important in the quest to understand the trans­
formation of IWRM by this community.
The importance of this group of actors is indicated by the fact that they 
represent about eighty-five percent of the country’s recorded water use at 
the outset of the water sector reform. This water was used in commercial 
agricultural production which made up the backbone of Zimbabwe’s 
economy.43 At the time, about half of all the water in Zimbabwe that was 
stored in dams was found in dams owned by white commercial farmers.44 
The rest was stored and controlled by the government. However, due to a 
pricing system put in place prior to Independence, and little changed since, 
the lion’s share of the government’s stored water was also favorably extracted 
by white commercial farmers (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Zimconsult 
1999a; Zimconsult 1999b).45
43 Approximately 60 % of GDP was controlled by the white farmers making up about one 
half of one percent of the population (Moyo S. 1995).
44 The white farmers did not have legal ownership to the water stored in the private dams. The 
ownership was vested in the state. Abstraction was made on the basis of “water rights” (see 
details below). In practice, however, the white farmers were the sole user of this water.
45 Water was also abstracted from underground reservoirs, and directly from rivers. The 
quantities of such water, however, were relatively low. The major concern of the white 
commercial farmers during the water reform under review was with water stored in dams 
(Derman and Ferguson 2000a).
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides an intro­
duction to the construction of reality nurtured within the community of 
white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. Focus is first on the collective 
memory of how the white farming community brought civilization and 
development to a country previously characterized by illness and poverty. 
In this section I also show that Water as Gold consists of a social identity 
build around the racial stereotypes ‘Us-the—White’ and ‘Them-the-Black’.
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Second, I display a short history of the varying relations between the white 
farming community and the government of Zimbabwe. Third, I attend to 
the transformation of IWRM with regard to its three pillars: catchment 
management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. 
The last section contains the concludes from the analysis.
Water as Gold
The analysis of this transformation of IWRM takes us back to the end of 
the nineteenth century when present day Zimbabwe was “discovered” by 
Cecile Rhodes. Rhodes named this area “the Second Rand”. He thereby 
hoped to associate these newly discovered territories with the First Rand 
where thousands of white settlers had made their fortune in the gold and 
diamond mines and which today is the financial centre of South Africa. 
Rhodes’ marketing campaign was successful and his vision of a Second 
Rand attracted not only fortune hunters but also a strand of the Afrikaner 
community in South Africa who were fed up with “British bigots” and 
London’s increasing calls for political reforms. To them, the prospects of 
a Second Rand offered a new start to fulfill the dreams of an independent 
way of life (Herbst 1990; Skålnäs 1995).
But there was no Second Rand. The new territories did not hide any rich 
mines and the rush soon dried up. However, the fortune hunters who stayed 
on in the new territory soon discovered that it was not what lay under the 
ground that would render this area prosperous. Its riches would come from 
what could be grown on it. The highlands of the new territories proved 
to be ideal for agriculture, so the would-be miners became farmers. In ad­
dition, it turned out that the soil and climate types of the new territories 
easily accommodated the same types of crops and cattle as South Africa and 
Europe. Expanding on existing techniques and practices in the new land 
they laid the foundation of one of the most successful agricultural com­
munities in Africa. As the area shifted names, reflecting differences in the 
political leadership—Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 
Zimbabwe—the white farming community built the ‘granary of Africa’ 
(Mumbengegwi 1987; Herbst 1990; Skålnäs 1995).
The area claimed by the commercial farmers thus offered great agricultural 
possibilities, and the farmers brought with them crops, cattle, and skill. 
The key to the success was, however, access to water. Some of the most 
fertile lands lay in chronically dry areas, and the whole country suffered 
from repeated droughts (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Derman 1998b). 
The role of water set the stage for a political struggle which has marked 
Zimbabwe’s political history ever since and, as I will show in this chapter, 
drove the transformation of IWRM by the community of white commercial
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farmers. A descendent to one of the first white settler families explained the 
role of water in his community by making a parallel to Rhodes’ promises 
of mining prospects:
I: My family came up here from South Africa, but we found 
no gold. But water became like our gold. And as with gold, 
water can create prospects, but it can also drive people to cheat 
and deceive each other (Interview 24B).
As the interviewee continued his recollection of his family’s history, he 
talked about the tremendous amount of hard work and entrepreneurial 
skill that had been necessary to make the waters of Zimbabwe into a source 
of prospects. This ‘success story’ of historical achievements in Zimbabwe’s 
water sector was a theme repeated by many white commercial farmers. The 
argument was, as I show below, that the historical achievements of the white 
farming community made the present day white community entitled to a 
special favorable treatment during the water sector reform under IWRM.
The ‘success story of the white farming community
As already mentioned, the main challenge facing the white farmers in this 
new territory was not so much with the total quantity of water available. 
The occasional and very rich rains—especially in the highlands of the coun­
try—provided plenty of water. The concern was the allocation of water in 
space and time. Spatial allocation problems were due to the fact that the best 
soils and the richest waters were geographically separated. To cultivate the 
land, water had to be transported, which called for investments in channels 
and irrigation systems. Adding to the spatial problems was the fact that 
the incumbent agrarian tribes inhabited some of the most fertile land. For 
white farmers to access these areas required resettlement of the natives in 
areas less suitable for agricultural production. The Land Apportionment 
Act of 1930, supplemented by the Land Tenure Act of 1969 became the 
cornerstone of the legal framework to make fertile land available for the 
commercial agricultural production. So called “resettlement areas” were 
designated for the natives to allow them to continue agricultural production 
at their own, very basic, technical level. Moreover, the poor living conditions 
in the resettlement areas created a supply of labor utilized in the burgeoning 
agrarian industry (Interview 4, 6, 20, 2B; Mumbengegwi 1987; Sylvester 
1991; Godwin and Hancock 1993; Skålnäs 1995).
The spatial allocation problems were accompanied by a temporal prob­
lem: Water had to be allocated from one time period to the next. As in 
much of South Saharan Africa, the settler community moved into an area 
subjected to erratic rainfalls. Besides the yearly cycles of dry and wet pe­
riods, droughts stretching over several years frequently plagued the area.
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Farming thus became dependent on the possibilities to store water over 
significant periods of time to assure continued supply. Massive investments 
in dam constructions were called for and executed with the help of gener­
ous government subsidies. To illustrate the magnitude of this endeavor, 
one interviewee told me that when children in contemporary Zimbabwe 
study geography they are asked how many lakes there are in the country. 
Looking at a map, the children would see more than 1 600 pools of water 
that look like lakes. The point of this story is, however, that Zimbabwe 
has no lakes. The 1 600 pools of water are the result of the intense efforts 
in water management largely initiated and executed by the white farming 
community (Interview 10).
That the success of the white commercial farmers carried a high price 
for the black population living in this area prior to the whites was less 
emphasized by interviewees. When the white settlers started their com­
mercial farming activities they made use of land and waterways that were 
part of the religious, political, and economic life of existing inhabitants in 
the area. For example, when the settlers installed the Water Act of 1926, 
all existing claims on water were nullified. Prior activities involving water 
in conservation or production practices did not entitle any legal claim to 
water in the new administrative system. According to the new system, water 
allocation followed the principle of‘first come, first served’. In practice, this 
principle meant, ‘the first to properly file a claim for water under the settler 
regime, first served’. In addition, the Water Act of 1926 stated that once a 
claim for water had been “properly filed”, the rights to use water was valid 
“in perpetuity”. Since the majority of the population neither knew of this 
system, nor had any resources to make a proper claim, all legal claims for 
water were soon held by members of the white community (van der Zaag 
and Savenije 2000).
The social identity of being white
There is no such thing as a homogeneous white community in Zimbabwe. 
Dissent, history, religion, and class are all relevant demarcation lines within 
their group (Godwin and Hancock 1993). This diversity was reflected in 
my interviews with white commercial farmers who displayed a large variety 
of opinions and views. Nevertheless, many of my interviewees alluded to 
belonging to a ‘White’ community built on the demarcation and stigma­
tization of blacks as the Other: ‘Them-the-Black’. The identity construct 
of white commercial farmers thus evolved around the racial demarcation 
of Us-the-Whites, and Them-the-Blacks.
The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) is the most influential organiza­
tion of white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. Consider this statement 
from a CFU member who frequently represented the organisation during 
the water sector reform:
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I: The man with the pale skin comes from a climatic zone 
where there is rain and resources for only four to six months 
per year, so he has to plan. But the man of Central Africa has 
resources all year around so he can just pick the fruits and 
enjoy the climate (Interview 20).
The view held by this leading member of CFU supports a construction of 
a common white identity by means of racial demarcations and stigmatisa­
tions of the blacks as the Other. To support this construction of a common 
identity, the interviewee tries to overcome internal differences in the white 
community by invoking a collective memory where the “man with the pale 
skin” shares a common history and comes from the same harsh climatic 
zone in contrast to the “man of Central Africa” who belongs to a collective 
enjoying a history of easily available resources all year around. A similar 
analysis of the reality construct of CFU is made by anthropologist Blair 
Rutherford (2001). She says:
[The leaders of CFU] rested very heavily on an ‘us and them’ 
contrast, stressing the advantages of a modern ‘white identity’ 
to the point that [their] ‘us’, the local institutions of white 
farmers, play a major role in resettlement as a guarantor of its 
(modern) commercial success, (p. 61).
As illustrated by the quotes above, the identity of blacks is associated with 
a natural inclination of irresponsibility derived from the favourable climate 
in the black people’s natural environment. This view is further elaborated 
by a member of CPU’s executive board who said:
I: They are constantly in debt to somebody or the government 
to give them a free handout... And a lot of those guys, they 
don’t want to move. They want to stay where they are, they 
just want to be properly supported (Interview 1).
The stigmatisation of the blacks as irresponsible is typically associated with 
the idea of the blacks sharing a history of backwardness without any of the 
traits signifying white men’s civilisation. This theme did, for example, come 
out in an interview with another leading member of this community. Dur­
ing this interview I introduced the idea that the history of marginalisation 
of the blacks had entitled this group to compensation during the current 
water reform. Consider his response:
I: We should not just compensate the black farmers, we should 
train them. They will just spend their compensation.
121
R: Would you not agree that that is a rather paternalistic 
view?
I: Yes, we are very paternalistic. I mean it was an exciting thing 
for black people to come into an economy where there was 
money. Before we came here they’d never seen money before. 
They’d never had clothes before it was just a skin around them. 
They didn’t have law and order and freedom (Interview 6).
Similarly, Rutherford describes CFU’s view like this:
Africans as a ‘race’ are imagined to be generally an evolutionary 
step behind Europeans, to be ‘traditional’ and not ‘modern’, 
and thus require guidance” (Rutherford 2001:63).
These quotes illustrate the social identity cultivated by leading members of 
the community of white commercial farmers. This identity is built around 
racial demarcations and a stigmatization ofThem-the-Black as economically 
irresponsible and incapable of long term reasoning and planning. Inter­
locked with this social identity is a collective memory with the basic theme 
of Us-the-White offering development and civilization to Them-the-Black. 
Consider this extract from the interview cited above (Interview 1):
I: When the white man first came here and founded a colony, 
it is estimated that there were about 180,000, say 200,000 
black people. But from the time the white man came the 
population started increasing, because we stopped them dying 
of disease, we stopped them dying of starvation, we stopped 
them killing one another.... Irrigation was a new science 
brought in by the expertise of the white man. So, before that, 
these chaps planted a crop and if there was a drought you had 
nothing. We gradually went through a number of stages with 
the building of dams and the spreading of electricity which 
made irrigation practical, economical. So it was just with the 
improved know-how and technology and electricity /that we 
managed the droughts/. We had a fantastic system here, which 
was developed by the expertise of the white man that put it 
right throughout the whole country through working hard, 
investing.... if the white man had never come, where would 
they still have been?” (Interview 6).
Another CFU farmer conveyed the same message in not so many words:
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I: We haven’t grabbed this land, we have developed it and put 
in resources here that will be here for ever (Interview 24B).
To sum up, the reality construct of the community of white commercial 
farmers was weaved around an imaginary self constructed as a negation of 
the irresponsible Them-the-Black. Connected to this identity is a collective 
memory of Them-the-White bringing civilisation to Them-the-Black.
The political organisation of the white commercial farmers
I turn now the political organisation of the white commercial farmers in 
Zimbabwe as a way to identify political entrepreneurs engaging in the 
transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as Gold. The focus will 
be on Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), which is the most 
influential political organization of the white commercial farmers in Zim­
babwe. With few exceptions, the CFU has as members all white commercial 
farmers. It functions as a hub of expert knowledge on farming techniques, 
weather conditions, world market prices on different grains, and helps 
provide individual farmers with access to international agricultural markets. 
Moreover, the CFU typically voices the interests of the white farming com­
munity in talks with the national political elite. It was from the ranks of 
CFU that the government invited representatives of the white farmers for 
discussions during the water sector reform (Interview 1, Rutherford 2001 ; 
Meredith 2002; Chan 2003).
The history of the CFU dates back to at least the 1942 formation of 
the Rhodesian National Farmers Union. At that time, agricultural politics 
took centre stage in Rhodesia’s political life and the Farmers Union was 
part of the strong network between farmers and politicians. The Rhodesian 
Front, in power from 1963 until Independence in 1980, was dominated 
by farmers. The Minister of Agriculture was typically a farmer, as was the 
Prime Minister during much of this period, Mr. Ian Smith. Over long pe­
riods of time, more than half the government were farmers which resulted 
in a wide battery of policy instruments designed to protect and support 
the agricultural sector (Mumbengegwi 1987; Herbst 1990; Bratton 1994; 
Skålnäs 1995; Smith 1997). Economist Clever Mumbengegwi describes 
the relationship between the state and the farmers during the period of 
white minority rule:
The policy instruments chosen were intended to guarantee 
that the commercial farmers played the pivotal role in the 
pursuit of the international regime’s objectives. Increased state 
intervention in directing and allocating resources became 
a necessity to ensure Rhodesia’s survival in a hostile world. 
(Mumbengegwi 1987:204).
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During the pre-independence era, a relationship was thus founded where 
the state and the farmers thrived in a symbiotic relationship aimed at politi­
cal and economic survival for the white farmers and the white dominated 
state. The state ensured favorable agricultural and economic policies and 
the agricultural sector provided the country’s economic backbone.
In contrast to the independence movement in many African countries, 
the incoming government under Robert Mugabe did not challenge the eco­
nomic power position of the former rulers. Entering State House in Harare, 
Mugabes government found itself in a peculiar situation of almost total 
economic dependency on its former foes (Mandaza 1987). Mumbengegwi 
(1987) notes that at Independence in 1980, the white commercial farm­
ing sector “accounted for 75% of the countries gross output, 95% of its 
marketed surplus, 100% of agricultural export earnings and 33% of the 
national formal wage employment” (p. 210). Adding to the new govern­
ment’s dependency on the white community was the lack of educated blacks 
in the bureaucracy. There were very few blacks even at junior posts, and no 
blacks held positions at senior administrative levels (Herbst 1990:30). As 
if this was not enough, the Lancaster House agreement—stipulating the 
terms for the transition to majority rule—included a clause seen to obstruct 
Mugabe’s government from reforming land ownership structures during 
a period of ten years. As I have argued in chapter five, Mugabe’s ability to 
realise the political agenda of “Zimbabwe” was thus highly dependent on 
his relationship to the white community.
Realising his dependency on the white community, Mugabe invited his 
former foes to continue the symbiotic relationship with the state (Rutherford 
2001; Meredith 2002; Chan 2003). In a speech on the eve of Independ­
ence, the just recent guerrilla leader, now Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, 
poetically proposed
If yesterday, I fought you as an enemy, today you have become 
a friend. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid 
the love that binds you to me and me to you. (Robert Mugabe 
cited in Herbst 1990:236).
Mugabe’s poetic invitation provided the foundation for a continuation of 
a favorable agricultural policy towards the white community. As a gesture 
of his intentions, Mugabe offered the post as Minister of Agriculture to the 
former CFU president. In the analysis of political scientist Jeffrey Herbst, 
Mugabe’s government struck a bargain with the white community. The 
bargain, “which is never discussed but is generally understood”, was that 
the whites could stay in Zimbabwe and continue their social and eco­
nomic activities for the rest of their lives. On their end of the bargain, the 
white community was expected to encourage their children to find lives 
for themselves outside of the country and thus provide for a natural end
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to the era of white influence in Zimbabwe. More importantly, the whites 
were expected to focus on economic activities and stay out of the political 
sphere (Herbst 1990:222 ff).
Mugabe’s bargain with the whites seemed to hold for a number of years 
as Zimbabwe experienced a relatively stable transition to independence. 
However, under the surface, several factors contributed to the deterioration 
of the bargain between the political rulers and the white community. In the 
eyes of many Zimbabweans, the bargain with the whites came at the expense 
of reform for the blacks (Kanyenze 2003:83ff). Nearly twenty years after 
Independence the white community still owned the vast majority of land 
and water resources in the country, and large groups of black Zimbabweans 
increasingly voiced their demands for resource distribution (Dorman 2001; 
Mlambo 2001). With rising discontent among key groups within civil 
society, including war veterans, black businessmen, and young progressive 
farmers, Mugabe’s political equation started to include breaking the bargain 
with the white farmers. These new groups had simply become too powerful 
for Mugabe’s government to ignore their demands for distribution of land 
and water (Raftopoulos 2001; Kriger 2003). In addition, members of the 
white community ventured into politics and offered support to oppositional 
political groups (Mlambo 2001:23f; Raftopoulos 2000; Chan 2003). With 
leaders of the white farming community widely associated with opponents 
to Mugabe’s government, the tacit bargain with the post-colonial govern­
ment came to an end (Darnolf and Laakso 2003).
These factors led to the deterioration of the formerly amicable bargain 
between the white community of farmers and Mugabe’s government. At 
the centre of the increasing tensions stood the question of control over 
Zimbabwe’s natural resources and the role of the whites in politics (Worby 
2001). In a speech in April 2001, President Mugabe drew on the popular 
social identity in which the white commercial farmers were associated with 
the former colonial power, Great Britain. He said:
... this land, this Zimbabwe, is a sacred inheritance from our 
forefathers. It was the causus belli of our armed liberation strug­
gle. It cannot, therefore, be that we will have to beg a foreign 
power for and so we say hands off, Britain, hands off (Herald 
19 April, 2001 cited in Dorman 2001:23)
To illustrate the degree of conflict in this relationship around the turn of 
the 20th century, consider a speech from October 1999 in which President 
Mugabe stated:
Zimbabweans also had to be united in fending off the intruders 
who yesterday happened to have been our colonial masters and 
now pretend to be champions of democracy and transparency. 
(Herald 16 October 1999 cited in Dorman 2001:23)
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This speech by Mugabe comes close to being a direct inversion of the speech 
held at the eve of Independence where he poetically invited the white 
community to a bargain for the future (see above). The animosity now 
expressed by Mugabe was also prevalent in CFU circles. Consider a speech 
by the CFU’s Director, David Hasluck, at the CFU’s Annual Congress in 
September 2000. Based on other research, I take the sentiments in Dircec- 
tor Hasluch’s speech to be representative of the CFU’s relations with the 
government at this time (cf. Mlambo 2001; Worby 2001). In his speech 
Mr. Hasluck invoked an analogy to the biblical story of Davids fight against 
Goliath. Hasluck suggested that David represented the CFU, and Goliath, 
the gigantic barbarian, stood for the Black majority in government. In the 
biblical story, David is anointed by God to fight the big barbarian trying 
to invade the land designated by God for his people. By analogy, the CFU 
was argued to carry a divine mission to fight for the land designated to 
them by God, and just as David was, the CFU was predestined to win. In 
his choice of analogy the director of CFU thus suggested that even if the 
odds looked bad, it was an historical and moral imperative for the CFU 
to challenge today’s giant who stood in the way of David and his people 
as they tried to cultivate the land given to them by God. Recognising the 
magnitude of the task of trying to regain former positions of power, Mr. 
Hasluck proclaimed:
David became great not when he slew Goliath but at the mo­
ment he decided to try. (CFU 2000).
Invoking the analogy of David and Goliath thus served to make two 
points. First, it conveyed that the CFU’s fight against the government 
was a contemporary version of the fight between good and evil in which 
the champions of the good eventually stand to win. Second, the analogy 
provided the moral and historical pretext for the CFU to resist the govern­
ment and its policies. The message of the CFU’s leadership is that the CFU 
had a divine mission to re-claim the nation that once was. Even if the odds 
were bleak, it was the moral imperative for the CFU to accept this fight. 
This was a call to perpetuate the historical mission of the white farming 
community in Zimbabwe. This vision stands in sharp contrast to the post­
colonial project of “Zimbabwe” which, as I have explained in chapter five, 
was centred on the ambition to establish Mugabe’s government at the nexus 
of nation building.
Summing up Water as Gold
Five things stand out in regard to the construction of Water as Gold and 
how this subsequently led to the transformation of IWRM by the white 
farming community. First, the white community thrived on a collective 
memory of successfully having brought modern agricultural practices and,
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indeed, civilization to what today is Zimbabwe. Second, they nurtured a 
social identity woven around an imaginary self constructed as a negation 
of Them-the-Black. Attracted to these racial stereotypes was the idea that 
whites are characterised by the ability to engage in long term planning and 
entrepreneurial projects, while blacks are irresponsible and idle. Third, based 
on this construction of reality, leaders of the white farming community ad­
vocated a reactionary political agenda that alluded to the pre-Independence 
period. Fourth, political entrepreneurs in and around the CFU worked to 
realise the ideals of the white farming community in political life. Finally, 
during the time of the water sector reform, the relationship between the 
CFU and the government went from amicable to increasingly conflict 
driven. Control over the agricultural sector, and hence control over water 
resources, was at the centre of this degenerating relationship.
Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation 
to Water as Gold
Catchment management
I turn now to the question of how actors subscribing to the construction 
of Water as Gold transformed IWRM’s call for catchment management. 
When I introduced the concept of catchment management in my interviews 
with white commercial farmers, they typically associated this concept with 
the so called Mazowe Pilot Catchment Project around the Mazowe River 
(henceforth MPCP, e.g. interview 1, 11, 13, 24B). Located just north of 
Harare, the Mazowe catchment holds some of Zimbabwe’s most fertile land, 
and since the early days of the white settlers the area around Mazowe River 
has been a stronghold for the white commercial farmers in the country.
As the government officially launched MPCP in July 1997, the project was 
envisaged as a “test bed” which the government could use to develop and 
test the idea of catchment management on a small scale. Besides Mazowe, 
the government designated the area of Mupfure around the Sanyati river 
as a second pilot project. The two areas were regarded as typical cases in 
as much as they captured the diversity of Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector. 
Mazowe was highly developed and dominated by white, large scale, com­
mercial farmers. Mupfure was generally underdeveloped and populated by 
black, small scale farmers. For the water sector reform to succeed nation­
wide, the argument was that it had to be able to address the problems in 
Mazowe and Mupfure (Derman 1998b).46
46 I confine my analysis to the experience from Mazowe as this was the most progressive 
and influential project in terms of advancing ideas associated with the construction of 
Water as Gold.
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Prior to the reform, commercial water management in Mazowe had been 
organised around the so-called River Boards. The River Boards had legal 
provision to provide day-to-day water management under the auspice of the 
Department of Water Development.47 This mandate was given to the River 
Boards in 1985 and was widely seen as a concession from the government 
to CFU as part of the “tacit bargain” that characterised the relationship 
between these parties during that time (Herbst 1990; Taylor and Chatora 
1995). The River Boards were dominated and controlled by white com­
mercial farmers along the Mazowe River, and this racial bias had made 
them quite controversial in political circles during the run-up to the water 
sector reform. The need to review the legal status of the River Boards was 
identified by the government as one of the reasons to engage in the reform 
process (Interview 10; Derman 1998a).
47 Together the River Boards formed the Mazowe River Catchment River Board.
In response to having been designated as a pilot case for the water sector 
reform, a group of actors in Mazowe formed what they unofficially called 
the “Dream Team” or “the Old Boy’s club”. The Dream Team was made up 
of a handful of people including large-scale white commercial farmers in 
Mazowe, people with long experience from the judicial system regulating 
water management, and people with personal connections to strategic part­
ners in the government. The Dream Team was closely connected (through 
official membership and institutional support) to the CFU in general and 
in particular to the CPU’s newly founded organ the National Irrigation 
Liaison Committee (NILC). The formation of the NILC was part of the 
CFU’s attempt to strengthen its institutional capacity to accommodate its 
members’ interests during the water sector reform (World Bank, UNDP 
et al. 1993; Interview 1).
Consider how one of member of the Dream Team described his group 
and their mission:
I: People like X and me we were part of the Dream Team. 
We dreamed about setting up the perfect water management 
system for Zimbabwe and we thought we could do it (Inter­
view 11).
As indicated by this interviewee, the vision of the Dream Team was not 
confined to the water management system in Mazowe catchment. The 
Dream Team wanted to use the experiences from water management in 
Mazowe as a model for the water management sector in the country at 
large. In an interview with another member of the Dream Team, I asked 
what this ideal water management system looked like. What was, more
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precisely, the “perfect water management system” that the Dream Team 
had in mind? Consider the interviewee’s response:
I: For the perspective of white commercial farmers in Mazowe 
it is not necessary to reform because blacks cannot use water. 
Blacks just cannot use water. And I think that the general view 
among the farmers who are operating in Mazowe is that there 
was no proper water use in this area prior to the arrival of the 
whites. They think that proper water usage was created by 
their own fathers. These whites guys look at the blacks in the 
communal areas and they said ‘You can’t run water. So why 
should we reform? What’s wrong with what we are doing?’ 
(Interview 10).
This quote tells us that the dream for Zimbabwe nurtured by the Dream 
Team was one of continued white domination over water resources. There 
was no need to reform and address the existing racial imbalances char­
acterising water management. This dream of sustained racial imbalances 
and persistent privileges of white water users was not confined to Maz­
owe, but extended to the entire country. That this was the dominant view 
among white commercial farmers is sustained by a report commissioned 
and published by the German development organisation, GtZ. (GtZ was 
commissioned to represent Germany, which was one of the main financial 
sponsors of the reform). The report concluded that the aim of the white 
commercial farmers was to “maintain the privileges of the old Water Act 
for white farmers” and to maintain “the status quo” (Darby 2000:25).
The Dream Team’s aspirations were rationalised by the construction of 
Water as Gold. The interviewee above alludes to the collective memory of 
the white settlers’ ‘success story’ of bringing modernisation to the previously 
undeveloped area. Before the arrival of the whites, so the argument goes, 
there was no proper water management. Moreover, this dream thrives on 
social identities constructed on the two stereotypes: Us-the-Whites and 
Them-the-Blacks. By means of these social identities, the current white 
commercial farmers see themselves as the heirs of the settlers who intro­
duced modern water management to this underdeveloped area. Likewise, 
the blacks are turned into a collective of idle and unproductive farmers who 
lack the ability to use water properly: ‘blacks cannot use water’.
Based on this evidence, I argue that IWRM idea of catchment manage­
ment was transformed by political entrepreneurs drawing on the construc­
tion of reality of Water as Gold. Through this transformation, catchment 
management was detached from IWRM’s idea of being a means for ecosys­
tem management into a platform to mobilize for continued racial imbalances 
in water management. The white commercial farmers in Mazowe under-
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stood that one of the objectives of the water sector reform was to address 
the racial imbalances in the availability and usage of water in Zimbabwe, 
i.e. to distribute control over water from them to black farmers. Recognis­
ing this threat to their privileged position, the Dream Team engaged in 
strategic action to propagate Mazowe’s water management system for the 
water sector of the entire country. This dream did not spell out ecological 
sustainability but rather the continuation of racial inequalities. The MPCP 
was used as a basis to mobilise influential actors within the judicial system, 
farming community, and strategic actors close to the government to advance 
a continuation of the privileged situation for the white commercial farmers 
in water management. IWRM’s call for catchment management was thus 
transformed from a vehicle for ecologically sustainable water management 
to an instrument to perpetuate social and racial imbalances.
Here we should recall the political context in which this transforma­
tion took place. As I reviewed in chapter two and five, the government 
of Zimbabwe saw water as a strategic resource in the manifestation of the 
post-colonial project of nation building. Given the fact that large water 
resources were owned and controlled by the white commercial farmers, 
the realisation of the government’s post-colonial project implied increasing 
government control over water at the expense of the whites. For the white 
commercial farmers water was key to the economic production of agricul­
tural goods. But perhaps even more importantly, control over water and the 
development of water resources was central to the construction of reality 
that united this group. They defined themselves as part of the community 
who had explored and exploited the water resources of the country, and 
the collective memory of successful water management was a constitutive 
factor for this group (cf. presentation of Water as Gold above).
In a context in which control over water management had this kind of 
connotations, I argue that we should read more into the aspirations of 
the Dream Team than just how to manage the distribution of water. My 
argument is that the Dream Team’s aspirations about a particular water 
management system were part of a larger dream about the political system 
for Zimbabwe. As the Dream Team engaged in strategic actions to main­
tain the control of water for the white commercial farmers, this was in 
line with the vision of a return to white domination of the political life in 
Zimbabwe. To sustain this interpretation, recall the vision suggested above 
by the CFU’s director. According to this vision, it was a divine mission for 
the white farmers in Zimbabwe to stand up against the government and 
reclaim control of the country. It was, to use the director’s words, a fight 
between the anointed David and the barbarian Goliath, in which God called 
on David to fight for the land designated by God to his people.
Seen in this light, the Dream Team not only transformed IWRM’s call for 
catchment management into a platform for continuation of white domina-
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tion of water resources in Zimbabwe. The call for catchment management 
became part of the political process in which the white commercial farm­
ers and the government were engaged in the manifestation of competing 
political projects: Water as a means for white political control versus water 
as part of the post-colonial project of nation building.
Water as an economic good
In this section I will analyse the transformation of IWRM’s emphasis 
on treating water as an economic by actors subscribing to the construc­
tion of Water as Gold, i.e. white commercial farmers. To understand this 
transformation we must take into consideration not only the original idea 
presented by advocates of IWRM (see chapter two), but also the way that 
the government of Zimbabwe came to interpret the idea of water as an 
economic good (see chapter five). As the actors subscribing to Water as 
Gold were confronted with IWRM’s idea of water as an economic good, 
they had to take into consideration not only the original ideas of IWRM, 
but also how the government was responding to IWRM. As I showed in 
chapter five, the government opposed IWRM’s idea of letting market forces 
set the price for water. The argument was that subjecting the price of water 
to market forces would deprive the government of control of an important 
aspect in the management of water. Consequently, the government opted 
for the National Blend Price (NBP), in which the price for one unit of 
water would be calculated as the national average cost of water production 
(e.g. costs for constructions of dams and canals, and administrative costs. 
Most importantly, the NBP would be set by the government, as opposed 
to the IWRM’s original idea of water as an economic good for which the 
supply and demand of the market would determine the price. As I analyse 
the transformation of the idea of water as an economic good by the white 
commercial farmers, I will thus take into account not only IWRM’s original 
idea but also the government’s proposition in favour of the NBP, and the 
motivations behind the government’s position.
Throughout the water sector reform, the CFU objected to the govern­
ment’s proposition of NBP. Instead it argued for a mixed pricing system 
that included prices calculated on the basis of specific sites and within the 
boundaries of catchments. Water is a major input in the production of 
agricultural goods. The greatest concern for the white commercial farmers 
was thus presumably to be able to buy water at the lowest possible price. 
Prior to the reform, the white commercial farmers could buy water from 
the government at a highly subsidised price (Zimconsult 1999b). In my 
interviews with these farmers and their representatives at the CFU, they 
frequently voiced the concern that an implication of the water sector reform 
would be that the old pricing system would be replaced and the price for 
water increase (e.g. Interview 10, 13,20, also CFU 1999). One interviewee
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holding a senior position in the CFU described how the CFU tried to pres­
sure the government to set a low price for water (Interview 1 ). The interview 
person recalled how the CFU at one time presented the government with 
a price that was obviously far below the average production cost for water 
(the NBP). The idea behind this was that since the CFU represented the 
biggest water consumer—the biggest buyer—the government had to take 
their demands into consideration. The interviewee said:
I: The government is so unorganised and they cant get their 
ducks in a row, so they will just have to accept our offer. If we 
don’t buy their water, then who will? Nobody. So they will 
have to accept or go bankrupt (Interview 1).
The position voiced by this interviewee suggests that the CFU responded 
to the threat of an increased price for water on the basis of strict economic 
rationality: the CFU attempted to use its strong market position to get a 
low price for a strategic production input.
In my interviews with other representatives of the white commercial 
farmers, there was, however, another recurrent line of argument regarding 
how to price water. This line of argument took as point of departure the 
historical achievements of the white farming community in the development 
of the country’s water resources. As one CFU member put it:
I: Me and my father developed this farm and in fact this whole 
community. Maybe the price for water has to increase for some 
stakeholders. But the major stakeholders, me and my peers, I 
think we have a major right, a legitimate right, on water (In­
terview 20, cf. Latham 2002; Interview 6, 12, 21,2B, 3B).
This interviewee suggests that on the basis of the historical achievements 
in the development of Zimbabwe, he and his peers—the white commercial 
farmers—are entitled to a low price on water today. He presents this as a 
moral argument in which it would be unjust to demand this group to pay 
a price for water that does not take into account the historical achievements 
of this community. Accordingly, a fair price should include a ‘discount’. 
The interviewee alludes to the collective memory of what I have called the 
‘success story’ of the white commercial farmers. It was the white commercial 
farmers who brought civilization and modern water management to Zim­
babwe. These achievements form the foundation for a morally legitimate 
right to a low price on water.
Based on the line of reasoning represented by this interviewee, I argue 
that an important reason for the white commercial farmers’ opposition to 
the reform water sector reform was that the government’s pricing option
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(NBP) did not recognise the historical achievements of the white farm­
ing community. NBP would require a uniform price for all consumers 
of water for commercial agricultural use in Zimbabwe (so called “raw 
water”).48 Apart from the economic arguments about the price for water, 
this pricing system was seen by the white commercial farmers as a way of 
depriving their community of a morally legitimate right obtained though 
their historical achievement. In the eyes of the white commercial farmers, 
these achievements amounted to a rightful claim on a lower price on water. 
Applying a national blend price would imply that the benefits from the 
whites’ achievement would be reaped not only by the white commercial 
farmers but by the entire nation. In the eyes of these farmers, the heritage 
of whites in Zimbabwe would thus not be offered to the proper heirs but 
would be shared with the Other, blacks. From the perspective of Water as 
Gold, the government’s attempts to apply a uniform price on water was 
a way of denying the value of the exceptional achievements of the white 
community.
48 Water for “primary use”—i.e. household usage—and non-commercial agriculture would 
not be subjected to any price.
49 This conclusion is concurred with by the Water Economist Stefan Helming—seconded 
to the DWD by GtZ-who analysed the effects of different pricing systems as part of the 
German government’s support to the water sector reform, see Helming (1993).
IWRM’s idea of water as an economic good was thus transformed from 
a question of market incentives for water management into a question of 
obtaining recognition for the particular construction of reality of white 
commercial farmers. This analysis of the CPU’s policy on water pricing 
challenges the assumption that they acted based on economic reasons. This 
may be counter-intuitive since water is a major input in the production 
of agricultural goods, and it thus would be reasonable to assume that the 
CFU would be determined by economic calculations and rationality. In 
contrast to this economic rationality, I argue that the CFU opposed the 
government’s attempt to introduce the NBP based on a rationale derived 
from the construction of reality of this group. However counter-intuitive, 
my interpretation is sustained by the economic analysis conducted by the 
widely recognised consultancy firm Zimconsult. This firm produced several 
reports about the different pricing options available to Zimbabwe as a means 
of assessing which groups would stand to gain from the respective pricing 
options considered during the reform (site/catchment/NBP). Interest­
ingly, in Zimconsult’s analysis, the economically most favourable pricing 
policy for large scale commercial farmers was NBP. 49 In other words, the 
government’s price policy would have offered a lower price to commercial 
farmers than would the CFU’s position. Zimconsult based its conclusion 
on the effects of applying a national and sub-national price system in prac-
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tice. Using both historical and theoretical arguments, Zimconsult shows 
that the NBP system stood out as the most economically rational option 
for large scale commercial farmers. Peter Robinsson, head of Zimconsult, 
concluded that:
The intention that the blend price system should protect new 
smallholders from the true cost of new schemes has thus not 
applied: it is large-scale commercial farmers who have benefited 
from the blend price cross-subsidies (Zimconsult 1999a:8).
In the assessment of Zimconsult, it was economically rational for the CFU 
to go along with the government’s position. This analysis supports my in­
terpretation that the CPU’s response to the issue of water pricing was not 
driven by economic rationality. Using a different perspective, the economic 
rationality of the CFU was also questioned by David Durham, Deputy 
Director of Planning and Hydrology at Department of Water Develop­
ment. On 24 of May 1999 Durham wrote a letter to the CFU in which he 
tried to convey the economic irrationality and risk of the CFU’s position of 
opposing NBP in favour of a sub-national price (Durham 1999). Durham 
argued that a sub-national price would mean that the price would be based 
on the economic viability of each specific area or production site. Taking 
the example of the highly productive sugar industry, he wrote:
[The government] could increase the price that supplies them 
with water ten times. This would provide a significant boost 
to the development of our water resources while still allowing 
the sugar industry to remain viable. (Durham 1999:1).
That is to say, a catchment or site-specific formula would allow the gov­
ernment to price water by considering the productivity of water usage in a 
specific area. The most productive catchments and sites would have a higher 
price than the average national blend price. And since the CFU typically 
represented the most productive farmers, the national blend price would 
offer CFU’s members a discount on behalf of the less productive small and 
medium scale farmers. In a rather caustic tone, Durham ends his letter to 
the CFU suggesting that these calculations ought to be “food for thought 
for the future.”
To sum up, taking into account both the economic perspective of Zim­
consult and the policy perspective of the Department of Water Develop­
ment, the CFU’s opposition of the government’s proposition of a national 
blend price seems to be economically irrational. The CFU’s choice would 
not render the large commercial farming sector the lowest price for water 
while the government’s pricing policy would. This begs the question: Why 
did CFU not go along with the position suggested by the government?
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As I have state above, my argument is that for the white commercial 
farmers, the question of the water price was not an issue about strict eco­
nomic rationality. It was about obtaining recognition for the historical 
achievements of the white community in the country. In the context of the 
relationship between the white commercial farmers and the government, 
IWRM’s call for treating water as an economic good was transformed from 
a question of how many Zimbabwean dollars to pay for each quantity of 
water into a question of political recognition for Water as Gold. The CFU’s 
response to different pricing options was derived from a rational defined 
by the construction of Water as Gold. This obstructed an agreement with 
the government on how to price water.
Stakeholder participation
In the following section I will analyse the transformation of IWRM’s 
proposition for stakeholder participation by actors subscribing to Water 
as Gold. This proposition was built on the democratic ideal of widespread 
influence in the decision making processes related to the management of 
peoples’ livelihood. In a manner that resembles the democratic ideal of 
universal suffrage, the call for stakeholder participation was based on the 
idea that all water users have a stake in water management and thus also 
hold a right to influence how it is managed.
At the outset of my fieldwork, my expectation was that the CFU would 
endorse IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation. One might object that 
this was a naive expectation. It was, however, based on the fact that prior 
to the reform, the white farming community was under increased political 
pressure to re-examine and redefine its role in the Zimbabwean society. 
The special ‘bargain’ between the government and the white community 
drawn up after Independence was withering away and there was increas­
ing mobilisation in the government and society for the need to address the 
biased distribution of resources along racial lines (see chapter two and five). 
Some analysts even saw a risk of violence against the white community if 
the stark economic injustices were not addressed (Drinkwater 1991).
In this context, I expected that IWRM’s call for stakeholder participa­
tion could be part of the CFU’s strategy to reformulate its role in society. I 
thus expected the CFU to transform the call for stakeholder participation 
from IWRM’s call for increased democracy in the water sector alone, into 
a means to gain a new and legitimate role in the changing Zimbabwean 
society at large. The CFU could use the water sector reform to engage in 
a peaceful dialogue with interested parties in society and the government 
on their future role in society and thus pre-empt the risk for social or even 
political violence against them.
For my expectation to be well grounded, my interviewees at CFU would 
have to be self-critical in their analysis of their role in the history of the
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country. To sense a need to change, the CFU would have to recognise that 
it had been wrong. If the CFU was to see water sector reform as an op­
portunity to re-negotiate its role in society, they would have to recognise 
their role in the processes that had shaped the situation of social inequality 
now criticized. With this in mind, I asked members of the CFU how they 
perceived the need to modify the legal system to accommodate demands 
from the majority of the population whose voices currently were not heard. 
Consider the following extract from an interview with a high level official 
at the CFU concerning the reformation of the 1976 Water Act. Put in 
place during the time of white minority rule and remained, with only few 
amendments, the Act was the most important legal instrument for water 
distribution prior to the reform:
R: Considering the fact that under the present Water Act there 
is little influence by the majority of the population in water 
management, do you think that there is a need to modify it 
to accommodate for the majority population as part of the 
water sector reform?
I: The 1976 Water Act wasn’t an exclusive thing. There was 
no discrimination against who could apply to the water court 
for a water right. Anyone who had a legitimate use for water 
and had the capital to buy a system could go to the water court 
and apply. The lack of efficient use of the Water Act and water 
created an unjust situation, not the system. So don’t change 
the system, just use it better (Interview 1).
For the purpose of my analysis, what is interesting here is to analyse the 
consequences of the interviewee’s view on the 1976 Water Act in relation to 
the IWRM call for stakeholder participation. In particular, it is interesting 
to note how the interviewee outlines his argument and what implications 
his reasoning have in terms of what should be regarded as the legitimate 
distribution of claims on and blames about water resources between dif­
ferent actors in the water sector. The interviewee states that the system for 
water management put in place prior to Independence did not discriminate 
against the black majority. It was, in his opinion, a legal instrument with a 
focus on technical prerequisites for who should be allowed to use water.50
50 Technically, the interviewee is quite correct. There was nothing discriminatory, or even 
racist, in the in the 1976 Water Act. (Remember that the Act was put in place before 
Independence). The Act stipulates a set of neutral, technical requirements that have to be 
met before a water right can be approved (in particular Part VI and VIII of the Act). For 
an analysis of the political consequences of seemingly ‘technical’ regulations in Zimbabwe’s 
agricultural sector, see Rutherford (2001); Derman (1998).
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Any injustices in the current situation should be attributed to the misuse 
of the system, not the system as such.
In the context of the construction of Water as Gold, the statement of 
this interviewee translates into a statement that there was nothing wrong 
with the system for water management put in place by the whites. Any 
injustices in the current situation should be attributed to the misuse of 
the system by the blacks and their government after Independence. This 
statement thus alludes to the collective memory of whites bringing proper 
water management to an area historically characterised by underdevelop­
ment and misuse of water. Moreover, his view fits nicely with the social 
identity construction of the irresponsible and backward blacks as incapable 
of proper water management. The bias in the social distribution of water 
between whites and blacks was due to the blacks being incapable of using 
the fair system put in place by the whites.
The line of reasoning illustrated by the interviewee above is instrumental 
in rebutting any argument that the white farming community had a po­
litical or moral ‘debt’ which would call on them to engage in stakeholder 
participation to rectify and re-negotiate their role in society. In fact, instead 
of a need to address any historical injustices, the implication of what this 
CFU representative says is that the historical role of the white farming 
community gives the white commercial farmers a legitimate right to special 
treatment in the current water sector reform. The reason for this is that it 
was the whites who provided this arid and unorganised area with a modern 
system for effective and equitable water management. For this they could, 
if anything, place a legitimate claim on continued special influence in the 
water sector.
At a later stage in the same interview cited above (Interview 1)1 asked 
how the CFU’s view on stakeholder participation was perceived by other 
actors engaged in the reform process. Recall here that IWRM’s call for 
stakeholder participation was based on the widely accepted democratic 
norm of the right to self determination and had substantial backing from 
international development agencies, other farming groups, and, at least at 
a verbal level, the government itself.
R: So I take it that CFU did not put too much energy in 
engaging new stakeholders during the reform process. How 
did other actors react to that? I mean there was such a strong 
moral and political pressure for this idea.
I: Yeah, getting more stakeholders onboard was the politically 
astute thing to do at the time. And we discussed it quite a 
lot at the Committee on Irrigation [under the CFU Board]. 
We decided to advice our members that as they were heading
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to these stakeholder meetings they could stop off and grab 
some black guy by the collar and take him there so he can be 
seen. If he doesn’t say a bloody word for the whole year, don’t 
worry. Just you make sure that he gets elected the next year 
and stays there.
From the perspective represented by this interviewee, my expectation at 
the beginning of my fieldwork was thus not met. IWRM based the call 
for stakeholder participation on a democratic ideal resembling the ideal of 
universal suffrage. While I did not expect the white commercial farmers 
to necessarily embrace this ideal, I did expect them to see IWRM’s call for 
stakeholder engagement as an opportunity to assess their historical role in 
Zimbabwe and use it as a platform for peaceful dialogue on their future 
position in society. From my analysis of the empirical material, the white 
commercial farmers’ perception of their role in history precluded this mo­
tive for stakeholder participation. In their view, there was no blame associ­
ated with their historical role, and therefore there was no foundation for 
stakeholder engagement aiming at reconsidering the white community’s 
role in society.
Further analysis suggests another, closely related, reason for why the 
white commercial farmers did not embrace IWRM’s call for stakeholder 
participation. IWRM advanced the call for stakeholder participation based 
on the ideal of a democratic right to participate in the decision-making 
processes that affect a persons’ livelihood. The right to influence the man­
agement of water is not connected to any particular achievement but is an 
a priori right held by water users. This view contrasts sharply with a recur­
rent theme in my interviews with white commercial farmers. According to 
them, the right to influence in the management of water was derived from 
active engagements and successful achievements in this sector. It was, as I 
have shown above, the historical achievement of the white farming com­
munity in Zimbabwe that formed the basis for their claims on influence. 
The view of these interviewee can be summarized like this: ‘Stakeholder 
participation implies that influence in water management is taken from us 
who have deserved it thanks to achievements, and given to the blacks who 
neither have deserved it nor have the ability to deal with it’ (Interviews 10, 
11, 13, 20, 21).
For these actors, IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation is thus trans­
formed into a question of what value should be attributed to their and their 
fathers’ historical achievements in water management. From the perspective 
ofWater as Gold, IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation as a democratic 
right equates to nullifying the value of whites’ historical contribution to 
water management. Seen in this way, the commercial farmers’ resistance to 
stakeholder participation should be understood as a way to try to obtain
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social and political legitimacy for their construction of reality. If everybody 
has a right to influence in the management of water—irrespective of his or 
her achievements—what was the purpose of the sacrifices and hard work 
of the white farmers throughout history? None: if everybody was given 
the same rights, it would mean that society was not going to recognise the 
value of the whites’ historical achievements.
The white commercial farmers can be further clarified if we recall how 
the government of Zimbabwe addressed the issue of stakeholder participa­
tion. From within the construction ofWater as Zimbabwe, the government 
transformed IWRMs call for stakeholder participation into a legitimiza­
tion of increased influence for itself (see chapter five). In its eyes, the call 
for stakeholder participation was not a call for increased démocratisation 
in the sense that increased influence over water management would be 
placed in the hands of the voters, i.e., a devolution of power from the state 
to the people. Based on Water as Zimbabwe, the government saw itself as 
the legitimate representative of the blacks—the People—and the question 
of natural resources management as a quest to reclaim resources from the 
whites (see in particular the interview with Attorney General P. Chinamassa 
in chapter five). Taking this into account, the white commercial farmers’ 
resistance to stakeholder participation should thus be seen as a resistance 
towards increased government influence. I have shown above that the 
relations between these farmers and the government were quite hostile. 
While the government tried to use the management of water to advance its 
post-colonial political project, the white commercial farmers were engaged 
in strategic action to manifest an alternative political agenda with special 
privileges for the white minority in line with Water as Gold. In the rela­
tions between the government and the white commercial farmers, IWRM’s 
call for stakeholder participation was transformed into a component in the 
struggle over the manifestation of two competing constructions of reality: 
Water as Zimbabwe and Water as Gold.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have analysed the transformations of IWRM by white 
commercial farmers subscribing to the construction of that I have labelled 
Water as Gold. At the centre of the transformation process were well organ­
ised political entrepreneurs in the CFU and the related group known as the 
Dream Team. For them, the reality ofWater as Gold implied that the white 
commercial farmers were entitled to a very privileged position in Zimbabwe. 
It was, so the argument went, whites who had brought prospect to this 
arid land, and this gave whites the right to enjoy its fruits. These political 
entrepreneurs engaged in strategic action to manifest their construction of
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reality and what they saw as its political and, indeed, moral implications. 
While the water sector reform challenged the historical privileges of the 
white commercial farmers—in terms of access to water at subsidised prices 
and strong influence in the decision making process around water—these 
political entrepreneurs aimed to defend and even expand what they con­
sidered to be their legitimate claims in the water sector.
Two parts of the construction of Water as Gold were essential to the 
transformation process. First, the white commercial farmers nurtured a 
collective memory in which whites had brought civilization and proper 
water management to an area previously characterised by underdevelopment 
and ineffective resource use. Second, they nurtured a social identity weaved 
around an imaginary self constructed as a negation of Them-the-Blacks. 
In this world of racial stereotypes, whites were progressive entrepreneurs 
while blacks were irresponsible and idle.
Water as Gold was thus instrumental to legitimising the white domination 
of the water sector. The white commercial farmers were keen to name the 
practice of water management as one that demands long terms planning 
and hard work. To enjoy the potentials of water resources—so the argument 
went—called for great entrepreneurial skills and willingness to calculate and 
take risks. The benefits of water are not inherent in water as such. If that had 
been the case, why did the blacks not enjoy it before the arrival of the white 
man? Successful management of water derived from the degree to which 
it was executed by people with the right mind-set. In the construction of 
Water as Gold, whites were the carrier of this ideal mind-set. By contrast, 
blacks—constructed as a stereotypic negation of whites—were the root of 
ineffective water management.
The collective memory and racial stereotypes of Water as Gold further 
guides what these actors regarded as the basis for making legitimate claims 
and blames on resources in the water sector. It is the successful achievements 
white men—stretching from the early days of the settlers to present day 
farmers—that constituted the basis for legitimate claims on resources. The 
black’s burden was brought on themselves and implied no obligations for 
the white farmers. There was no historical mischief on the part of the white 
community—neither during the pre- nor post-independent period—that 
would constitute the basis for legitimate claims for the white commercial 
farmers to make concessions towards the blacks. Quite the contrary, the 
white commercial farmers regarded themselves as entitled to legitimate 
claims on favourable deals in the water sector (such as a relatively lower 
price on water).
The construction of Water as Gold implied that the meaning of each of 
the three pillars of IWRM was transformed in the eyes of white commercial 
farmers who engaged with it to have their views manifested as legitimate 
in society at large. Table 6.1 summarises the transformed meanings of each 





Transformed meaning Behavioural implication
Catchment 
management
Platform for political mobiliza­
tion against post-colonial rulers, 
for maintaining white farm­
ers’ reality constructions and 
privileges.
Use legal provision for catchment 
management to step-up organisa­
tion of alternative political agenda 
and to spread this to catchments 
throughout the country as part 
of a process aiming at a increased 
leverage for whites in society at 
large.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Call to deprive white com­
mercial farmers of legitimate, 
historically obtained, discount 
on water pricing.
Oppose economically favourable 
pricing policy offered by the Gov­
ernment as a means to maintain 




Means to increase control by 
backward Blacks at the expense 
of progressive Whites.
Support the display of blacks at 
stakeholder meetings but obstruct 
any substantial influence by 
blacks.




7. IWRM AND WATER AS SCIENCE
The third IWRM transformation to be analysed is that by actors subscribing 
to a construction of water that I have labelled “Water as Science”. Since those 
who enacted this transformation were primarily employed in Zimbabwean 
government institutions (e.g. DWD and ZINWA), I have labelled these 
actors as scientific water officials” for the purposes of this chapter.
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section outlines in detail 
the two tenets of the construction of Water as Science: (i) a strong belief 
in the ability of natural sciences to distinguish the relevant problems and 
solutions to issues of water resources management, and (ii) the emphasis on 
water resources management as a scientific practice in service of the national 
development of Zimbabwe. In section two, I focus on the struggle around 
competing claims on the social identity of lead-agent in the reform process. 
The empirical point of departure is the fact that the Zimbabwean govern­
ment chose not to entrust the implementation of the water sector reform 
with the cadre of existing scientific water officials in the administration but 
set up a new group of actors—the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group and 
the Water Resources Management Strategy team (IMSG/WRMS)—and 
entrusted them with this prestigious task. This set the stage for a competi­
tive interaction between political entrepreneurs advancing the respective 
constructions of Water as Science (held by the scientific water officials) 
and IWRM (held by the IMSGAWRMS officials). The subsequent three 
sections focus on the transformation of IWRM with respect to the three 
pillars of IWRM: catchment management, water as an economic good, 
and stakeholder participation. The chapter closes with a presentation of 
the conclusions of the analysis.
Water as Science
From my interviews with people in the public institutions for water 
management in Zimbabwe, it became clear that many of them had a firm 
confidence in the ability of the natural sciences to provide the proper road­
map to water resources management. They shared a collective memory 
according to which the relevant problems and proper solutions to water 
resources management will be defined by natural sciences. Consequently, 
they saw the managerial challenge as simply applying natural scientific 
models and practices to water resources and subsequently determining the
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optimal solution to the water problems (e.g. interview 16, 10B, 4B, 8B). 
This collective confidence in the natural science forms the basis for the first
tenet of Water as Science.
The historical roots of this collective memory can be traced back to the 
colonial period. At the time, a significant part of Rhodesia’s image as a 
modern, progressive nation hinged on Rhodesias reputation as a world 
leader in water management. In particular, Rhodesias world leading role in 
water management was manifested in the massive Kariba dam completed 
in 1960. The Kariba dam tamed the mighty Zambezi River into what was 
then, and still is, one of the world’s largest dam constructions. Situated in 
“the middle of nowhere”—i.e. in the inhospitable Zambezi valley populated 
mainly by tzetze flies—the Kariba dam was widely seen as the icon of the 
“civilization project” in which man used science to master nature on the 
African continent (Interview 12, 20, 2B, 3B; Soils Incorporated (Pty) Ltd 
and Chalo Environmental and Sustainable Development Consultants 2000;
Stålgren and Söderbaum 2002).
Water resources management as away of using natural sciences to subject 
nature to the needs of mankind was a recurrent theme in my interviews 
in Harare (in particular interview 16, 4B, 6B). They described scientific 
water management as a practice of using scientific methods to define the 
needs and opportunities of mankind in relation to nature. Interestingly, 
anthropologist Wendy Nelson Espeland (1998) describes a similar way of 
thinking from her studies of scientific water officials in the USA. She writes 
this about these actors’ “engineering ethos”:
[They regard] the conquest and possession of nature as a source 
of wealth and redemption; the transformation of what was 
dangerous, wasteful, and remote into something compliant 
useful, and accessible; how taming nature revealed man at his 
best — heroic, dominant, intelligent, (p. 47).
As did their colleagues in the USA, the scientific water officials in Zimba­
bwe described nature as a resource to be explored and enjoyed by means 
of scientific practices for the benefit of mankind. Connected to this collec­
tive memory was the social identity in which the scientific water officials 
saw themselves as the vanguard of the subjugation of nature. This was, in 
the words of Espeland “man at his best” engaged in “taming nature” (cf. 
interview 20, 20B 4B-9B).
This similarity in outlook between my findings in Zimbabwe and Espe- 
land’s in the USA can perhaps be attributed to the similar academic train­
ing of scientific water officials in the two countries. From my interviews 
I found out that many scientific water officials had a formal academic 
training in some natural science subject (mainly hydrology or hydrogeo-
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logy) from universities in Africa or overseas.51 Several of them frequently 
participated in international scientific conferences which kept them up to 
date on the latest international findings and methods of scientific water 
resources management.
51 Hydrology and hydrogeology are the two main natural science disciplines concerned with 
water management. Hydrologists are experts on surface water, while hydrogeologists have 
their expertise on groundwater management.
The second tenet of Water as Science that I found in my interviews was 
a strong emphasis on scientific water management as a practice that should 
be applied in service of the nation of Zimbabwe. Based on this view, these 
interviewees were very reluctant to take sides on issues on the social distri­
bution of water resources within the country. That was, they said, “politics 
and not “water management”. As one interviewee put it “You know, water 
is water, and water is basically non-political” (Interview 12).
Scientific water resources management was thus seen as a practice that 
stood above domestic political infighting with the aim of serving the de­
velopment of the nation as a whole. This sentiment is captured in a state­
ment reiterated by many interviewees, almost like an in-house slogan at 
the Department of Water Development:
I: The basin stops at the boarder. Every drop of water that goes 
to Mozambique is a wasted drop of water (for ex. interview 
4B, 5B, 6B; cf. Derman 2000).
Of course, those saying this would know from their natural science back­
grounds that a basin does not stop at the boarder. A basin is defined by 
the geography that distinguishes one system of surface and groundwater 
from the next. The flow of water in a basin does not consider national 
boarders but follows the shapes of nature. Nevertheless, the interviewees 
compromised their scientific epistemology in this case to uphold a nation­
alistic ideology. Consequently, every drop of water that was not developed 
within the boundaries of the nation but goes downstream to Mozambique 
was considered a professional failure (“a wasted drop of water”). I take this 
as a sign that these people, besides seeing themselves as natural scientists, 
identified themselves as part of the development of Zimbabwe. In fact, we 
could respecify the statement above—that their scientific outlook implied 
subjecting nature to mankind—to say that their scientific outlook implied 
subjecting nature to the citizens of Zimbabwe. The scientific water officials 
were determined to bring water to their fellow citizens, and through their 
scientific outlook they subjected nature to the people of Zimbabwe.
This close affinity to the development of the nation makes it easy to 
associate Water as Science with the construction of Water as Zimbabwe
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(chapter five). However, although both realities are constructed around an 
agenda of national development they should be seen as distinct. Indeed, 
many of the interviewed scientific water officials emphasised the need to 
“keep politics out” and often deplored how politicians used water as a means 
to favour their own political interest rather than the interests of the nation 
(Interview 20, 4B, 5B). In their view, politicians used water as a means to 
build a political platform for the benefit of the politicians. By contrast, the 
scientific water officials argued that water should be used as a means to 
build a platform for development of the entire nation.
To sum up, scientific water officials identified themselves as the vanguard 
in the application of natural sciences to water resources management prob­
lems in service of national development.
Competing claims on leading positions in 
Zimbabwe’s water administration
How was IWRM transformed by actors subscribing to Water as Science? 
To address this question I first turn to the competition between, on the one 
hand, the Department of Water Development (DWD) and, on the other, 
the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group and the Water Resources Management 
Strategy team (IMSG/WRMS). The DWD group of scientific water officials 
had a long tradition of scientific water management in Zimbabwe, while 
the IMSG/WRMS group was only set up by the government and donor 
community to spearhead the water sector reform. The Inter-Ministerial 
Steering Group (IMSG) was assigned the function of the administrative 
nexus of the reform process. To give IMSG sufficient weight in the existing 
administrative structures, it was headed by the Permanent Secretary of the 
Ministry of Land and Water Resources. WRMS was the designated opera­
tional body under IMSG and mandated to drive the reform process on a 
day-to-day basis (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands 
et al. 1995).52
52 Evidence suggests that as the reform got under way tensions developed between IMSG 
and WRMS. As I do not see these as significant for the transformation of IWRM, I do not 
attend to them explicitly.
The focus in this section is on how political entrepreneurs within the 
DWD acted to undermine the political and financial viability of the 
IMSG/WRMS. My argument is that the aim of actors within the DWD 
was to reclaim from the IWSG/WRMS what they saw as their entitled 
social identity as the vanguard of water resources management in Zim­
babwe. My conclusion is that this power struggle had the effect that the 
actor designated by the government and supporting donors to implement
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IWRM in Zimbabwe—the IMSG/WRMS—was substantially weakened 
and de-legitimised. Those who were affiliated with the implementation 
of IWRM in Zimbabwe were marginalised within the administrative and 
political structures and, as I will show, deprived of their ability to forcefully 
implement IWRM.
Great expectations and disappointments
As I have shown above, the public water officials at the DWD nurtured a 
proud collective memory of water management dating back to the 1950’s 
and 1960’s. As the water sector reform set off at the mid-1990’s, these actors 
saw themselves as the rightful leaders of the reform (Interview 4, 8, 5B, 6 B, 
7B). The government, supported by the international donor community, did 
not act to meet these expectations but decided to set up a new entity—the 
IMSG/WRMS—and put them in the position to spearhead the reform 
process (Government of Zimbabwe 1995). Why did the government of 
Zimbabwe not trust the DWD to lead the water reform process? As I have 
shown in chapter five, the post-colonial government tried to manifest Zim­
babwe as a political platform. To succeed in this ambition, the government 
had to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, demands on mar­
ket liberalisations and structural reforms voiced by the international donor 
community and progressive parts of the Zimbabwean establishment, and, on 
the other hand, demands for an increased nationalisation which would free 
Zimbabwe from the reminiscence of white domination lingering on since 
the colonial period. During the early 1990’s different groups of political 
entrepreneurs around the government supported these respective demands, 
i.e. increased liberalisation, and increased nationalisation respectively (Moyo 
1995; Skålnäs 1995; Darnolf and Laakso 2003). The inauguration of the 
IMSG/WRMS was a compromise that could satisfy demands of both these 
camps. Even though the IMSG/WRMS were de jure government bodies, 
they had an image of independence. An official at one of the international 
development agencies supporting IWRM put it like this:
I: WRMS were in the government, but not of the government 
(Interview 26).
This picture of the new agency made it easy for the liberal reformists to 
accept the IMSG/WRMS under the umbrella of market liberalisation and 
structural adjustments. For proponents of increased market liberalisation 
and structural adjustment, the IWRM/WRMS was a way to “outsource” 
the water reform in accordance with the slogan of “rolling back the state” 
which was popular among international development agencies at the time 
(Bond and Manyanya 2003). By contrast, for supporters of the nationalisa­
tion process, the choice to discount the DWD could be put up as a way to
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isolate what in conservative circles was considered to be “a white unit” in 
the post-colonial administration (Interview 16B). As I described in chapters 
five and six, the post-colonial government rested heavily on the technical 
know-how and competence of the white community in Zimbabwe. Given 
the white farmers’ specialisation in irrigation and water management, it is 
not surprising that, as one interviewee put it, the “DWD had too many 
white faces” (Interview 12). The political entrepreneurs in government who 
portrayed the DWD as a safe haven for whites could be satisfied by the 
government’s choice not to give the DWD the prestigious and powerful 
task to spearhead the reform.
As the government of Zimbabwe decided to entrust the role of lead-actor 
in the reform to the IWSG/WRMS rather than the DWD, this was seen 
by my interviewees from the DWD as a direct attack on their social iden­
tity. Consider how one senior official at the DWD headquarters described 
these developments:
R: Would you tell me about the relationship between, on 
the one hand, the IMSG/WRMS, and, on the other hand, 
DWD?
I: Initially all things were supposed to happen within the 
DWD. But then WRMS became as a separate body under 
the Ministry. WRMS became much like just another Depart­
ment. Initially they were supposed to capacity build within 
the DWD. But they did not; there was no capacity building 
and no co-ordination between WRMS and DWD. We were 
as two different departments. But one was the favoured son; 
the other was the un-favoured son.
R: Was WRMS becoming too powerful?
I: Yes, but they did not fulfil expectations. It can perhaps not 
be classified as a total failure, your view on that one depends 
on where you sit (Interview 5B).
This quote illustrates the disappointment and offence felt by managers at the 
DWD as a result of the inauguration of the IMSG/WRMS. The interviewee 
asserts the sentiment of entitlement to the leading role during the reform: 
“all things were supposed to happen within the DWD”. Contrary to these 
expectations, the IMSG/WRMS was set up to become an organisational 
unit with the status of “another Department”. This created a sense within 
the DWD of having been deprived of their social identity as the main actor 
within the water sector. The prestigious role of spearheading the reform was
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given to a suddenly favoured upstart—“the favoured son”—without any 
consideration of historically based achievements and rights.
According to the blueprint of the reform, recruitment to the IMSG/ 
WRMS should have assured the assembling of a highly qualified team 
with diverse professional backgrounds, whose combined experience would 
facilitate an integrated approach to water management (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). Members of the 
IMSG were consequently recruited from within government to assure a 
strong basis for the reform process within different Zimbabwean minis­
tries with stakes in water resources management. The WRMS was made 
up of senior actors with different academic and professional experience, 
including development economics, modern environmental management, 
and communication experts (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of 
Netherlands et al. 1995: Annex 2). The intended relationship between the 
DWD and these new actors was stipulated in the Terms of Reference of 
the WRMS. It reads:
[WRMS should] introduce to the Department of Water Re­
sources and collaborating government entities a new approach 
to water resources planning. (Government of Zimbabwe, 
Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: Annex 6, p. 3)
What is more, the same document instructs the DWD’s staff how to relate 
to these new actors:
[The department s staff should] be professionally guided by the 
appropriate professional in the WRMS Secretariat. (Govern­
ment of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: 
Annex 6, p. 28).
In the eyes of management at the DWD, these formulations implied that 
the WRMS was set up to ‘teach’ the DWD proper water management while 
the DWD staff were to accept the role of pupils guided by the ‘profession­
alism’ of the WRMS officials (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of 
Netherlands et al. 1995). Given the social identity of the scientific water 
officials at the DWD, it is not difficult to understand that this division of 
labour was difficult to stomach. As to further increase the impudence felt 
by the DWD, their new ‘teachers’ comprised people without training in 
natural science. As frequently pointed out in my interviews at the DWD, 
some members of the WRMS even had a social science background as op­
posed to the strong emphasis on natural sciences within the department. 
This is how one senior manager at the DWD described the recruitment of 
the WRMS officials:
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I: The tenders that went out [for recruiting the WRMS team] 
were not qualified. These people had no prior experience with 
proper water management, at least not the majority ofWRMS 
people (Interview 4B).
Similarly, regarding the chairman of the WRMS, Mr. Pazvakavambwa, this 
interviewee said:
I: Simon Pazvakavambwa was recruited on political grounds. 
He was the former Director of Agri tex [Agricultural Extensions 
Services] but had no prior experience for the water resources 
section, and today we cannot use the WRMS document for 
anything (Interview 4B).
My interviewees at the DWD thus constructed a social identity of the 
WRMS which was in large parts the opposite of their own. Contrary to the 
scientific water officials at the DWD, the people recruited to the WRMS 
were not selected based on their natural science background, nor did they 
have a proven track record of water management in Zimbabwe. The re­
cruitment was seen as the result of illegitimate political considerations. The 
WRMS was in stark contrast to the DWD‘s social identity of competence 
in natural sciences and a-political role in the historical development of the 
country.
How did actors at the DWD react to the inauguration of the IMSG/ 
WRMS to lead the reform? To address this question, the two subsequent 
sections outline two ways in which political entrepreneurs within the 
DWD tried to deal with the fact that the prestigious role of spearheading 
the reform had been given to “new kids on the block” (Interview 8). In line 
with the first strategy, managers in the DWD tried to use their established 
positions within the Zimbabwean bureaucracy to bypass the WRMS and 
hence regain control of the developments in the water sector. Second, as 
attempts to bypass this new actor were only partly successful, the DWD 
explored its strategic advantages of being well connected in the existing 
public administration to isolate the WRMS and render it incapable of 
pursuing what the DWD saw as their task.
Bypassing the “new kids on the block”
Management at the DWD had great hopes for the reform process as it began 
in the mid-1990s. In line with the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Program, 
which was applied in Zimbabwe at the time, the DWD had suffered re­
peated budget cutbacks and consequently experienced severe ‘brain drain’, 
losing key experts to better paid jobs in the private sector in Zimbabwe and 
abroad. When the water sector reform was starting to take off, this was seen 
by the DWD’s management as a sign of that the tide had turned and that
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they once again would get the attention and resources of the government 
as well as the international donor community (Interview 4, 5B, 7B).
As I have pointed out, these hopes were not met. Realising that the IMSG/ 
WRMS was being selected to spearhead the reform process, the DWD 
managers found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, the insult of 
not having been selected for this task suggested that they should disavow 
the WRMS completely and try to sabotage the reform process. On the other 
hand, the reform process represented a chance to obtain financial resources 
and confirm the DWD’s proud history in service of the nation. Facing this 
dilemma, political entrepreneurs at the DWD engaged to bypass the IMSG/ 
WRMS. That is, they tried to run the management of water sector along 
established routines—with the DWD as the main actor—without paying 
more than lip-service to the official status of the IMSG/WRMS. The aim 
was to render the IMSG/WRMS inefficient and irrelevant, with the result 
that the DWD would be reinstated to its position in the water sector, while 
maintaining the governments and donors’ increasing attention to the sector. 
When it became obvious’ that the IMSG/WRMS were incompetent—so the 
reasoning went—the DWD would be asked to officially take over the reform 
process from these “new kids on the block” (Interviews 16, 4B, 5B, 7B).
In this context we should recall that the organizational structure of the 
water sector reform was deliberately designed to ensure the IMSG/WRMS’s 
firm footing in the existing web of actors in the water sector (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). The government and 
supporting donors had identified the link between the IMSG/WRMS and 
existing actors in the water sector as key to a successful water sectors reform. 
To this end the IMSG (which oversaw the WRMS) was assigned to func­
tion as the administrative nexus of the reform process, and all government 
ministries with a stake in the water sector were invited to participate in the 
IMSG. As political entrepreneurs at the DWD set out to isolate the IMSG/ 
WRMS they thus targeted a key strategic component of the reform.
Despite the government and donors’ attempts to give the reform a firm 
footing in the existing administrative structures, the DWD enjoyed the ad­
vantage of having a long history in the Zimbabwean bureaucracy. While the 
members of the IMSG/WRMS were busy getting organised, this strategic 
advantage was readily used by senior staff at the DWD to prepare drafts of 
key components of the country’s future water management structure. The 
aim of these hasty moves was to bypass the IMSG/WRMS.
The first attempt by the DWD to by-pass the IMSG/WRMS was evident 
at a very early stage of the reform. In fact, the minutes from one of the first 
meeting of the the IMSG state:
The majority [of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group] felt 
that the proposal [filed by DWD] gave the impression that 
DWD wanted to strengthen the Department and use WRMS
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as a means to achieve this. (Inter-Ministerial Steering Group 
7 June 1994).
This quote indicates that the DWD did not act in line with the new ad­
ministrative order set up as part of the water sector reform. On the contrary, 
the DWD tried to use the WRMS as a means to favour its own position 
while leaving the WRMS out of the administrative loop. The attempts 
by the DWD to bypass the IMSG/WRMS are further evident from the 
proceedings regarding the content of Terms of Reference for the WRMS. 
Table 7.1. summaries these proceedings. Since the DWD was the most 
experienced actor in the water sector, the DWD’s management was assigned 
by the IMSG to draft the Terms of Reference for the WRMS. Interestingly, 
in the draft presented by the DWD to the IMSG, the WRMS would be 
administratively subsumed under the DWD and assigned a status equivalent 
to other branches of the Department (see the first column, table 7.1.). This 
structure was quite the opposite of the structure outlined by the govern­
ment in which the WRMS was placed on equal footing with the DWD 
(Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). The 
structures proposed by the DWD worked to bypass the WRMS and put 
the DWD back in control of the reform. In reaction to this move, politi­
cal entrepreneurs in support of the IMSG/WRMS opposed the DWD’s 
propositions which lead to substantial revision of the DWD’s draft (see 
second and third column, table 7.1).
It is evident from the IMSG’s deliberations regarding the WRMS Terms 
of Reference that the DWD failed in their attempt to bypass these new ac­
tors. As the table shows, the suggestions made by the DWD were checked 
and changed by the IMSG. However, as further analysis of these relations 
show, the DWD officials were quick to take a new initiative to try to bypass 
these new actors.
The second attempt to bypass the IMSG/WRMS was evident in the 
preparation of the ZINWA Act. The ZINWA Act was the legal foundation 
for the organization designed to take over the bulk of water management 
services in accordance with the reform (see chapter two). In other words, the 
ZINWA. Act outlined the future workplace for many of the water manag­
ers who used to work with the DWD. The attempt to bypass the WRMS 
was played out at the IMSG meeting on 16 November 1994. Without 
prior notice and without any official mandate, the Deputy Director of the 
DWD, Mr. Landing, presented an outline plan for ZINWA. Not surpris­
ingly, the DWD’s bold initiative met with immediate and strong reactions 
by members of the IMSG. The minutes from the meeting tell us that some 
members of the IMSG objected by raising the questions whether the DWD’s 
motion was “appropriate” and should be discussed at the meeting. Others 
moved to strike the DWD’s initiative from the agenda and suggested that 
the meeting should continue in accordance with the stipulated procedures,
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i.e. without regard to the DWD’s plan for ZINWA. The minutes reveal, 
however, that after “some discussions” a compromise was reached whereby 
the DWD’s motion should be reviewed in cooperation with other members 
of the IMSG. Trying to prevent any similar attempts in the future, the chair­
man of the IMSG ended the meeting by giving specific instructions that 
if anyone wanted to make suggestions regarding the water sector reform 
they should submit their proposals to the chairman. This would allow the 
chairman to circulate the suggestions to all the concerned parties to assure 
that the reform process was run according to plans (Inter-Ministerial Steer­
ing Group 16 November 1994).
Table 7.1. Comparison between the Terms of Reference proposed by the 
DWD and the Ministry of Lands and Water Resource together with sup­
porting donors Source: Internal documents from the DWD; Government 
of Zimbabwe 1995: Annex 2.
The DWD’s draft Terms of 
Reference for the WRMS
The WRMS Terms of Refer­
ence after the IMSG’s move 
to counter the DWD
Comment
Item 2 of the draft ToR 
stipulates the WRMS’s 
function: “In cooperation 
with the DWD Planning 
Unit, draw up Terms of 
References for diagnostic, 
background, field and 
support studies as outlined 
in the approved detailed 
Actions plan”.
“Draw up ToR for diagnostic, 
background, field and support 
studies as outlined in the ap­
proved detailed Actions plan”.
The IMSG moved to strike 
“In cooperation with the 
DWD Planning Unit”. This 
change increased the leverage 
for the WRMS and emphasis 
that the reform was not run 
by the DWD.
Item 8 of the draft ToR 
stipulate that The WRMS’s 
tasks include “Recom­
mending changes to the 
legislation to ensure that 
the strategy as it relates to 
their sector can be imple­
mented”.
Recommending to the IMSG 
changes to the legislation to 
ensure that the strategy as it 
relates to their sector can be 
implemented.
The formulation in the 
DWD’s text does not say 
to whom WRMS should 
make its recommendations. 
In the administrative milieu 
in which the DWD was 
the default option for any 
initiatives regarding water 
management, this omission 
could easily be used to the 
DWD’s advantage. As the 
IMSG realized this danger, it 
moved to clarify the first part 
of Item 8 by stating that the 
recommendations should be 
made to the IMSG.
Item 9 did not exist in the 
DWD’s draft but was added 
by the the IMSG.
Item 9 reads “Carry out 
any other task related to the 
WRMS as directed by the 
IMSG”.
In light of the risk that the 
DWD might try to use the 
WRMS for its own purposes, 
the IMSG clearly manifests 
the order of command, i.e. 
that the WRMS is under the 
IMSG, not the DWD.
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In the sections above I have analysed two attempts by political entrepreneurs 
within the DWD to bypass the IMSG/WRMS with the aim of regaining 
control of the reform. Neither of these attempts can be classified as suc­
cessful. The third and final example that I shall give represents a successful 
attempt on behalf of the DWD. This move by the political entrepreneurs at 
the DWD came to the attention of the IMSG on the 31 August, 1995. The 
IMSG was then informed by the DWD that a “paper on the formulation of 
a National Water Authority (ZINWA) and proposed changes to the Water 
Act” had been “sent up the line” and was “currently being considered by 
Cabinet” (Inter-Ministerial Steering Group 31 August 1995). Compared 
with previous initiatives by the DWD, this time the DWD’s move not 
only included the ZINWA Act but also the second major legal document 
of the reform, the Water Act which was to guide the future water distribu­
tion in Zimbabwe. In addition, while the DWD previously had presented 
their plans to the IMSG, this time they only reported on what was already 
done. The IMSG was presented with a fait accompli. Not surprisingly, the 
DWD’s bold initiative evoked sharp protests from members of the the 
IMSG/WRMS. However, this time it was too late for the IMSG to check the 
move by the DWD and the proposition was already with the Cabinet.
Reading the minutes from the IMSG meeting on the 31 August 1995 
it is evident that several members of the IMSG voiced their complaints. 
However, this time the chairman had no choice but to close the meeting 
with a lame request to “receive a copy of the Cabinet Memorandum”. The 
DWD could thus record that, instead of actually steering the water sector 
reform, the IMSG/WRMS were now in a position of having to ask the 
DWD for information regarding developments initiated by the DWD 
regarding the key legal instruments of the reform. This must be seen as 
a substantial defeat for the IMSG/WRMS, and an equal victory for the 
DWD management in their quest to regain what they saw as the position 
to which they were entitled: as the organisation that should lead the water 
sector reform in Zimbabwe.
Isolating the “new kids on the block”
The analysis above has shown that in the eyes of political entrepreneurs 
at the DWD, the fact that they were not selected to spearhead the water 
sector reform was a great disappointment. The DWD’s management had 
expected that the water sector reform would confirm their social identity 
as the vanguard of Zimbabwean development. With the inauguration of 
the IMSG/WRMS, these expectations were threatened.
The previous section showed that the DWD tried to bypass the IMSG/ 
WRMS so as to render the latter irrelevant and promote their own posi­
tion. In this section I will analyse how the DWD tried to obtain the same 
goal by isolating the newcomers from the wider administrative structure
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and the international donor community. The idea was that by cutting off 
the IMSG/WRMS from external support it would, to use the figurative 
speech of one interview person, “be killed” (Interview 5B). In this context, 
to “kill” the IMSG/WRMS meant to make them irrelevant and hence have 
the DWD reinstated as the leading actor in the water sector.
The rationale behind the DWD’s attempts to isolate the IMSG/WMRS 
becomes clear if we consider the blueprint for reform (see Government 
of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:28ff). Good and 
functional communication between the IMSG/WRMS and the existing 
administrative structure was seen as essential for the long term effects of the 
reform. In fact, the long-term impact and dissemination of the reform was 
seen as a direct function of the degree to which the IMSG/WRMS were 
attached to and incorporated into existing administrative structures.
Many of my interviewees were reluctant to talk about the relationship 
between the IMSG/WRMS and the DWD. When I brought up the subject, 
they would describe the relationship in vague language. For example, one 
interviewee described the relationship simply as “cordial”. Others would 
chose to talk about something else despite repeated questioning. The clearest 
testimony of these events comes from members of the IMSG/WRMS who 
described the effects of the DWD’s moves to isolate them as a feeling of 
“alienation” with the existing administrative structure. One of them said:
I: We were seen as us and them. It was we the WRMS people, 
and them at the DWD (Interview 8).
Another official in the IMSG/WRMS team expressed the same sentiment 
of alienation:
I: We never felt owned by the Ministry and there is a great 
risk that the work we have done will just collect dust on some 
shelf. We were supposed to have a lot of support from different 
ministries, but instead it just turned into a power struggle.
R: In your opinion, what was the effect of all this?
I: There was initially this idea that WRMS should continue 
after its initially set life time. But now people think that it 
should not. The expectations on WRMS never were fulfilled, 
and now we have even lost the support of the donors (Inter­
view 18).
As these quotes illustrate, the members of the IMSG/WRMS were isolated 
from the existing administrative structure in the Zimbabwean administra-
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tion. Contrary to the initial efforts to create an integrated structure, there 
was a sense of “us” and “them” between the IMSG/WRMS and DWD.
Paralleling the isolation of the IMSG/WRMS from the rest of the Zim­
babwean administration, a vital component in the DWD’s attempt com­
prised steps to ensure that communication between the IMSG/WRMS 
and the donor community was cut off. The communication between the 
IMSG/WRMS and the donors was widely seen as decisive for the viability 
of the newcomers and the success of the reform (Government of Zimba­
bwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:28). Of particular importance 
were communications with Norad (representing Norway) and DGIS (the 
Dutch) who were the main supporters of the WRMS. Indeed, Norad/DGIS 
provided the lion’s share of the WRMS budget and its financial support 
was vital for the reform process.
In an attempt to ensure that the reform process became an integrated 
part of the government structures, the government had stipulated that 
all communications between the WRMS and donors must go via the re­
sponsible Ministry (the Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Resources, 
MRRWR, see Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et 
al. 1995). Officially the donors endorsed this stipulation. It was, as several 
interviewees explained, in line with the ambition to obtain “local owner­
ship”, which was seen as vital to ensure long terms success of the reform 
(Interview 26, 15B). However, it is clear from my interviews with actors 
in the donor community that while the donors endorsed the ambition to 
integrate the IMSG/WRMS in the existing Zimbabwean administration, 
they also wanted to see these actors (in particular the WRMS) as something 
different from the rest of the government. The donors wanted a hybrid in 
which these new actors were “in the government but not of the government” 
(Interview 26). The IMSG/WRMS’s ability to live up to this hybrid social 
identity was seen by many interviewees as an important reason why the 
IMSG/WRMS got so much donor support. In fact, one WRMS official 
described the organisation saying:
I: We became a well fed donor baby (Interview 8).
The IMSG/WRMS’s ambiguous position in the government administra­
tion—“in the government but not of the government”—was systematically 
used by political entrepreneurs in the DWD to isolate the baby from its 
mother, i.e. the donors. The first sign of this was that messages from the 
WRMS to the donors simply never reached their recipients (Interview 30B). 
According to my interviewees, the reasons for this was that the messages from 
the WMRS were stopped by actors in the DWD who were well connected 
with the administrative structure and thus had access to postage services
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and the like (Interview 8,9,18). The management at the DWD thus used 
their established influence with the administration to interfere with the vital 
communication link between its adversary and the donors.
Realizing that the IMSG/WRMS was being increasingly isolated from the 
donors, the WRMS’s chairman, Mr. Simon Pazvakavambwa, disregarded 
the protocol that stipulated that all communications should go via the 
responsible Ministry. He engaged in direct contacts with separate donor 
agencies. At first, the donors appreciated this directness as it matched 
the ambition to bypass some of the malignant state bureaucracy. Simon 
Pazvakavambwa’s directness was in line with the donors’ hoped-for hybrid 
social identity, and one donor said that they were “quite happy to cut some 
of that red tape” (Interview 30B).
However, after some time the donors started to suspect that mischief 
was afoot. The reason was that as the direct communication between the 
WRMS are the donors increased, the communication from the officially 
stipulated channels—via the Ministry—decreased. What had been appreci­
ated by the donors as clear and direct communications was increasingly seen 
as a sign that something was wrong. Some donor agents interpreted these 
developments as a sign that WRMS chairman, Mr. Pazvakavambwa, had 
become “autocratic” (Interview 26, 15B). Other donors suspected that Mr. 
Pazvakavambwa’s direct communication was a sign that the reform process 
had lost “local ownership”, i.e. that the WRMS had been detached from 
the established government institutions (Interview 26, 16B, C3). Based on 
this analysis, several donors increasingly disattended Mr. Pazvakavambwa’s 
direct approaches and encouraged him to communicate via the Ministry. 
As this communication link was controlled by established actors within the 
DWD, the WRMS was increasingly isolated from communication with 
the previously supportive donor community.
From the above I conclude that the political entrepreneurs trying to 
isolate the WRMS were quite successful. To use the language of one of the 
official cited above, the DWD had managed to separate the “baby” from its 
“mother”. The isolation from the donors created severe financial problems 
for the WRMS. For example, several attempts were made by the WRMS’s 
chairman to negotiate an extension of the WRMS’s project. My interviews 
with the donors suggest that they were, in principle, quite willing to meet 
this request. A decisive reason why they did not, however, was that the 
reform process seemed to have lost “local ownership”.
To sum up, I have analysed how political entrepreneurs engaged in a power 
struggle over the position as lead-actor of Zimbabwe’s water sector reform. 
Drawing on their social identity as the scientific vanguard in the historical 
development of the country’s water resources, the political entrepreneurs at 
the DWD felt that they had a legitimate claim for this prestigious position.
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However, the IMSG/WRMS were placed in this position and the scientific 
water officials at the DWD attempted to bypass and isolate the IMSG/ 
WRMS. As a means to this end, the DWD constructed a social identity 
that served to de-legitimize any claims made by the IMSG/WRMS on the 
position as lead-actor. According to this social identity, the IMSG/WRMS 
was an incompetent group of political appointees. This social identity was 
the opposite to the social identity of the scientific water officials, who were 
portrayed as the providers of a scientifically-based approach that would 
benefit the national development of Zimbabwe. Political entrepreneurs 
at the DWD were quite successful in their attempts to de-legitimise and 
out-manoeuvre the IMSG/WRMS, and the position of the IMSG/WRMS 
became increasingly weak during the reform process.
The effect of these developments was that the actors originally desig­
nated to implement IWRM in Zimbabwe were deprived of their political 
and economic viability. My argument is that as the champion of IWRM 
was marginalised, the room for other political entrepreneurs to transform 
IWRM increased. This conclusion builds on the assumption that had the 
IMSG/WRMS been able to maintain a strong position through the reform, 
it would have been able to more forcefully engage in activities to convince 
water users of the benefits of IWRM. In addition, it is reasonable to argue 
that as the scientific water officials de-legitimatised the IMSG/WRMS, this 
spilled over on the wider social and political legitimacy of IWRM as an 
approach to water resources management. These scientific water officials 
were widely seen as the nation’s experts on water resources management. 
As these experts were seen to de-legitimise the messengers carrying IWRM, 
stakeholders in society at large could easily conclude that the established 
experts on water management also disavowed IWRM as the foundation of 
the reform process.53
53 Above I argue that officials within the water sector reacted to the reform in ways that 
would maintain their professional identities. How does this argument fair against the popular 
argument that the actors were driven by economic incentives? As the water reform process 
gained momentum during the early 1990’s, the DWD, as was much of Zimbabwe’s public 
sector, was subjected to severe budgetary reforms in a corollary of the structural adjustment 
programme, ESAP. Decreasing budget funds offset a ‘brain drain’ from the DWD as some 
of its most qualified officials joined the private sector or moved to greener pastures in neigh­
bouring countries and beyond. In this context the water sector reform was widely associated 
with great hopes. In 1993 the World Bank hosted a major conference on IWRM at Victoria 
Falls (see chapter two), and donors were showing substantial interest in funding water sec­
tor reforms in Southern Africa. In other words, water sector reform was on every donor’s 
agenda, and IWRM was the latest fashion. So if the water sector officials were perceptive of 
economic incentives, adopting IWRM seems like the right thing to do. The fact that they 
did not adds support for non-interest based explanations as the one that I present.
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Transforming the pillars of IWRM 
in relation to Water as Science
Catchment management
In this section I analyse how IWRM’s call for catchment management was 
transformed by scientific water officials acting out of the construction of 
Water as Science. As I started my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, I did not expect 
scientific water officials to have any objections to IWRM’s call for catch­
ment management. The reason was that scientific water officials typically 
have formal training in hydrology or hydrogeology, in which catchments 
are a central concept. A person trained in such natural sciences is thus 
quite accustomed to the idea that water should be perceived and managed 
in accordance with the boundaries created by the natural flow of water. In 
other words, it is not surprising that several of the interviewed scientific 
water officials talked about catchment management with great familiarity. 
One senior official at the DWD said:
I: This catchment idea was there for a long time. Actually one of 
the first things that I did after my education was to map out the 
catchments of Zimbabwe. For us as hydrologists, we have always 
looked at water in terms of catchments (Interview 4B).
Given the tradition of natural scientists dealing with catchments, I set out on 
my fieldwork with the expectation that IWRM’s call for catchment manage­
ment would be embraced by the scientific water officials in Zimbabwe. As 
I will show in this section, my expectations were not met. While scientific 
water officials were very supportive of the general idea of catchments as the 
basic unit for water management, IWRM called for a catchment manage­
ment system that implied a restructuring of much of the administration 
for water management in Zimbabwe. Specifically it called for surface water 
experts (hydrologists) and groundwater (hydrogeologists) experts to work 
in an integrated way that challenged the distribution of professional status 
between these two groups. In the eyes of scientific water officials, IWRM’s 
proposal for catchment management was not seen primarily as a way to 
organise the management of water, but a way to organise the water manag­
ers, i.e. themselves.
IWRM’s call for catchment management implied that different sub­
groups of scientific water officials who had previously worked in different 
sections of the DMD should now work closely together. Prior to the water 
sector reform, surface and groundwater were managed quite separately 
within different sections of the DWD. The distinction between surface 
and groundwater management was further emphasised by the Water Act
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of 1976, which stipulated different allocation systems for surface water and 
groundwater. Surface water was regulated according to the appropriate 
principle” which connected the right to use water to the appropriate use 
of water in production. Groundwater was regulated as a private property 
and the owner of the land above the water could abstract and use under 
groundwater at his discretion (van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).
The legal and organisational environment of these two groups was thus 
quite different. This segmentation between hydrologists and hydrogeologists 
was challenged by IWRM’s call for catchment management. Proponents of 
IWRM argued that surface and groundwater experts needed to work closely 
together so that all aspects pertaining to water in a catchment could be man­
aged in an integrated way. Managing surface and groundwater separately 
would cut to the core of IWRM’s idea of ecosystem management (World 
Bank 1993; Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands er al. 
1995; Global Water Partnership 2000).
For the scientific water officials working at the DWD in Harare, the 
segmentation between hydrologists and hydrogeologists was, however, vital 
for the distribution of status and professional prestige. In particular, the 
hydrologists that I interviewed frequently pointed out that they generally 
had longer education than hydrogeologists and they argued that hydrolo­
gists therefore were entitled to a higher professional and social status than 
hydrogeologists (e.g. interview 8B, 29B, 3C).54 As I asked one hydrologist 
holding a top-management position at the DWD how he would feel about 
working more closely together with hydrogeologists, he replayed:
54 I have not been able to corroborate if there was a material basis for the hierarchy between 
the two professional groups (for example in terms of differences in average wage, or distribu­
tion of professions on different managerial levels). The interesting point here, however, is 
that the distinction between surface and groundwater served as a the basis for a professional 
demarcation between groups widely seen as hierarchical in terms of social and professional 
status. Consequently, eliminating the distinction between hydrologists and hydrogeologists 
would erode the basis for professional stratification.
I: I am a hydrologist, hydrologist, hydrologist, and I would 
never work with a hydrogeologist. I belong to the old school.
You need specialists in separate fields otherwise you will lose 
expertise. Maybe you can merge at the higher levels, but you 
have to stick to professionalism. I have an extensive education 
in hydrology. You know, there is hydrogeology and hydrology 
and you should not mix the two. You should get them to talk 
but you should not merge them (Interview 4B).
This quote testifies to a resistance against implementing IWRM’s idea of 
catchment management based on its implications for the social identities
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of scientific water officials. From the perspective of the hydrologist cited 
above, following IWRM would imply working closely with a professional 
group that he considered inferior. Consequently, following IWRM would 
imply the risk of losing some of the esteem associated with his social identity. 
IWRM’s call for catchment management to be mirrored in the adminis­
trative structures for water professionals challenged the main demarcation 
around which different sub-groups of scientific water officials had been 
organised and formed their social identity. In particular, implementing this 
organisational implication of IWRM would deflate the status position of 
the formerly most prestigious group, i.e. the hydrologists.
So while IWRM’s idea of catchment management was firmly established 
at the intellectual level (stemming from the scientific water officials’ natu­
ral science education), its consequences in terms of social ranking chal­
lenged existing social identities which distinguished different sub-groups. 
Hydrologists therefore used their established power position to obstruct 
IWRM’s organisational implication in terms of a close collaboration with 
hydrogeologists.
The effects of the power struggle between hydrologists and hydrogeolo­
gists within DWD becomes evident in a comparison between the proposed 
and the actual organisational structure of ZINWA, i.e. the new organisa­
tion for water management and the workplace for many of the staff of the 
DWD after the reform. Figure 7.1. depicts the organigram for ZINWA 
as drawn up by the Government of Zimbabwe and supporting donors at 
the beginning of the reform (Government of Zimbabwe, Government 
of Netherlands et al. 1995:15). This organigram reflects the logical con­
sequences of catchment management as spelled out in IWRM. There is 
no mention of different organisational units for different kinds of water 
(surface and groundwater). On the contrary, the section “Water Manage­
ment” is subdivided into “River Catchment Agency Boards” implying an 
integrated management approach for the entire ecosystem of the catch­
ment. Likewise, the organigram explicitly states that “Research and Data 
Management” shall comprise both surface water specialists (hydrologists) 
and groundwater specialists (hydrogeologists). While figure 7.1. represents 
the organigram recommended in the policy documents guiding the reform 
process, figure 7.2. is the organigram of the de facto ZINWA organisation 
which developed as a result of the reform. The latter organigram upholds 
different and distinct organisational units for the management of surface 
water (hydrologist) and groundwater (hydrogeologists). In other words, 
the organisational implication of IWRM’s call for catchment management 
was not realised in the organisation set up to manage water in Zimbabwe, 
ZINWA. Contrary to the intentions of IWRM, the new organigram set 
up as part of the reform maintains the disintegration between hydrologists 
and hydrogeologists.
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Figure 7.1. Organigram for Zinwa proposed by the Government of Zim­
babwe and supporting donors (Government of Zimbabwe, Government 











Figure 7.2. Organigram for Zinwa after reform (Internal memo Zinwa, 
received by Stålgren, 19 June, 2001).
To find out how this shift in organizational structure—from integrated 
to disintegrated—could be understood, I discussed the above organigram 
with a hydrologist holding a senior position in Harare. Consider this quote 
from the interview:
R: Is it not odd that there are separate sections for surface and 
groundwater in an organization thought to practice integrated 
water resources management?
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I: Yes, they are kept separately even though they now sort under 
one man.. .When we are trying to convert peoples mind they 
tend to lean on what they have been doing best for so many 
years (Interview 9B).
This interviewee testifies to the resistance towards IWRM’s call to integrate 
the management of surface and groundwater. He attributes the problems 
of disbanding the distinction between hydrologists and hydrogeologists to 
resistance to give up professional positions stratified around what people 
“have been doing best for so many years” (see also interviews 5B, 8B).
Proponents of IWRM thus called on catchment management as a means 
to obtain an integrated ecosystem approach to water resources management 
and to ensure that all water in the catchment would be managed in a coher­
ent way (World Bank 1993; Government of Zimbabwe, Government of 
Netherlands et al. 1995; Global Water Partnership 2000). In my analysis 
from the perspective of Water as Science, IWRM’s call for catchment man­
agement was transformed from an idea about ecosystem management into 
a question of the distribution of social status between different professional 
groups. At a general, intellectual level, hydrologists and hydrogeologists alike 
understood the need for integrated management of all water resources in 
a catchment. But as IWRM called for organisational changes with the aim 
of realising this goal, these changes were blocked as a consequence of the 
struggle for prestigious social identities between sub-groups of scientific 
water officials. In particular, the privileged hydrologists obstructed the in­
tegrated management approach suggested by IWRM as it challenged their 
high status social identity. In the construction of Water as Science, catch­
ment management was thus transformed from a platform for an ecosystem 
approach to water resources management into a scene for a power-struggle 
between different groups of scientific water officials. As a consequence of 
this transformation, IWRM’s call for organisational changes that would 
cater for ecosystem management of water was not implemented. Instead, 
the segmented organisational structure that perpetuated existing power 
positions was prolonged.
Did this have any real consequences in terms of the management of water 
in Zimbabwe? Would the management of water in Zimbabwe have been 
different if hydrologists and hydrogeologists had engaged in close coopera­
tion? This is clearly a difficult question to assess as it calls for counterfactual 
data. There is no way of knowing how water would have been managed had 
the two groups had decided to work more closely. In addition, it is difficult 
to assess the influence of this single factor as opposed to the array of other 
issues influencing the complex system of water management. Having said 
this, it clear that for the international experts designing IWRM, a close 
cooperation between hydrologists and hydrogeologists was seen as essential
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for the sustainable water resources management (World Bank 1993; Global 
Water Partnership 2000). This includes the Programme Documents set 
out by the government of Zimbabwe and the supporting donors emphasis 
on close cooperation between surface and groundwater specialists as a key 
step towards reaching the goal of ecosystem management (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). The assessment of 
these experts was that only if ground and surface water was managed in 
an integrated way could sustainable water resources management be ob­
tained. Therefore hydrologists and hydrogeologists were called to disband 
traditional demarcations and work closely together. To the extent that these 
international experts were right, the continued separation of hydrologists 
and hydrogeologists in Zimbabwe impeded the achievement of sustainable 
water resources management.
This conclusion is supported by the August 2003 Government of Zim­
babwe review of the organisational changes undertaken during the water sec­
tor reform (Presidential Land Review Committee 2003). The report points 
to the need for sustainable water use and deplores that the implementation 
of catchment management was “compromised” during the reform process. 
Based on this assessment, the report continues: “It is recommended that a 
catchment management position be created in both DWD and ZINWA. 
(p. 75). The role of this catchment manager would, according to the report, 
be to foster increased integration between surface and groundwater man­
agement at catchment level with the aim to increase the level of integrated 
water management. In other words, the report sustains my conclusion that 
the disintegration between different kinds of water managers impeded 
sustainable water management.
To conclude, my analysis suggests that the struggle for prestigious social 
identities by scientific water officials had a substantial bearing on the man­
agement of water in Zimbabwe. From their construction of reality ofWater 
as Science, these water officials transformed IWRM call for catchment 
management from a vehicle for ecosystem management of water into a 
threat to the hierarchy of social identities and prestige. Because of this un- „ 
derstanding of IWRM, the most prestigious group within the DWD—the 
hydrologists—resisted working with the lower status hydrogeologists. The 
jockeying for positions during the reform hindered the development of an 
organisation for ecosystem management approach to water and thus the 
degree to which IWRM’s goals could be achieved.
Water as an economic good
In this section, I analyse how scientific water officials responded to the 
IWRM emphasis on water as an economic good. The objections raised by 
advocates ofWater as Science against the economic thinking of IWRM are
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eloquently spelled out in document that was circulated at the DWD and 
which can best be described as an internal, unofficial memo. It was handed 
to me during one of my interviews at the Department. It was written and 
signed by T.C Kabel, Deputy Director of the Department of Water Devel­
opment, Design Branch. It is worth quoting at some length:
Water is devalued and shamefully debased when categorised as 
an ‘economic good’. It is far more important that that. Water is 
crucial element for all economic development and should not 
be merely classed as a simple ingredient in a myopic Keynesian 
theory. The provision of an adequate supply of water is a sine 
que non for all progress in agriculture and industry, and the 
benefits that flow to the nation from such a provision far ex­
ceed the superficial direct economic return derive from selling 
the water at a certain price The cost-benefit analysis and 
calculations of rate of return are based on a very narrow spec­
trum. No cognisance is generally taken of the very significant 
downstream or secondary economic benefits. The provision of 
water is the first step in a whole chain of development initia­
tives, leading to increased employment, increased personal and 
company tax returns to the fiscus, a reduction in drought relief 
payments, increased export earnings and the growth of Gross 
Domestic Product...In addition to that, some of the values 
derived from water cannot be valued in money.. .What is the 
economic value of better community health? ... We should 
reject the slogan that ’water is an economic good’. As with all 
slogans, it is a substitute for rational thought”
This text captures the two reasons that I found to be the basis for why 
proponents of Water as Science objected to IWRM idea of water as an 
economic good. First, thinking of water as an economic good does not take 
into account the value of water for national development. Water manage­
ment in the service of the nation is a central feature in the construction of 
Water as Science. Scientific water officials embraced the social identity of 
themselves as the vanguard in using science in service of their nation (see 
introduction to this chapter). One interviewee explained his objections to 
water as an economic good like this:
I: Economic thinking allows the fast buck ethos of the Econo­
mists winning the argument against broader considerations 
(Interview 12).
According to this interview person, economic thinking puts a premium 
on self-interested actors who are after “the fast buck”. This stands in sharp
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contrast to Water as Science which embraces a national perspective on water. 
The inability of economic calculations to integrate “broader considerations” 
in the evaluation of water was a recurrent argument among the interviewed 
scientific water officials (see interviews 16, 2B-8B).
The second reason why these actors objected to water as an economic good 
was the inability of economic calculations to provide a rational approach 
to the evaluation of water. In the quote above, the Deputy Director at the 
DWD likens the ambition to apply economic principles to water manage­
ment with a “slogan” which is the antithesis of science, or as he puts it: “a 
substitute for rational thought”. In his view, the idea of water as an economic 
good is detached from proper analysis and consequently fails to provide a 
rational approach to the evaluation of water. Economic thinking—as op­
posed to that of natural science—does not represent a truly rational approach 
to evaluating water. We should understand this position in relation to the 
great confidence in the methodologies and techniques of natural science 
on which proponents of Water as Science built their construction of reality. 
The critique of the application of economic principles should thus not be 
confused with the commonplace critique that the oft-reported failures to 
implement economic principles in African contexts should be attributed 
to the lack of the proper institutional system in such contexts (Clapham 
1996). The later critique sees economic principles as something attractive 
but difficult to obtain. In contrast, the argument above is that economic 
principles per se constitute the problem, not the lack of social and political 
institutions to support them. In fact the Deputy Director of the DWD 
associates himself with a political, national, agenda for development and 
his argument is a systemic critique against economics as an irrational mode 
of thought and thus incapable of making the right considerations for the 
nation and its people.55
55 Having said this, I should recognise that some interviewees supportive of Water as Sci­
ence suggested a more pragmatic view on water as an economic good. These interviewees 
pointed to the bad financial situation in the water sector, and argued that acknowledging 
economic thinking could help up the situation (Interview 4B, 5B, 8B). On one occasions, 
the interviewee made a direct connection between the introduction of economic principles 
and the fact that he had not been regularly paid due to the poor economic situation at the 
Department of Water Development (Interview 7B). However, this pragmatic and instru­
mental view on water as an economic good was typically coupled to reservations along the 
lines outlined above.
To conclude, scientific water officials emphasised that the usage of water 
should be evaluated by scientific methods and with regard to the role of 
water for national development. In their view this was not obtained by 
thinking of water as an economic good as proposed by supporters of IWRM. 
By contrast, the idea of water as an economic good put a premium on the 
fast buck ethos of agents guided by narrow interests, and the underlying
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economic rationality was inferior to that of the natural sciences. In the eyes 
of scientific water officials, IWRM’s idea of water as an economic good was 
thus transformed from a vehicle for effective resource allocation to an ir­
rational idea that challenged the ambition of scientific water management 
for the good of all citizens of Zimbabwe.
Stakeholder participation
IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation was to a large extent based on 
the normative ideal of including previously marginalised water users into 
the management of water resources (see chapter two). In the context of the 
water sector reform in Zimbabwe, this was equivalent to a call to include 
local, black, farmers in the management of water resources. IWRM points 
to this previously marginalised stakeholders and identifies them as a group 
whose views on water management are important and legitimate and hence 
should be given increased voice in the water management.
The sentiment of scientific water officials in Zimbabwe regarding stake­
holder participation is aptly illustrated by a recurrent reaction that I got 
when I brought up this subject in my interviews with these actors. As I 
started taking about stakeholder participation, the scientific water officials 
often said:
I: Don’t mention the S-word. (e.g. Interview 12, 16, 4B- 
6B).
In fact, this phrase— Dont mention the S-word”—was almost a slogan 
or running joke whenever IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation was 
discussed in interviews or during tea breaks and casual conversations that 
I had with scientific water officials. As I asked a senior water official for 
his comment about this in-house slogan, he elaborated his own view on 
the matter:
I: Yes, there are certain words, I used it once but I refuse it 
now. It is ‘stakeholder’. It is part of the language that I can’t 
handle. This idea of the consumer groups being given more 
shares in the decisions affecting them is a sort of philosophy. 
So this idea, I think this idea was probably fostered by external 
agencies, the various donor groups that were keen to help a 
developing country. Those European countries came in with 
assistance, and of course these guys were all full of these new 
concepts the way developed countries are (Interview 12).
To say the least, this interviewee does not approve of the idea of stakeholder 
participation. It is so despicable that he would rather not talk about it.
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In particular, we should notice how the interviewee tries to de-legitimise 
stakeholder participation by associating it with two lines of reasoning: 
First, stakeholder participation is an “idea” or philosophy , which, second, 
was “fostered by external agencies”. By these two associations, the inter­
view person indicates that stakeholder participation is neither founded in 
good, practical water management (it is “a philosophy ) nor in the needs 
and priorities of the nation (it was brought in by external agencies ). 
Stakeholder participation is illegitimate since it is based on an elusive 
philosophical idea without foundation in the real practical traditions and 
needs of Zimbabwe.
The first association above—stakeholder participation as a philosophy 
without foundation in practical water management—serves the dual pur­
pose of de-legitimising stakeholders and portraying the interviewee and his 
ingroup as custodians of sound scientific water management. He and his 
scientific water official peers base their approach on well founded scientific 
methods rather than some elusive ideas or philosophy.
This distinction between the scientific approach of scientific water officials 
and the un-scientific approach of stakeholders was a recurrent theme in my 
interviews with actors alluding to Water as Science. The way in which these 
actors described their own scientific knowledge base contrasts substantially 
with the way they talked about the knowledge base of local stakeholders. 
The scientific water officials regarded their own knowledge as founded in 
proper natural science. By contrast, they described the knowledge base of 
local stakeholders in ways that is better described as beliefs rather than 
“knowledge”. The idea can be summarized like this: ‘Local stakeholders have 
beliefs about water: scientific water officials have knowledge. The scientific 
knowledge which the scientific water official represents was described as 
learnt through a process of trial, error, and incremental adjustments within 
formal scientific institutions. I was frequently given lengthy descriptions of 
the interview persons’ education background and they were sure to tell me 
of university degrees and courses acquired in countries such as the UK, the 
Netherlands, or South Africa. In contrast to their own scientific knowledge 
base, the belief of local stakeholders was described as emanating from oral 
traditions and religious practices embraced by people, many of whom could 
hardly read and write (e.g. interview 12, 16, 2B).56
56 Some of my interviews with actors in the official water administration showed great respect 
for the belief systems held by stakeholders. In chapter eight I will show how some of these 
actors combined a strong affiliation to Water as Science with a belief in Water as a Gift 
from the Gods. Despite obvious contradictions between these constructions of reality, these 
actors seemed quite at ease and did not try to reconcile the two realities. One interviewee 
even called himself a “rain dancing hydrologist”.
This message conveys the social identity of stakeholders as a group who 
subscribe to unscientific beliefs about water and are therefore disquali-
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fied from the position as experts’ in water management as proposed by 
IWRM. By contrast, scientific water officials are given the social identity 
of the guardians of scientific knowledge which entitles them to power and 
influence in the water sector.
I return now to the quote above from interview twelve and I will focus on 
the second association that he made: that the idea of stakeholder participa­
tion was fostered by external agencies. Here the interviewee alludes to the 
collective memory of the long history dating back to colonialism in which 
external powers dictated the conditions for management of Zimbabwe’s 
national resources. Against this backdrop, I interpret the interviewee as 
arguing that IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation is part of external 
agencies’ agenda to direct the internal affairs of the country. IWRM is part 
of the tradition of external actors meddling in how Zimbabweans deal with 
their natural resources. IWRM is thus a variation of colonialism. This as­
sociation with the collective memory of oppression by external actors serves 
to legitimise the interviewee and his in-group of scientific water officials as 
the group who should lead the water sector reform. The message is that the 
idea of stakeholder participation is but yet another tool used by external 
actors to interfere in Zimbabwean affairs. By contrast the scientific water 
officials stand as the custodians of water management in the service of the 
post-colonial project of nation building in Zimbabwe.
This message is elaborated by another interviewee at the DWD. First, this 
interviewee stated that it was a mistake in the first place to acknowledge 
IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation. Then he said this:
I: We should have gone ahead with what we wanted to do. The 
idea was not to disadvantage anybody, the idea was to level 
the playing field and make it OK to anybody irrespective of 
what colour or what sector they come from. We just wanted 
to come up with a piece of legislation that’s workable for the 
whole country and anyone in it. We finally achieved that, but 
it was a struggle (Interview 16).
The interviewee and his peers stand out in this quote as custodians of a 
scientific approach to water that would not favour any particular agenda 
but work towards a solution for the whole country “irrespective of what 
colour or what sector they come from”. Contrary to the unscientific and 
narrow-minded stakeholders, he represented the group of scientific water 
officials in the service of their country. The interviewee leaves no doubt as 
to whether or not he and his peers are able to define the agenda that is best 
for the country. In his view, the scientific models of his profession endow 
him and his peers with the expertise to define a solution “that’s workable
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for the whole country and anyone in it”. His scientific outlook puts him 
above domestic disputes and enables him to define an impartial agenda for 
water management.
A similar finding has been reported byElinorOstrom(1997). Summaris­
ing field work on irrigation systems in Asia she noted that
Educated engineers presumed that uneducated farmers do 
not know enough about hydrology and engineering to be 
consulted. Consequently engineers do not learn from local 
farmers many of the local details about soil conditions, water 
velocity, and shifting watercourses that are important to make 
‘improved’ engineering works operate better than the ‘primi­
tive’ system they replace (Ostrom 1997:164).
To conclude, based on my empirical material and theoretical framework I 
argue that actors subscribing to Water as Science used the collective memory 
of external influence in the management of Zimbabwe’s natural resources to 
de-legitimise IWRM call for stakeholder participation. They advanced two 
stereotypical social identity constructs to sustain that they were better suited 
than stakeholders to have power and influence in the water sector. First, 
stakeholders were depicted as relying on unscientific beliefs about water and 
driven by narrow self-interest. Second, the social identity of the scientific 
water officials was constructed as representatives of a scientific approach 
to water management in the service of their country. These social identi­
ties served to sustain the claim of scientific water officials as the legitimate 
experts on water management as much as it de-legitimised IWRM call for 
stakeholder participation. IWRM’s call for stakeholder participation was 
built on an ideal of increased democratic rule in water management. In the 
eyes of scientific water officials, this call was transformed into a call to let 
self-interested dilettante be given a mandate in decisions regarding water 
management of great importance for the development of the nation. Did 
this change in views on stakeholder participation have any real consequences 
during the water sector reform, or was this view mostly something spelled 
out during tea breaks and conversations among peers? The next section 
addresses this question.
From “stakeholderparticipation” to “awareness campaigns”
I have argued above that in the eyes of scientific water officials, stakehold­
ers were self-interested subscribers to unscientific beliefs. This view served 
to disqualify stakeholders from increased influence in Zimbabwe’s water 
management at the same time as it perpetuated power positions for scientific 
water officials. But did it have any real consequences for how IWRM was
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implemented in Zimbabwe? To address this question, consider an extract 
from an interview with a senior water manager at the DWD who, as part 
of his official mandate, was required to foster stakeholder participation 
during the reform process:
R: How would you describe the push for stakeholder partici­
pation during the reform?
I: I think that there was over-participation in some instances. 
People just slow down the process, and we should have moved 
much faster. Stakeholder participation is a drawback and slows 
the process (Interview 16).
According to this interviewee, stakeholder participation is not a matter of 
accumulating knowledge to determine the way for reforming the water 
sector as suggested by IWRM. Stakeholder participation is “a drawback” 
that “slows the process”. I hold that this position should be understood 
against the confidence of scientific water officials in the ability of natural 
science to define the relevant problems and solutions to water manage­
ment. Consequently, the roadmap for how to develop the water sector is 
not the outcome of stakeholder participation. It is rather the outcome of 
scientific calculations.
Proponents of IWRM in the Zimbabwean government and interna­
tional donor community proposed a number of activities to increase the 
level of stakeholder participation in water management (Government of 
Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). To comply with these 
propositions, scientific water officials were tasked with setting up a large 
number of meetings with stakeholder groups with the stated intention to 
increase their participation and allow stakeholder ‘expertise’ to be heard. As 
I interviewed scientific water officials about these activities, I noticed that 
when they talked about stakeholder participation they would use expres­
sions like “awareness campaigns” and “promotion activities” as synonyms 
for “stakeholder participation” (Interview 8, 9, 16, 6B, 14B). Rather than 
being consultative processes for the exchange of ideas with stakeholders, the 
activities of “stakeholder participation” were thus seen as forums for making 
people “aware” of, or to “promote”, things. For actors subscribing to Water 
as Science, there was no need for stakeholder consultations as a means to 
find out how to approach water management. For them, natural science 
defined the proper approach and stakeholder participation was merely a 
process of making people accept what is established by natural science. 
Consequently, the IWRM call for stakeholder participation was changed 
from a platform for interactive communication between stakeholders and 
scientific water officials, to a one-way communication in terms of “aware-
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ness campaigns” and “promotion activities” where scientific water officials 
would disseminate their knowledge to the stakeholders.57
57 Some of my interviewees based their arguments for why it was futile to engage in stakeholder 
participation on the lack of material and educational capacity among stakeholders. One inter­
viewee said:
I: As long as the rural people are not empowered nothing much will happen. 
We will still have the same situation that we had before under the Old Act. It 
will be the same people who will use the water since these are the people who 
will have the land. So we have to address the land issue (Interview 18).
This interviewee argues that there is no use in engaging in stakeholder participation as long 
as the stakeholders are not empowered with material resources such as entitlement to their 
land. Clearly this is a different line of reasoning than my argument that stakeholder partici­
pation was seen as meaningless because there was nothing to be learnt from the unscientific 
beliefs held by stakeholders. To fully understand the lack of stakeholder participation, such 
materially based arguments should thus be considered.
The view on stakeholder participation held by scientific water officials is 
also evident from my interviews with some of the stakeholders invited to 
the stipulated stakeholder meetings. This is how one stakeholder described 
the process officially labelled “stakeholder participation”:
I: They set up a series of workshops, but unfortunately, at 
most of the workshops the pundits told you what they felt 
you should know. And when you suggested alternatives and 
it didn’t fit in to their overall plan, it wasn’t accepted. There 
were a couple of ding-dong battles at one or two of these 
workshops. Because we said:
- ‘We come here but we’re wasting our time, because you people 
don’t take our thoughts into consideration’.
Mr. X (senior water official) brought no interference in his 
thoughts on how to get it done. Neither did Mr Y (Senior 
water official) who was also a person who wasn’t prepared to 
listen to others because he felt he already had it (Interview 13, 
parenthesis added).
Another stakeholder described his experience of “stakeholder participation” 
in this way:
I: At the time I didn’t realize all the plans had been made, and 
it was just a process of making us stakeholders feel like we 
thought up the idea. Often the desirable results are predeter-
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mined and it was very much a question of leading stakeholders 
down the right path, emphasizing the things that they thought 
needed to be emphasized. Putting cards on the board in such 
way that certain things become more important than others. 
It’s a quite (pause)... It’s a beautiful skill. And it works! If 
the stakeholders think they thought of it, then they’ll push it 
harder, because they’ll think it’s their idea (Interview 11).
These quotes testify to the reluctance of scientific water officials to engage in 
the exchange of ideas with stakeholders. I see this as a result of the scientific 
water officials social identity in which stakeholders are portrayed as bear­
ers of unscientific beliefs about water. The distinction between this social 
identity and their own—the guardians of scientific knowledge—erodes the 
rationale for the exchange of ideas with stakeholders. The supremacy of 
scientific water management precluded the need for stakeholder participa­
tion. IWRM pushed for stakeholder participation as means to develop 
the agenda for water management, but for actors subscribing to Water as 
Science the appropriate agenda was better arrived at through calculation 
than through consultations.
Why did the scientific water officials bother to hold stakeholder meetings 
if they saw them as meaningless exercises? The reason seems to be that these 
meetings were strongly emphasised by the international donor community 
and those parts of the government who supported the reform process (Gov­
ernment of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995; interview 
16, 4B,15B, 19B, 30B). Had the stakeholder meetings not been held, the 
scientific water officials could have experienced financial repercussions from 
the donors and the government. In addition to that, evidence suggests that 
the stakeholder meetings served to silence complaints from unsatisfied 
stakeholders. Any stakeholder who would say that the views of stakeholders 
had not been heard could be provided with the impressive statistics of how 
many stakeholder meetings had been held. The stakeholders were silenced 
by the water officials’ claim that they have already been heard. As on disil­
lusioned stakeholder put it:
We hear first hand how they are giving each other water so that 
when we question it, they will say, ‘but you were there, how 
can you fight such a system?’ ” (cited in Sithole 2001:10).
My analysis is thus that having orchestrated the stakeholder meetings, the 
scientific water officials deprived the stakeholders of their right to object 
to the implications of the system.
I have argued that IWRM s call for stakeholder participation was trans­
formed by scientific water officials and consequently seen as a threat to
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their exclusive position as experts on water management. As part of this 
transformation, political entrepreneurs in favour of Water as Science drew 
on the collective memory of external interference in Zimbabwes natural 
resources management. Further these scientific water officials nurtured a 
social identity of themselves as custodians of scientific knowledge in service 
of their country. To de-legitimise the competing claim for stakeholders as 
“experts” on water management, scientific water officials portrayed stake­
holders as a negation of their own social identity. Stakeholders were con­
structed as their opposite Others, i.e. as non-scientific and narrow minded. 
Based on these identities, the scientific water officials made their claim for 
the role as experts on water management. As a consequence, the IWRM 
call for stakeholder participation was changed from a process of deliberation 
characterized by an exchange of ideas and priorities, into campaigns aimed 
at infusing ready-made conceptions of water into local communities seen 
to be captive to unfounded belief systems and unproductive practices.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have focused on the transformations of IWRM by those 
I have called scientific water officials subscribing to the construction of 
Water as Science. This construction of reality is characterised by two tenets. 
First, a collective memory consisting of a strong conviction that natural 
scientists can define the relevant problems and proper solutions to issue of 
water management. Second, that this scientific knowledge should be used 
as a tool in the development of the nation. Consequently, actors subscrib­
ing to this construction of reality regarded scientific water officials as the 
vanguard in a struggle where the mission is to use natural science in a quest 
to manage nature for the benefit of the citizens of Zimbabwe.
The power-struggle over the social identity as leader of the water sector 
reform has been a central theme in this chapter. Prior to the reform, the 
DWD was the central unit for water management in Zimbabwe. This was 
where I found most of my interviewees subscribing to Water as Science. 
In the view of actors at the DWD, they had a legitimate claim to lead 
the reform process. They had the appropriate scientific knowledge and 
a historical legacy of serving the nation in areas of water management. 
As the Zimbabwean government and supporting donors inaugurated the 
IMSG/WRMS as the lead actor in the reform, there was great disappoint­
ment at the DWD. The IMSG/WRMS was set up to reflect the IWRM 
ambition to have a multi-sector and multi-dimensional approach to water 
management. Consequently, it was staffed with actors from several line 
departments in the administration as well as non natural-science experts, 
such as communication experts and economists. Senior staff at the DWD
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regarded this as offensive to their social identity and the collective memory 
in which they and their professional peers guided public sector water 
management. Consequently they engaged in a fierce struggle to regain 
what they regarded as their rightful social identity and to defend what 
they saw as their legitimate claim on the role of leading experts on water 
management. My analysis points to how these actors at the DWD used 
their established position in the public administration in repeated attempts 
to cripple the IMSG/WRMS. They tried to bypass the IMSG/WRMS in 
important decision-making processes, and to isolate them from both the 
wider water-related administration in Zimbabwe and the international 
donor community. The goal was, in the figurative speech of one interview 
persons, to kill” the IWRM/WRMS and reinvigorate the DWD as the 
leading actor in the water sector reform (Interview 5B).
On balance, the political entrepreneurs at the DWD won the power 
struggle with the IMSG/WRMS. Due to this struggle, the IMSG/WRMS 
officials were deprived of much of their administrative and financial lev­
erage as leaders of the water sector reform. I argue that this had severe 
consequences for the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe. The IMSG/ 
WRMS was explicitly mandated to implement IWRM in Zimbabwe. My 
analysis makes it clear that their marginalisation contributed to the wide­
spread transformation of IWRM by different actors in Zimbabwe. Due to 
the IMSG/WRMS’s weakened position, the social and political meaning of 
IWRM could more easily be transformed by political entrepreneurs engag­
ing in competing constructions of reality. Had the IMSG/WRMS not been 
marginalised by the DWD, they could have counteracted some, or most, 
of the transformations of IWRM that I report throughout this book.
The construction of Water as Science implies that the meaning of each 
of the three pillars of IWRM were transformed in the eyes of the scientific 
water officials. Table 7.2. summarises the transformed meanings of each 
pillar and points to its behavioural implications.
175





Transformed meaning Behavioural implication
Catchment 
management
Challenge to social stratification 
between different kinds of scien­
tific water experts (hydrologists 
and hydrogeologists).
Maintain segmented organisa­
tional structure and distinctions 
between managers of surface 
and groundwater as opposed to 
IWRM call for ecosystem 
management.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Contradiction of rational water 
resources management for ben­
efit of all of Zimbabweans. Call 
for inferior science (i.e. econo­
mics) to legitimise narrow­
minded, egoistic use of water.
Obstruct market-based pricing 
in support of price reflecting 




Challenge to scientific practice 
in which the proper road-map 
to water management is arrived 
at through calculations rather 
than consultations. Stakeholder 
management was a call for dilet­
tantes to manage water.
Turn campaigns for stakeholder 
participation into one-way com­
munication exercises to transmit 
solutions to water management 
arrived at through calculations 
based on natural sciences.
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8. IWRM AND WATER AS A GIFT FROM 
THE GODS
This chapter analyses the transformation of IWRM by actors subscribing 
to a reality construct in which water is interlinked with the spiritual world. 
I have labelled this reality construct “Water as a Gift from the Gods”.58 Ac­
tors subscribing to Water as a Gift from the Gods assume the existence of 
an invisible world inhabited by spiritual beings that engage with peoples’ 
lives in the material world. The spiritual beings control many of the events 
in the material world, including health, distribution of weal th, and fortune. 
Most significantly for my analysis, the spiritual beings are in control of the 
availability and distribution of water. One of my interviewees was a rain­
maker (see below), who put it like this: “We have ancestral spirits lined up 
for the supply of water” (Interview 3, see also 3b, 29, 8, cf Nyatsanza 1970; 
Lan 1985; Ranger 1999; Derman 2003; Ellis and ter Haar 2004).
581 use the word “gods” and “spirits” as synonyms to denote non-physical actors.
The first section of this chapter outlines the main content of the con­
struction of Water as a Gift from the Gods through detailing the collective 
memory and social identities embraced by its supporters. I also situate the 
main political entrepreneurs of this construction—i.e. traditional leaders 
in local societies—in a political context of competing claims for legitimate 
rule with the national government. The three subsequent sections make 
up the bulk of the chapter and focus on transformations in relation to the 
three pillars of IWRM: catchment management, water as an economic good, 
and stakeholder participation. The final section provides the conclusions 
from my findings.
Water as a Gift from the Gods
The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods is embraced by a wide 
and diverse selection of Zimbabweans. According to a survey conducted at 
the University of Zimbabwe, a vast majority of the rural population associ­
ate the supply of water with the benevolence of the gods (Derman 2003). 
Eighty-four percent of the rural population observe certain behavioural 
rules and/or perform certain rituals directed towards the ancestral spirits 
to maintain water supply. Seventy-three percent pointed to the rain-maker
as one of the most important persons involved with water allocation.59 In 
addition to this support in rural society, I also found support for Water as 
a Gift from the Gods among actors who I elsewhere associated with other 
constructions of reality, in particular Water as Zimbabwe and Water as 
Science (see below, cf. chapter five and seven).
59 The methodology of this survey requires that these figures be considered with caution. 
The sample of interviewees was strategic rather than random but included variation in 
tenure systems as well as geography.
60 See chapter four on multiple identities.
While Water as a Gift from the Gods was part and parcel of many ac­
tors’ constructions of reality, there was no particular organised group who 
systematically advocated the implications of this construction during the 
water sector reform. Politicians, academics, and public opinion makers gave 
voice to the connection between the spiritual world and water in speeches 
and journals (Chikozho 2002; Derman 2003). The Zimbabwe Traditional 
Healers Association (ZINATHA) functioned as a platform for traditional 
leaders and rain-makers and ZINATHA’s public relations officer frequently 
appeared in debates and in mass media. But it would be an exaggeration to 
compare ZINATHA’s role with, for example, the role of CFU as a proponent 
of Water as Gold (see chapter six).
The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods was thus advocated 
by a diffuse, rather than well organised group of political entrepreneurs. 
This had implications for my ability to identify specific political entre­
preneurs engaged in proposing Water as a Gift from the Gods during the 
water sector reform. Traditional leaders and rain-makers constituted the 
primary group of interviewees. In addition, I looked for actors from so­
cial and professional groups normally associated with other constructions 
who, occasionally, also promote the construction of Water as a Gift from 
the Gods.60 Water as a Gift from the Gods was, for example, advanced by 
many of the interviewees from the public water administration who also 
advocated the Water as Science construction (chapter seven). Consider the 
following quote from an interview with a professional water official with 
an extensive formal academic training in hydrology who called himself a 
“rain-dancing hydrologist”:
R: I understand that some people tend to see the supply of 
water as connected to the spiritual world. What is your view 
on that?
I: I respect the rain dance, every single one, and I have partici­
pated in my own village’s every single year since I came back 
[from my university training abroad]. I have never missed 
the ritual.
178
R: So such a rain dance, how is it performed?
I: Usually it is a Friday night. We are dancing and brewing 
a special beer all night and then five in the morning on Sat­
urday, the elders take it up to some hill. Then people bring 
more beer during the day but also some meat and we eat and 
dance the whole afternoon. Yes, and then we leave the beer up 
there and the elders will ask for sufficient rain, just for rain, 
no lightning, so that we have a good crop. This is usually 
performed in September.
R: Have you ever actually experienced a change in the pattern 
of rain coming from such a ritual?
I: Yes, now what happens, is usually, if you send the wrong 
person and the beer is not accepted, then there is a problem 
with the rain, so you can actually tell if the ritual was well 
conducted or not by the rain pattern. At times it can give very 
violent storms. So it is not just the amount of rain but also 
how hard they come.
R: So, is the person who goes with the beer, if he has commit­
ted some injustices...
I: Yes, that would create problems, that is why they want to 
send elderly, very elderly people up there.
R: What about your own role in all of this? I mean you are 
quite familiar with water management.
I: Yes, everyone in the village knows that I am a water person, 
but I have not been consulted there. They say that this is 
beyond you. That it is about things that I do no know. I find 
that very humbling (Interview 8).
This quote points to two central tenets in the construction of Water as a 
Gift from the Gods. First, the interviewee points to how the availability of 
water is determined by the moral relationship between the gods and man­
kind. It is clear from the interview that the gods will consider the moral 
status of the person sent to ask for rain. This was a theme picked up by the 
rain-makers I interviewed. They emphasised that the availability of water is 
connected to a moral discourse stipulated by the gods (Interview 3, 3B, 29, 
see details below). The gods provide water to people in accordance with how
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pleased they are with the moral content of people’s lives: an abundance of 
water as a sign that they are pleased with peoples’ conduct, while drought 
is the gods’ way of calling on the people to repent and return to the morally 
correct ways of living. Alois Mandondo at the Institute of Environmental 
Studies, University of Zimbabwe, has described this view by saying that 
the gods exercise “tutelary powers over the living” by regulation of water 
(Mandondo 1997a:357; cf. Lan 1985; Wilson 1995).
The second thing that stands out from the quote above is that as much 
as the gods communicate to the people by regulating the rains, people 
can also communicate with, and effect, the gods via the rain-makers. The 
interviewee describes how some of the village elders are selected to be the 
rain-makers and perform the rituals supposed to appease the gods to send 
rain. Anthropologist David Lan (1985) describes how a person is selected 
to the prestigious and powerful position of rain-maker through a system 
based on hierarchy and lineage. Together with chiefs and headmen, the 
rain-makers make up the most important leaders in rural societies in Zim­
babwe. Individuals request that rain-makers transmit their calls for rain to 
the gods. As described in the citation above, this request is made by means 
of rain making ceremonies during which the rain-maker leads the people 
through a well defined procedure in which people pledge to repent their 
wrong-doings in return for rain (cf. Nyatsanza 1970; Ranger 1999).
To better understand the role of rain-makers, consider the following 
extract from one of my interviews with a rain-maker. I was introduced to 
this rain-maker by Dr. Sibanda from ZINATHA who also functioned as 
my interpreter from Shona during this interview. I was only allowed to 
make this interview after having gone though a number of rituals (includ­
ing having been introduced to the ancestral spirits in a pray conducted by 
the rain-maker) and having taken off my watch and shoes as a sign of my 
respect for this holy man who was seen to live in a world that was beyond 
the limitations of time:
R: I understand that in the traditional Zimbabwean way of 
looking at water, water is very much related to the spiritual 
world. Could you explain for me how that works?
I: I am the rain-maker. I know how to call the rain to fall. I 
know how to make rain so that there is flow in a river. I know 
how to make that water stand still so that people can move 
across. So what you are saying that life and spiritual life is in 
water. That’s true.
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R: How come that there is sometimes so little water and some­
times even drought? How can we understand this?
I: Oh, that is because we are not appeasing the spirits. Things 
have to be asked for. Whatever we want we should ask for it. 
If we haven’t asked then the Creator says you do not want to 
follow the procedures then I will show you trouble, then he 
sends a drought (Interview 29).
This interviewee sums up the key characteristics of Water as a Gift from 
the Gods. This construction builds on the collective belief that the gods 
determine the amount of rain. If the gods are pleased with people’s moral 
conduct, there will be abundance of rain, and if they are not, they will pun­
ish man by drought. In addition, the quote points to two social identities 
that are central in the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. First, 
the rain-maker is one of the most esteemed actors in rural society. Second, 
this construction of reality represents water users as moral subjects whose 
need for water and rain can only be met if they follow the moral codes 
stipulated by the gods and turn to a spirit medium to have the rain-making 
ceremonies preformed.
The political context
To understand the transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift 
from the Gods we must take into account the political context in which 
this transformation took place. Zimbabwe, like many African states, is 
characterised by two sets of institutions: customary systems controlled by 
traditional leadership (including chiefs, kraal head, spirit mediums, and rain­
makers) and a set of statutory institutions controlled by the government. In 
Zimbabwe, the legislative institutions were introduced during the colonial 
era without much attention being paid to customary political and religious 
boundaries (Ranger 1999). Tver since, there has been an uneasy relation 
between the two systems of local level institutions. The central government 
has tried to control the local leadership, who, for their part, generally regard 
the government’s institutions as obstacles to social, communal, and spiritual 
interaction (Mandondo 1997b; cf. Munro 1998; Derman 2003).
In an interview with a rain-maker I asked him to explain the relationship 
between his peers of local leaders and the central state:
I: When we were colonised, it was the whites who started 
colonising us, they used our native law, including our water 
laws and then they slowly took our native laws away, phasing 
them out. And it was the same with the blacks who then come 
into power. So because of both the blacks and whites our laws 
are no longer guiding this country. They have phased out all 
of them. They are now again changing the laws of the country
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and our waters. And again they do no respect how things used 
to be done in the past.
R: What do you think of the changes now taking place, the 
new water laws and organisations?
I: You see those who are now changing our water laws are act­
ing wrong. Those new laws are not from our tradition. Before 
the colonialists came, the laws guiding this country used to 
come from us. We would specify what should not be done and 
what should be done. All was orderly. Patrik, be careful, we 
are talking of two laws. We as spiritual leaders, and our chief, 
we had our own laws that I am telling you about, which have 
been put aside since the time we were colonised. Now this new 
water law is not even our law. It comes from somewhere else. 
So that is why we are saying that the law is being imposed on 
us (Interview 29).
The introduction of IWRM was, according to this rain-maker, part of a 
tradition stretching back to colonialism whereby the traditional ways of 
dealing with water were increasingly marginalised. Whereas traditional 
leaders have tried to maintain their historical mandate and capacities, both 
the white colonialists and black government after Independence have tried 
to manifest their political presence in rural societies by expropriation of 
control over natural resources from customary institutions (see chapter five 
and six). This development is described by several analysts who conclude 
that even though the traditional leaders had been increasingly marginalised, 
the struggle for control over the local polity has so far been inconclusive 
(Mandaza 1987; Moyo 1992; Moyo 1993; Ranger 1999; Darnolf and 
Laakso 2003). At the time of the water sector reform, many daily activities 
in rural societies, including water management, were conducted under 
mixed system of traditional leadership and state control (Derman 1998b; 
Sithole 2000; Derman and Ferguson 2000a; Sithole 2001).
With this background on the construction of Water as Gift from the Gods 
and the political struggle over legitimate rule in the local polity, I now turn 
to an analysis of how political entrepreneurs supportive of Water as a Gift 
from the Gods transformed the three respective pillars of IWRM.
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Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation to 
Water as a Gift from the Gods
Catchment management
In chapter two I established that catchment management is central to 
IWRM’s ambition to obtain ecosystem management of water. Catchment 
management is a means to apply an integrated approach to all the factors 
influencing water use in a demarcated geographic area, the catchment, are 
jointly addressed in the management of water. A consequence of this is, for 
example, that water should be set aside for the needs of animal and plants 
in the ecosystem.
As I set off to analyse how proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods 
regarded the call for catchment management, my assumption was that they 
would find this idea attractive. My assumption rested on the presumption 
that the construct of Water as a Gift from the Gods encapsulated a tradi­
tion of local knowledge on how to live sustainably in the ecosystem. Alois 
Mandondo (1997a) writes about a similar view prevalent in the research 
community at large holding an “emancipatory approach” towards local 
cultures and beliefs are regarding local actors as living “in harmony with 
nature” (p. 354f).
At face value my empirical material offers support to my initial assump­
tion. The rain-makers that I interviewed explained how the Creator had 
made the earth as one unified and interdependent system. Much like 
IWRM’s emphasis on disbanding the tradition of different management 
systems for ground and surface water, the rain-makers emphasised that all 
waters are united in a holistic system guided by the spirits. The rain-makers 
thus offered no support for the management in place before the water sector 
reform, in which ground and surface water were guided by different legal 
and administrative practices. Rather, they seemed to agree with IWRM’s 
emphasis on an integrated approach to water management. Furthermore, 
they concurred with IWRM’s emphasis to include nature itself as holding 
legitimate rights to water. All water resources should thus not be exploited 
by man alone but the needs of nature itself should be catered for (Interview 
3, 29).
This similarity between IWRM and Water as a Gift from the Gods was 
acknowledged by professional water officials at government institutions (the 
DWD and ZINWA) whose task it was to obtain support for the reform 
process in local societies. These officials went out to local villages to inform 
water users of the water sector reform. As I interviewed a senior information 
official in Harare, he described how he actively alluded to the holistic view 
dominating local thinking when he talked about catchment management 
to local water users and leaders:
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I: These local people seem to accept quite easily the idea of 
catchment management and the idea of setting aside water 
for the environment. Sometimes when I meet my fellow 
Zimbabweans, I speak in Shona [the local language] and try 
to explain why there needs to be water in the river. Maybe 
there is need for fish further down stream or there are factories 
further down. There are also some pools that in the Shona 
culture are taken to be sacred. So if no water is released these 
will dry up and that will be seen as a bad sign or bad omen in 
the Shona culture. So I try to explain why we have to make 
these releases for the ecosystem. They seem to accept these 
ideas. So I use the traditional views as a tool to help them 
understand these new concepts. I use these things that they 
can relate to (Interview 7B).
This quote suggests that IWRM’s call for catchment management found 
support among proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Proponents 
of both systems emphasised the need for an integrated approach to water 
and regard it as part of the same holistic system.
At this level of analysis, the evidence thus seemed to support my initial 
assumption that proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods would be 
supportive of IWRM’s call for catchment management. This conclusion 
was, however, challenged by a further analysis of the empirical evidence. 
Recall that IWRM’s call for an integrated approach to water management 
built on the assumption of interconnections between activities in the physi­
cal world. Humans, animals, and the biological world are all part of an 
interactive ecosystem. By contrast, proponents of Water as a Gift from the 
Gods not only emphasise the interconnections of the physical world but 
also connections between the physical and spiritual worlds.
While both IWRM and the construction of Water as a Gift from the 
Gods favour an integrated, holistic approach to water management, they 
thus differ with respect to the idea of causality. IWRM assumes that the 
actions of man have a direct causal effect on the state of nature. Man can, 
according to IWRM, change the state of nature by direct interaction with 
nature. Consequently, changing the actions of man towards nature is the 
major concern for water management. By contrast, the approach favoured 
by Water as a Gift from the Gods did not build on an idea of a direct causal 
interaction within the physical world. Instead, it was based on a spiritual 
reality in which there is no direct link between the actions of man and the 
effects on nature. The causal connection between man and nature goes via 
the spiritual world. The state of nature is not a function of man’s interaction 
with nature. It is a function of man’s relationship with the gods.
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This leads me to conclude that for actors subscribing to Water as a Gift 
from the Gods, IWRM’s call for a holistic, integrated approach to water 
management was transformed from a call for integration in the physical 
world into an acknowledgment of the integration of the physical and the 
spiritual worlds. It was a transformation of the rationale behind catchment 
management from an ecosystem approach to a spiritual approach to water. 
This transformation changes the causality between man and nature from a 
direct to an indirect relation. As IWRM’s call for ecosystem management 
was transformed in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods, substantial 
behavioural imperatives of IWRM thus vanished. While IWRM’s call was 
for man to be cautious in relation to water, the construction of Water as 
a Gift from the Gods eroded the rationale for such action. Why should 
people mind their interactions with nature when the state of nature is 
determined by the gods?
Catchment management in favour of local rule
I turn now to another way to understand the reaction to IWRM’s call for 
catchment management by the local traditional leaders, who were one of 
the key groups supporting Water as a Gift from the Gods. While the above 
analysis centred on catchment management as a call for ecosystem man­
agement, I now focus on the consequences of IWRM’s idea of catchment 
management in terms of demarcations of geographical units for water man­
agement. Catchment management implied abandoning water management 
along provincial lines which guided the administration of water prior to the 
reform. Proponents of IWRM argued that, to better reflect the ecosystem, 
water should be managed along the lines of catchments defined by the 
natural flow of water, not by politically defined provinces.
Recall from the introduction of this chapter that the provincial system 
was introduced by the central government in Harare as part of the attempt 
to gain control over local politics and without consideration of traditional 
chiefdoms and practices (cf. chapter five). Consider now an interview with 
a local stakeholder leader who worked to promote catchment management 
as part of the reform:
R: Why did you not go along with the provinces instead of 
the catchment? Why introduce the catchments?
I: We couldn’t go with the provinces. Often rivers in a province 
flow in different directions. Some rivers flow north, some flow 
west, some flow south, and there was no way you could gain 
advantage in that respect. It is also in our tradition to think 
along the way of how water flows. It is just how the elders long 
time ago were looking after these areas. They divided the areas
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in terms of water sharing. Even the way the river’s boundaries or 
the chiefs’ boundaries were set, they were set in terms of water 
so that the chief’s boundaries and the water-ways coincided. In 
fact, the scientific way of defining catchments and the cultural 
way of demarcating chiefdoms coincided (Interview 10).
This interviewee suggests that the reason why local leaders supported the 
introduction of catchment management was that proponents of catch­
ment management named water in a way that implied geographic units for 
water management (catchments) that coincided with the demarcations of 
traditional chiefdoms. Naming water as part of the ecosystem (the basis for 
catchment management) implied managerial units that were more in line 
with customary institutions and patterns of interaction than the provincial 
system. That seems to have been one reason why catchment management 
was well received by local leaders.
To understand the political significance of catchment management we 
should consider that the political history of Zimbabwe has been marked 
by an uneasy relation between traditional leaders and different attempts to 
centralise rule (see e.g. the citation from interview 29 above). The demar­
cation of provinces was one way for the central government to manifest its 
control at the local level (Munro 1998). Therefore I argue that we should 
understand the support for catchment management offered by local actors 
and traditional leaders as part of the struggle for power in relation to the 
central government. From the perspective of these actors, IWRM’s call for 
catchment management provided support in the struggle for power with the 
central government. Local leaders’ supported IWRM’s call for catchment 
management because it was a strategic stance against the provincial system 
favoured by their competitor for power, i.e. the central government.
In summary, as I set out to analyse the reception of IWRM’s call for 
catchment management I expected this to be well received by proponents 
of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Both conceptualise water as part of an 
integrated and interdependent system. At face value, the empirical evidence 
supported this expectation, but a further analysis suggested that the idea of 
catchment management was substantially transformed in the construction 
of Water as a Gift from the Gods. For actors supportive of Water as a Gift 
from the Gods, the idea of catchment management was transformed from 
an idea in favour of ecosystem management into an acknowledgement of 
the connection between the physical and spiritual world. This was a shift 
from an ecosystem to a spiritual system approach to water. Whereas the 
former underlines the direct connections between the actions of man and 
the state of nature, the later disbands such connections in favour of water 
as a gift from the gods. In addition, I have argued in this section that the 
accommodation of catchment management should be understood in a
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political context in which the demarcation of catchments was a way for 
local leaders to oppose the provincial system favoured by the centralistic 
government. This analysis suggests that the idea of catchment management 
was transformed from being a vehicle to achieve ecosystem management 
to become an instrument in a struggle around the distribution of power 
between the customary and state institutions. Instead of calling on local 
leaders to act in a way that integrated all activities in the catchment in their 
decision making, as IWRM suggested, catchment management became a 
platform in the struggle for power against the central government and its 
provincial system of rule.
Water as an economic good
I now turn to analysing how the idea of water as an economic good was 
transformed in relation to the construction of Water as a Gift from the 
Gods. Recall from chapter two that proponents of IWRM suggested that 
the consumption of water be associated with a price reflecting the relative 
scarcity of water. Naming water as an economic good was a way to encour­
age austerity and resource effective water use.
It is clear from my interviews, however, that the idea of pricing water 
was not well received by proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods. The 
argument was, in short, that water is god given and should not be paid for. 
Consider an extract from one of my interviews with a rain-maker:
R: Now with these new laws that are coming, they say that 
they want to sell the water. They want to put a price on water. 
What do you think about that?
I: How can they say this? Are they the ones who know where 
water comes from? No, we do not want such a law. We feel 
that if we have a Minister of Water he should know where to 
ask for rain. Really, he should go to us rain-makers and ask 
for rain. But he acts like if he does not know where we go and 
ask for water. This pricing of water, we are against it. How can 
they price something that they do not know where it comes 
from? Do you now want to decide for the Creator? You are 
now deciding for god. God is the one who provides the water 
(Interview 29).
According to this rain-maker, putting a price on water would be to act 
against the logic of the gods. It would be to try to replace god with man: 
“to decide for the Creator”. Pricing water would be to belittle the Creator 
and make him irrelevant in the process of providing water. The rain-maker 
suggests that only someone who is unfamiliar or hostile to the spiritual reali-
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ties of rain making would propose such as thing as putting a price on water. 
A similar view was reported by a group of researchers from the University 
of Zimbabwe who conducted field work in a local community to assess the 
sentiments towards the reform (Manzungu, Senzanje et al. 1999). Their 
conclusion was that “Farmers saw no justification of the government to 
make farmers pay for water that came from God” (p. 9, cf. Sithole 2000; 
Derman and Ferguson 2000a). In the context of Water as a Gift from the 
Gods, the call for water as an economic good was thus transformed from a 
vehicle for effective resource allocation into a question of the authority of 
the gods. Accepting water as an economic good would be to obstruct the 
spiritual logic whereby the proper allocation is determined by the gods, 
not the markets.
Given the fundamental contradiction between Water as a Gift from the 
Gods and water as an economic good, it would have been reasonable that 
proponents of the former would reject the latter completely. Due to an in­
triguing renegotiation of this relationship, this was, however, not the case. 
Consider the continuation of the above interview with the rain-maker:
R: If people are taking water for big agricultural schemes and 
irrigation and then they are taking these crops and they are 
selling them to people for food, isn’t it reasonable that these 
people should pay for the land and for water that they are 
using?
I: What I would feel should be priced or sold is the energy 
that moves the engine to draw water from the dam but not 
water itself. If you need electricity, yes, you can buy it but 
water is the most holy thing of God. Pricing water will never 
work (Interview 29).
According to this interviewee, it is not acceptable to price water per se, 
but it is possible to put a price on the infrastructure needed for managing 
water. Other empirical material indicates that this position was widespread 
among proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods (Interview 3; Sithole 
2000; Derman 2003).61 In fact, this proposal for extracting a price from 
water management was identified and utilised by proponents of IWRM. 
Public water officials engaged in information campaigns aimed to inform 
water consumers about the reform. The so-called WRMS team told the 
local constituencies that the price that was going to be charged was not
61 There is no indication in my material that suggests that this position was favoured because 
it implied a lower price for water consumed by the local communities represented by the 
rain-makers.
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a price on water as such but a price for the infrastructure associated with 
managing water. One of these actors explains:
R: So let’s talk about another one of those concepts, water as an 
economic good, how did you work with that concept?
I: We tried to explain that concept of water as an economic 
good. You see there are some categories of people to whom 
you can explain these concepts. But for other categories, it just 
doesn’t make sense. Especially in the rural areas. So we have to 
do a lot of explaining. Again, the people believe, the people in 
the rural areas believe water is a gift from god. So they say ‘Why 
should we pay’. So now we are getting around that problem by 
saying ’You are not paying for the water, but you are paying 
for the service. Somebody brings the water, somebody purifies 
the water for you so that you can drink it. You are paying for 
that, it’s not for the actual water.’ So that is how the privilege 
was explained. You are paying for the services that I am making 
which makes it possible for you to drink water.
R: How did that argument come up? It is a very cunning 
argument to get around this problem.
I: Yes, people kept arguing that water was a gift from God. 
So then we said ‘Ok the water came from heaven, but I had 
to draw the water, I had to bring it up to your unit pipe. 
Somebody has to pay for those pipes. If you are in urban area 
you have to pay for the water, somebody has to pay for the 
chemicals that we use to purify the water So that’s how we 
made it up explaining it (Interview 18).
This quote testifies to the strategic manoeuvre engaged on by actors im­
plementing IWRM to accommodate people convinced that Water is a Gift 
from the Gods. Supporters of Water as a Gift from the Gods objected to 
the pricing of water but accepted the pricing of services and goods associ­
ated with water management. This distinction was used by public water 
officials as they tried to get acceptance for IWRM in rural societies where 
the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods was widely embraced. 
As this distinction gained legitimacy in rural societies the idea of water as 
an economic good was thus transformed so that the price charged for water 
use was not related to water as such but to the infrastructure used in the 
management of water.
However cunning this line of reasoning was, it implied a clear devia­
tion from the behavioural incentives implied by IWRM’s idea of water
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as an economic good. IWRM suggests that water be priced so that the 
price regulates the consumption of water. The price for water should be 
formulated to reflect the demand and supply of water and thus function 
as an incentive to obtain resource effective use and austerity in times of 
scarcity. The problem is that this behavioural implication does not follow 
if the price is put on infrastructure rather than on the volume of consumed 
water. Whereas the price of water perse is sensitive to the relative scarcity of 
water, the price of infrastructure is not. Therefore, a price on infrastructure 
is not instrumental in achieving the behavioural incentives that motivated 
IWRM’s call to make water an economic good.
The way to actually calculate the price for water was one of the most dif­
ficult issues to settle during the water sector reform in Zimbabwe. Despite 
the different options considered by the key actors, a price formula that would 
function as an incentive to preserver water was, however, not established 
and accepted (see chapters five, six and seven). In an official review of the 
reform process issued by the Zimbabwean Government in 2003, one of 
the major challenges for the future is identified as inculcating widespread 
acceptance for the idea of actually paying for the consumption of water 
(Presidential Land Review Committee 2003).
My analysis suggests that this lack of implementation of IWRM was, in 
part, the result of a dilemma faced by public water officials tasked to gain 
support for IWRM. Their dilemma was that if they stuck to the original 
ideas of IWRM and put a price on the consumption on water, their efforts 
to implement IWRM would be refuted by proponents of Water as Gift 
from the Gods. If, on the other hand, they accommodate the construction 
of Water as a Gift from the Gods and link the price to infrastructure they 
would drain IWRM of one of its key instruments of behavioural change. 
The options were thus either a breakdown of communication with sup­
porters of Water as a Gift from the Gods, many of whom were local lead­
ers, or a change of the behavioural implications of IWRM. Faced with this 
dilemma, the public water officials opted for the latter strategy: to support 
the transformation of IWRM in relation to the popular construction of 
Water as a Gift from the Gods. This transformation came at the expense 
of one of IWRM’s most central instruments to achieve sustainable water 
management: a price structure reflecting the scarcity of water.
Stakeholder participation
In my analysis of actors advocating Water as a Gift from the Gods, I found 
that they offered scant support for IWRM’s call for stakeholder participa­
tion. My interviewees pointed to two reasons for refusing stakeholder 
participation. The first centred on how to name the problem of water man­
agement. Proponents of IWRM call for stakeholder participation because 
they believe that it is man’s interaction with nature that determines the
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State of nature. Changes in human behavioural patterns can thus improve, 
for example, the availability and quality of water. This idea of a direct 
causal relation between man and the state of nature is not found in the 
construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods (cf. the section above on the 
transformation of IWRM’s call for catchment management). The call for 
stakeholder participation thus built on an idea of causality that was alien 
to the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Allow me to return 
to part of a quote from the interview with the rain-maker above:
R: How come that there is sometimes so little water and some­
times even drought? How can we understand this?
I: Oh, that is because we are not appeasing the spirits. Things 
have to be asked for. Whatever we want we should ask for it. 
If we haven’t asked then the Creator says you do not want to 
follow the procedures then I will show you trouble, then he 
sends a drought (Interview 29, also cited above).
This rain-maker tries to define the problem of water availability as a problem 
related to the will of the gods. The gods regulate water availability in ac­
cordance with how pleased they are with the moral conduct of man: Man’s 
direct interaction with nature has nothing to do with it.
Stakeholder participation—i.e. man engaging in direct interaction to 
improve the state of nature—is thus futile according to Water as a Gift from 
the Gods. It is, quite simply, not the way things work. Increased involve­
ment of stakeholders as a means to improve the management of nature 
is to act without foundation in the proper spiritual logic. In fact, both of 
the rain-makers who I interviewed suggested that it is blasphemy for man 
to get directly involved in the regulation of water (Interview 3, 29). Man 
should be subservient to the benevolence of the gods. If man tries to regulate 
nature without the involvement of the gods, this is a sign of disbelief in the 
powers of the gods. The rain-makers that I interviewed reiterated that if 
people would only follow the proper conduct and appease the gods, there 
would be an abundance of water. One of the rain-makers said:
I: We as spiritual leaders and our laws are put aside by this 
new law. This new law does not come from us. And this is 
where the problem of stability in this country emanates from. 
The economy, water, poverty alleviation, what have you. The 
problem is that there are two laws. And one law, which is 
the original law, our law and the law of our ancestors, is now 
being bypassed. It is being oppressed. So we have problems. 
(Interview 29).
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What is interesting here is that the rain-maker points to the connection 
between the state of, on the one hand, the physical world, and, on the other 
hand, the spiritual world. Problems in the physical world occur because 
people have neglected the gods and the traditional ways, but there is no 
direct connection between the actions of people in the physical world and 
the state of the physical world. People can not correct the problems in 
the physical world emanating from their wrongdoings. People are moral 
subjects under the gods.
My argument is thus that a central reason why IWRM’s call for stakeholder 
participation was refuted by advocates of Water as a Gift from the Gods 
was that it built on an idea about the causal relationship between man and 
nature that was alien to this construction of reality. It is important, however, 
not to mistake this view for fatalism in the sense that the acts of people 
can have no effect on the human conditions. People can influence their 
living conditions through a causal process based on the gods assessment 
of the people’s moral conduct. Good behaviour, in the eyes of the gods, is 
blessed with abundance of rain, while drought follows from misconduct. 
Man’s impact on nature occurs via the rain-makers and is defined by a 
spiritual logic.
Stakeholder participation as a threat to the social identity of traditional rulers
I turn now to the second reason why IWRM’s call for stakeholder partici­
pation was refuted by leading advocates of Water as a Gift from the Gods. 
The reason, in short, was that the IWRM’s idea of stakeholder participation 
provided a basis to question the legitimacy vested in the social identities of 
the traditional leadership at the local level.
As I outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the construction of 
Water as a Gift from the Gods included the social identity of rain-makers, 
who are part of the leadership group traditionally holding a strong posi­
tion on the local level in Zimbabwe. The social identity of rain-makers 
provides a legitimate claim for elderly men, designated as rain-makers, 
to obtain a high level of social and political prestige in the local society. 
Typically, the selection of rain-maker follows a lineage system which puts 
the (earthly) control of water management in the hands of a small group 
of men (Nyatsanza 1970; Ellis and ter Haar 2004). By contrast, IWRM’s 
call for stakeholder participation builds on the idea that everybody with a 
stake in water management has a right to participate in the procedures of 
managing water. In principle, this democratic ideal is the opposite of the 
traditional leadership structure invested in the construction of Water as 
Gift from the Gods. Again, recall one of the interviews with a rain-maker 
above. He said:
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I: I am the rain-maker. I know how to call the rain to fall. I 
know how to make rain so that there is flow in a river. I know 
how to make that water stand still so that people can move 
across (Interview 29).
This interviewee identifies the rain-maker as the medium negotiating 
water to the people. This position is challenged by the idea of stakeholder 
participation and that is why this pillar of IAX2RM was obstructed by local 
leaders. A similar sentiment of resistance towards stakeholder participation 
was reported by Manzungu and his team of researchers from the University 
of Zimbabwe (Manzungu, Senzanje et al. 1999). They concluded from their 
field work on the reform process that there was a strong resistance towards 
this idea because the traditional leaders
have always been in charge of the scheme without government 
intervention and their successful history of self reliance was 
testimony to their ability to survive....[The traditional lead­
ers] did not welcome any venture initiated by the government 
which would end up affecting their community. They argued 
that Mutambara was a self reliant farming community... [and] 
they believed that water belonged to no one but God (p. 7).
The report by Manzungu and colleagues shows how the resistance to stake­
holder participation was based on a collective memory of successful water 
management connected to a social identity in which traditional leaders 
were seen to play the key role of managing what belongs “to no one but 
God”. This line of reasoning was also expressed in the Parliamentary debate 
regarding the new Water Act which emphasised the need for stakeholder 
participation and suggested the introduction of new local institutional 
structures to this end (the catchment councils, and sub-catchment councils). 
Member of Parliament Mr. Makoni—who also held a position in his local 
traditional community which allowed him to use the title of “Chief”—com­
mented on this by saying:
Cheif Makoni: Let us not run away from the fact that tra­
ditional leadership has got a very deep involvement in the 
procurement of water and getting ready for water to come 
from where it comes from. If we as traditional leaders are not 
involved in this committee, you will find that in other places 
you will have no rain and no water because you will have left 
the real people out. (Government of Zimbabwe 1998b).
This speech by Chief Makoni illustrates the belief in the role of the tradi­
tional leaders as rain-makers and the resistance towards allowing other actors
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to come in and compete with this role. Chief Makoni s message is that if 
the state institutions try to challenge the power of traditional leaders by 
favouring stakeholder participation, the rain-makers will use their powers 
to see to it that there is drought. My argument is that traditional leaders 
and rain-makers saw stakeholder participation as a threat to the foundation 
of their social identity and authority in the management of water. IWRM 
provided the foundation to call on increased stakeholder involvement and 
therefore provided the basis for a struggle for power between different ac­
tors at the local level. This power struggle was between, on the one hand, 
traditional leadership drawing their authority on the claim of a legitimate 
monopoly on communications with the spiritual world, and, on the other 
hand, actors proposing the IWRM idea that water users, based on their 
social identity as stakeholders, have both a right and the ability to have a 
direct effect on the management of water.
The different rationales behind legitimate authority in the water sector 
had concrete consequences for how to establish legitimacy to engage in 
water management at the local level. Looking at the reported composition 
of the stakeholder bodies set up during the reform (Catchment Councils 
and Sub-catchment Councils) it is clear that these bodies quickly were 
dominated by members of the traditional local leadership (Sithole 2000, 
Sithole 2001; Chikozho 2002). I interviewed one individual who had 
managed to get into office as a stakeholder representative in a Catchment 
Council without holding any position in the traditional local leadership. 
He described his problems of being accepted based on his non-traditional/ 
non-spiritual mandate:
I: They didn’t expect me to be their leader, because they think 
that I didn’t know anything about what I am supposed to 
manage. I used to think that water was something that came 
from the tap for me to drink. That’s what I know. But they 
say that it wasn’t necessary for me to manage water because it 
was God given. So how could they accept to be led by me? I 
really had to prove myself to them (Interview CIO).
This quote testifies to the struggle for legitimate power offset by the 
competing claims for legitimate leadership in water management. The 
construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods eroded the legitimacy for 
stakeholder representatives without foundation in traditional structures to 
act as managers of water.
To conclude, my analysis is that in the eyes of actors advocating Water 
as a Gift from the Gods, stakeholder participation was transformed from 
a tool for mobilising water consumer in the management of water, and 
instead seen as a way of rebelling against the power of gods and the au-
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thority of the traditional leadership. For these actors, the legitimate way 
to accommodate the call for stakeholder participation was to allow for the 
traditional leaders and rain-makers to stand as stakeholder representatives 
rather than allowing for a widespread democratic process of electing popular 
stakeholder representatives. I suggest that the dominant construction of 
reality among the rural population was strategically manipulated so that 
the traditional leaders were seen as the only morally legitimate actors to be 
involved in the procedures of water management. In this context, IWRM’s 
call for stakeholder participation was thus transformed from a vehicle for 
popular mobilisation of local stakeholders to a means for perpetuating the 
domination of the existing local elites.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have analysed the transformation of IWRM by actors 
subscribing to a construction of reality characterised by a linkage between 
the physical and the spiritual world. According to these actors, many events 
in the physical world, including the availability and quality of water, are 
controlled by spiritual beings. I have labelled this construction Water as a 
Gift from the Gods.
Water as a Gift from the Gods comprises a collective memory in which 
the problem of water management is defined in relation to the interaction 
between the gods and man. Accordingly, the right to legitimate claims on 
water is linked to a normative discourse stipulated by the gods. If the gods 
are pleased with the people’s morality, they will provide water, if they are 
not, there will be drought. Two things are important here. First, there is no 
automatic connection between the moral conduct of man and the avail­
ability of water. Between the gods and man stand the rain-makers, with 
extensive powers as mediators of peoples requests for rain. Second, the 
construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods does not contain the idea 
of a direct causal link between the actions of man and the state of nature. 
The relation between man and nature is better described as indirect, going 
via the rain-makers and the judgments of the gods.
Water as a Gift from the Gods comprises two specific social identities. 
First, rain-makers are constructed as mediators between the gods and the 
people. To appease the gods and ask for rain, people must turn to the rain­
makers and ask them to perform certain rain-making ceremonies. Since 
people cannot address the gods directly, the rain-makers have great powers 
in societies embracing the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. 
Second, Water as a Gift from the Gods stipulates the social identity of water 
users as subjects whose need for water and rain can only be met if they fol­
low the moral codes stipulated by the gods and turn to a rain-maker.
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Whereas Water as a Gift from the Gods is embraced by a wide and di­
verse selection of Zimbabweans, including actors normally associated with 
contrasting constructions of reality, its strongest base is in rural society and 
among traditional leaders. Zimbabwe’s political history is marked by the 
competition for legitimate claims for power over the rural polity, where 
the central government has tried to manifest its presence and control by 
expropriation of customary institutions and marginalisation of traditional 
leaders. Therefore I have emphasised that the transformation of IWRM 
in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods should be seen in light of a 
political context in which the water sector reform was part of the struggle 
for power in rural Zimbabwe between central government and traditional 
leaders.
The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods implied that the 
meaning of each of the three pillars of IWRM was transformed. Table 
8.1. summarises the transformed meanings of each pillar and points to its 
behavioural implications.
Table 8.1. Summary of transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as 
a Gift from the Gods.
Water as a Gift from the Gods
Pillar of 
IWRM
Transformed meaning Behavioural implication
Catchment 
management
Recognition of holistic “spir­
itual-system” approach (as op­
posed to ecosystem approach) 
placing water in the hands of 
the gods. Support of traditional 
chiefdoms and platform for 
political mobilization for local 
rule against the state.
Discourage man from direct 
interaction with nature to 
improve its conditions. Increased 
legitimacy for local leadership at 
the expense of stakeholders and 
citizens.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Pricing water is a challenge to 
the authority of the gods. A 
sign of lack of faith.
Obstruct pricing of water.
Favour pricing system based on 
infrastructural use (which de­
tached the price from reflecting 
quantity of water used).
Stakeholder 
participation
Challenge to the spiritual order 
and social organisation based 
on the idea of the state of 
nature as determined by man’s 
relations with the gods, rather 
than with nature.
Obstructing widespread stake­
holder participation. Support 




In a world of increasing global interdependence, effective instruments that 
promote domestic behavioural change are crucial. Many of the challenges 
of global sustainable development derive from politics and practices at 
domestic levels with effects far beyond national borders. Global warming, 
HIV/AIDS, and small arms proliferation are but a few examples of global 
problems emanating from domestic practices. International regimes are ve­
hicles geared to promote increased cooperation and address such problems. 
They are based on expert knowledge and best practice, and typically carry 
widespread political legitimacy to instigate reforms at domestic levels.
The international regime of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) is a case in point. The lack of safe water causes the death of some 
five million people each year and unsustainable water management leads to 
soil erosion, the loss of productive land, and contributes to social conflicts 
(UN 2003; Elliott 2004; Jonch-Clausen 2004; UN 2005a). These effects 
are not limited to any one national context: soil erosion spreads across 
boarders, the loss of productive lands hits global agricultural markets, and 
social conflicts in one country can lead to migration and subsequent loss 
of political stability in the nearby region and beyond.
The international regime of IWRM is the response of the international 
community to address this global water crisis. IWRM provides policy 
guidance for sustainable water management which acknowledge water as 
part of the ecosystem while recognising the benefits of economic incentives 
and the value of democratic participation (UN 2002). It was developed 
and gained widespread international acceptance as the result of a number 
of high level conferences including the UN conferences on sustainable 
development in Stockholm (1972), Rio (1992), and Johannesburg (2002). 
More than one hundred countries worldwide are currently undertaking 
reforms of their water management systems based on the ideas and values 
of IWRM. It provides the basis for all major international development 
organisations engaged in promoting sustainable water management in the 
developing world.
The result
This book has presented an analysis of the implementation of IWRM in 
Zimbabwe, which was one of the first countries to undertake a water sector
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reform according to IWRM principles. Even if considerable work remains to 
be done before the legal and institutional structures for water management 
in Zimbabwe are fully in line with the principles of IWRM, Zimbabwe has 
been classified as one of the most successful IWRM implementations. In 
a recent assessment of the Global Water Partnership, Zimbabwe was one 
of only two countries in Southern Africa reporting “good progress” in the 
IWRM based reform process (Global Water Partnership 2004).
Despite the official adoption of IWRM and far reaching reforms in 
formal regulatory arrangements, the empirical analysis presented in this 
book shows that various groups of actors in Zimbabwe hold very different 
understandings of IWRM and its implications for water related practices. 
The analysis, summarised in table 9.1., points to variations in understand­
ings of IWRM between the international and domestic level, as well as 
across different groups of actors within Zimbabwe. In accordance with 
the structure of the analysis of this book, table 9.1 displays these variations 
across the three fundamental principles, or ‘pillars’, of IWRM: catchment 
management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. 
Table 9.1. combines the information from the tables summarizing each 
of the four constructions of reality that I found around water use in Zim­
babwe: Water as Zimbabwe, Water as Gold, Water as Science, Water as a 
Gift from the Gods.
Pillar of 
IWRM
IWRM at international level




Water is integral to ecological and 
social systems.
Management of water resources 
should consider the externalities 
of water use for human actors 
and biological systems. Sector­
wide approach to management 
systems within catchments.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Water is a scarce resource with an 
economic value.
Market economic principles 
and institutions should be used 





Water is an essential component 
of life. Stakeholder participation 
gives people the right to self-de­
termination and creates a sense of 
ownership, thus providing incen­
tives for sustainable use.
Water resources management 
should involve all people with 
a stake in the management of 
water.
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IWRM at domestic levels




Threat to the viability of the 
nation-state and its administra­
tive back-bone i.e. the provin­
cial system
Support formal implementation 
of catchments to appease propo­
nents of IWRM, but maintain 
the key managerial instruments 
for water management within 
the government controlled pro­
vincial system.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Challenge to the socialisa­
tion of water consumers into 
citizens. Seen as an instrument 
against a unified nation-state.
Government calculated NBP 
detached




Call for increased participa­
tion by representatives of the 
marginalised Blacks; i.e. the 
government.
Introduce formal institutions 
for stakeholder participation but 
maintain control by the state 





Platform for political mobi­
lization against post-colonial 
rulers, for maintaining white 
farmers’ reality constructions 
and privileges.
Use legal provision for catch­
ment management to step-up 
organisation of alternative 
political agenda and to spread 
this to catchments throughout 
the country as part of a process 
aiming at a increased leverage 
for whites in society at large.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Call to deprive white com­
mercial farmers of legitimate, 
historically obtained, discount 
on water pricing.
Oppose economically favour­
able pricing policy offered by 
the Government as a means to 
maintain recognition for con­
struction of Water as Gold.
Stakeholder 
participation
Means to increase control by 
backward Blacks at the expense 
of progressive Whites.
Support the display of blacks at 
stakeholder meetings but ob­
struct any substantial influence 
by blacks.
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Challenge to social stratifica­
tion between different kinds 
of scientific water experts (hy­
drologists and hydrogeologists)
Maintain segmented organisa­
tional structure and distinctions 
between managers of surface 
and groundwater as opposed 
to IWRM call for ecosystem 
management.
Water as ao 
economic 
good
Contradiction of rational water 
resources management for 
benefit of all of Zimbabweans. 
Call for inferior science (i.e. 
economics) to legitimise nar­
row-minded, egoistic use of 
water.
Obstruct market-based pricing 
in support of price reflecting 




Challenge to scientific practice 
in which the proper road-map 
to water management is arrived 
at through calculations rather 
than consultations. Stakeholder 
management was a call for 
dilletants to manage water.
Turn campaigns for stakeholder 
participation into one-way com­
munication exercises to transmit 
solutions to water management 
arrived at through calculations 
based on natural sciences.
Water as a Gift from the Gods
Catchment 
management
Recognition of holistic “spir­
itual-system” approach (as op­
posed to ecosystem approach) 
placing water in the hands of 
the gods. Support of traditional 
chiefdoms and platform for 
political mobilization for local 
rule against the state.
Discourage man from direct 
interaction with nature to im­
prove its conditions. Increased 
legitimacy for local leadership at 
the expense of stakeholders and 
citizens.
Water as an 
economic 
good
Pricing water is a challenge to 
the authority of the gods. A 
sign of lack of faith.
Obstruct pricing of water.
Favour pricing system based on 
infrastructural use (which de­
tached the price from reflecting 
quantity of water used).
Stakeholder 
participation
Challenge to the spiritual order 
and social organisation based 
on the idea of the state of 
nature as determined by man’s 
relations with the gods, rather 
than with nature.
Obstructing widespread stake­
holder participation. Support 
of traditional local leaders in 
stakeholder institutions.
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The empirical results summarised in table 9.1. are based on the theory of 
domestic transformations of international regimes presented in chapter 
four. The aim of this theory is to be attentive to how international regimes 
may be transformed by domestic actors whose daily practices are the target 
of international regimes. This theory is developed to complement existing 
scholarship in international relations reviewed in chapter three. If I had 
conducted my analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe 
within the confinements of the existing scholarship on international regimes, 
a different picture would have emerged. In fact, had I applied any of the 
conventional theories on international regime implementation (realism, 
liberalism or constructivism) to the case of IWRM in Zimbabwe, I would 
not have seen the reported variations in targeted domestic actors’ under­
standings of IWRM. Existing scholarship on international relations largely 
turns a blind eye to domestic variations in understandings of international 
regimes. Scholars of in ternational relations have increasingly been concerned 
with the spread of international regimes and norms from the international 
level to national contexts. While these scholars differ with regard to theo­
retical orientations—be they realists, liberalists, or constructivists—they 
share the assumption that the understanding of the international regime is 
constant. The targeted domestic actors’ understanding of the international 
regime is assumed to be the same as the understanding held by actors at 
the international level.
The crucial principle of the theory of domestic transformations of inter­
national regimes is to recognize that when an international regime is being 
implemented in domestic contexts it can become part of evolving domestic 
politics and practices that reflect domestic variations in constructions of 
reality. In this process the international regime takes on new meanings, 
which affects the behavioural implications of the international regime. In 
contrast to existing scholarship, I argue that the understanding of an in­
ternational regime and its behavioural propositions are constructed, rather 
than constant, during the implementation process.
The theory of domestic transformations of international regimes provides 
an account for the causal mechanisms which result in the observed diversity 
in domestic actors’ understandings of the international regime. How do we 
explain that different actors come up with different understandings of the 
international regime? Combining research in social-psychology, sociology 
and international relations, I have offered an explanation that emphasis 
how domestic constructions of realities and the content of the international 
regime set the stage for strategic action by political entrepreneurs in the 
targeted environment. This point should be seen in light of contemporary 
theories of international regime implementation that tend to regard the 
targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of external impetus for change 
embedded in international regimes. In contrast to existing scholarship, I
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analyse domestic actors as political entrepreneurs with an agenda for re­
constructing the international regime and a game plan for how to make 
this reconstruction legitimate in society.
The Implications
This study has shown that it is not the international regime in its original 
form that impacts upon domestic patterns of behaviour. The domestic 
impact of an international regime is contingent on how it is transformed 
by strategic domestic actors based on their constructions of reality. What 
are the implications of this result for theorising about the implementation 
of international regimes? What does this result say about the prospects of 
using international regimes as vehicles for international cooperation? In 
this final section, I point to five implications of my analysis for the study 
and implementation of international regimes.
International politics and changes in domestic constructions of 
reality
Trying to identify how domestic norms and cognitive maps change, leading 
scholars have pointed to changes in material circumstances (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993; Hall P. 1993; McNamara 1998). The idea is that as old 
norms and cognitive maps fail to function due to changed material condi­
tions, actors will grapple to find new, more suitable, ones. To these scholars, 
changes in norms and cognitive orientations are epiphenomenal to changes 
in material conditions. With regard to domestic effects of international 
regimes, national responses to international regimes are seen as a result of 
national actors trying to grapple with changing material conditions. The 
changing material conditions can, for example, derive from international 
development agencies that offer assistance only on the condition of national 
political reforms. Alternatively, international regimes can provide new 
guidelines for domestic actors subjected to changes in national or local 
conditions, such as écologie or economic collapse. Domestic actors adopt 
international regimes that hold out the promise of a policy that better fits 
evolving material conditions.
My analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe partly sup­
ports this view. Recall, for example, how the instigation of the water sector 
reform was sparked by a combination of donors’ conditions for sweeping 
policy reforms within the framework of the World Bank’s Structural Ad­
justment Program, and a series of extraordinary droughts at the turn of the 
1980’s and early 199O’s (chapter two and five). More interestingly, however, 
the dominant result of my analysis is that the implementation of IWRM 
was not just a process of adaptation to changing material conditions. It
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was a process marked by power and politics in which domestic actors were 
concerned with the effects IWRM would have on their constructions of 
reality; their collective memories and social identities.
To give but two examples, it was pointed out in chapter six that the Com­
mercial Farmers Union (CFU)—comprised mainly of white commercial 
farmers—could have obtained a lower price for water if they had accepted 
the pricing policy suggested by the government as part of the reform. Despite 
these economic prospects, this policy was stymied by the CFU because they 
saw it as contradictory to the social identity and collective memory that 
formed their construction of reality. Similarly, I showed in chapter seven 
how prospects for economic support from international donor agencies were 
held out to public officials in Zimbabwe’s water administration in return 
for a straightforward implementation of IWRM. Despite this, and the fact 
that these actors understood, on an intellectual level, that IWRM would 
provide effective solutions to pressing problems (like integrated catchment 
management), they obstructed the implementation. The reason was that 
these actors, acting out of the construction of Water as Science, transformed 
the meaning of IWRM into a tool in the conflict over prestigious social 
identities (the distinction between hydrologists and hydrogeologists) and 
their collective memory (as the vanguard of modern nation-building).
This illustrates that domestic responses to international regimes will not be 
determined by how well the international regime provides policy guidelines 
to meets concrete material problems and demands. Targeted domestic actors 
will respond strategically to the international regime based on how it relates 
to, and can be reconstructed in the context of evolving constructions of 
reality. The transformation of IWRM was neither a functional response to 
changing material conditions nor was it the result of actors guided simply 
by ideational factors. The picture that emerges from the empirical analysis 
is one in which ideational factors define the interest of materially oriented 
actors, and, to borrow Max Weber’s famous dictum, serve like switch­
men who direct their action along one track or another. Similarly, Elinor 
Ostrom (1998) has called for “a behavioural theory of boundedly rational 
and moral behaviour” (p. 2). She states that “All long-enduring political 
philosophies have recognized human nature to be complex mixture of the 
pursuit of self-interest combined with the capability of acquiring internal 
norms of behaviour and following enforced rules when understood and 
perceived to be legitimate” (1998:2 cf. March and Olsen 1989; North 
1990; Levi 1997; Naurin 2004). As political entrepreneurs in the local 
community (rain-makers and traditional leaders) acted in support of Water 
as a Gift from the Gods they not only reconfirmed a deep religious belief 
system, they reconfirmed the social identities that were the foundation of 
their own social and material privileges in local communities. Likewise, as 
much as the government’s construction of water resources management in
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racial terms drew on the ideas making up the governments post-colonial 
project of nation building, it also served the purpose of legitimising the 
government’s increased control of society.
The point that national responses to international regimes should not be 
analysed as functional adoption to material conditions has been made by 
constructivist scholars. Martha Finnemore (1996) analysed the epistemic 
community around Robert McNamara in the World Bank to account for 
changes in economic policies of Third World countries during the 1970’s. 
Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) focus on how adaptation to the interna­
tional norm of human rights can be attributed to the work of normative 
entrepreneurs drawing on the normative discourse of this ideal (c.f. Klotz 
1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998).
The analysis that I present differs from existing constructivist scholarship 
in as much that the latter conceptualise domestic responses to international 
regimes as a movement away from domestic orientations and towards in­
creased resemblance with the international regime. Domestic norms and 
ideas change while the international regime remains constant. By contrast, 
I show that as domestic political entrepreneurs respond to international 
regimes, they draw on both the international regime and domestic construc­
tions of reality to come up with a new transformed understanding of the 
international regime. A transformed international regime is made up as a 
mixture of, on the one hand, the international regime, and, on the other 
hand, domestic constructions of reality. A similar point was recently made by 
Acharya who, critical of the ”static” analysis of contemporary constructivists, 
set out to show how domestic actors in South East Asia have responded to 
international standards on regional organisations (such as the EU, Acha­
rya 2004). In his account, rational actors at the domestic level—“norm 
takers”—change the international standards for regional organisation to fit 
prevailing domestic conditions. Although I am sympathetic to Acharya’s 
attempt to expand on current constructivist literature, his analysis does 
not acknowledge the domestic level as a dynamic political entity that also 
changes during the influence of international regimes. Whereas construc­
tivist analysts tend to hold the international regime constant during their 
analysis, Acharya’s analysis does not acknowledge changes at the domestic 
level. Acharya envisages the implementation of international regimes as a 
process of “localisation”, i.e. how international regimes are made local. By 
contrast, I offer an account of the interface between international regimes 
and domestic politics as a transformation in which both the international 
regime and domestic constructions of reality are subjected to change.
To sum up, my analysis suggests that we should understand the impact of 
international regimes on domestic policies and norms as a process involving 
strategic actors at the cross-road of international standards and domestic 
constructions of reality. It is not adequate to analyse their response as a search
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for functional solutions to material circumstances. Nor should this be seen 
as a process of wholesale adoption of the international regime (leading to 
global homogenisation), or as the reverse, i.e., a process in which domestic 
standards trump international norms and ideas (as Acharya would have it). 
I argue that we should see the domestic impact of international regimes as 
contingent on a process of strategic transformations of the international 
regime as well as evolving domestic constructions of reality. In this proc­
ess, the aim is not necessarily—if at all—to find a remedy for how to cope 
with material circumstances or how to adopt to internationally established 
ideas and norms. It is a process that turns on actors’ social identities of 
themselves and others, their collective memories of the past and visions 
of the future.
Political entrepreneurs and domestic transformations of interna­
tional regimes
At the outset of this book, I criticized contemporary theories of interna­
tional regimes for down-playing the level of strategic action of targeted 
domestic actors. Existing theories regard the targeted domestic actors as 
passive subjects of external impetus for change rather than as agents with 
an agenda setting capacity in their own right. Consequently, the theories 
give scant insights into how targeted domestic actors strategically transform 
the international regime in relation to evolving domestic constructions of 
reality.
I have presented a theory in which domestic actors are seen as political 
entrepreneurs engaging in strategic actions which aim to create a transfor­
mation that they think will reduce their cognitive dissonance while increas­
ing the legitimacy of their in-group to claim material and non-material 
resources. In this process, taken-for-granted facts of domestic constructions 
of reality as well as different components of the international regime are 
called into question and recast. Contrary to the dominant view among 
theorists of international regimes, there was thus no constant “match” or 
“mismatch” between IWRM and the domestic constructions in Zimbabwe 
(Cortell and Davis 1996; 2000; 2005).
Analysing the actions of the domestic political entrepreneurs I looked for 
factors shaping their perceptions of reality and setting the boundaries for 
what kind of transformations were likely to be viable in Zimbabwean society 
at large. Combining research on social-psychology, sociology and interna­
tional relations, I accounted for how strategic political entrepreneurs are 
bounded by deep-seated constituents of human psychology and embedded 
in prevalent domestic constructions of reality. The presented analysis thus 
has the advantage of providing an understanding of variations in domestic 
transformations, while at the same time pointing to fundamental processes 
in the reconstruction of actors’ collective memories and social identities.
205
With regard to the re-formation of collective memories, political entrepre­
neurs are affected by cognitive dissonance, and individual limitations in 
remembering reality, while at the same time recognising how these can be 
exploited by political entrepreneurs for strategic reasons. Similarly, social 
identities are shaped by basic social-psychological processes in a way that 
not only set limits for the constructions of social actors, but can also be 
used for strategic purposes by political entrepreneurs.
I analysed political entrepreneurs as part of a web of competing con­
structions of reality around water in Zimbabwe. The empirical analysis 
showed how existing constructions of reality affected which repertoire of 
transformations of IWRM would be seen as legitimate in society at large. 
Established domestic constructions of reality influenced which transforma­
tions of IWRM that were politically viable.62 63Moreover, the analysis showed 
how political entrepreneurs can take an active role in creating the domestic 
constructions of reality within which the international regime will be im­
plemented. Prevalent domestic constructions not only affect the actions 
of political entrepreneurs, but they are affected by their actions. Checkel 
(1997a) describes the role of political entrepreneurs as that of developing a 
“game plan” for a context with pre-defined “situational conditions” (p. 9). By 
contrast, my analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe shows 
how political entrepreneurs took an active role in creating these situational 
conditions. Political entrepreneurs are thus not restricted to applying their 
game plan to a game structured by external circumstances. By recreating 
domestic constructions of reality and international regimes, they take part 
in determining which game is going to be played. The relations between 
the government of Zimbabwe and the white commercial farmers are a case 
in point. These relations were not determined by anonymous historical pro­
cesses but were part of the strategic manoeuvrings of political entrepreneurs 
within these groups. The racial stereotypes of “Black” and “White” which 
greatly influenced the transformation of IWRM were not pre-defined 
conditions making up the playing-field on which political entrepreneurs 
were to implement IWRM. They were deliberately constructed by political
62 For example, recall from chapter five how political entrepreneurs proposing Water as Zim­
babwe managed to delay the introduction of IWRM for several years by associating it with the 
colonial heritage of external interference in the management of Zimbabwe’s natural resources. 
IWRM was only introduced in Zimbabwe by connecting it with the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which had been accepted by the top national leadership as the 
legitimate template for nation building during the second half of the 1990’s. Only when ESAP 
had become available as a domestic construction of reality were political entrepreneurs able to 
establish legitimacy for IWRM.
63 Recall, for example, how opponents of IWRM in the government pictured the actors 
supportive of IWRM as white colonialists upholding the colonial tradition from the pre­
Independence period in Zimbabwe. Likewise, as the government gave in to the IWRM call 
of stakeholder participation, it reconstructed itself into a stakeholder representative.
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entrepreneurs throughout the water sector reform.63 Similarly, the analysis 
of Water as a Gift from the Gods showed how, in a context influenced by 
modern scientific conceptions of water management, traditional leaders 
used rain-making rituals and threats of the revenge of the gods to define the 
game of the water sector reform in terms of their construction of reality. In 
so doing, the traditional leaders also emphasized the imperative of paying 
tribute to the earthly representatives of the ancestral gods, i.e. themselves 
and their peers.
While the analysis provides some insights into the causal processes guid­
ing political entrepreneurs during domestic transformations, additional 
research is much needed. My results suggest that this research should include 
particular attention to how (by what means) political entrepreneurs shape 
domestic contexts. This research should aim to explain variations in how 
successful political entrepreneurs manifest their respectively preferred trans­
formations as legitimate in society at large. What determines if a political 
entrepreneur is successful in transforming international regimes?
In addition, my analysis raises questions about what determines that 
which political entrepreneurs regard as being in their interest. How are 
the perceptions and interests of political entrepreneurs formed? How can 
political entrepreneurs be influenced to regard the actual implementation 
of (untransformed) international regimes to square with their interests? 
Addressing these questions is vital not only from a theoretical point of 
view but also from the perspective of using international regimes to achieve 
behavioural change at domestic levels.
The power of targeted domestic actors
A third venue for further research suggested by my analysis regards what 
constitutes resources of power, and how this power can be executed by 
targeted domestic actors during the transformation process. Following the 
realist and liberal tradition of international relations theory, conceptions 
of power in the study of international regimes has predominantly been 
material in orientation (see e.g. Barnett and Durvall 2005).
The empirical analysis gives ample support to such a material understand­
ing of power. It is, for example, difficult to understand the considerable 
impact of political entrepreneurs supportive of Water as Gold without 
taking into account the organisational structure and considerable material 
resources of the CFU. The importance of their material resources stood 
out even more given that their previously amicable “bargain” with the 
government had broken down at about the same time as the water sector 
reform began (chapter six). The white farmers managed to manifest their 
views on water despite being socially and politically contested and without 
historical allies.
The presented analysis further points the power derived from non-material
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factors such as the construction of collective memories and social identities. 
Constructivist scholars interested in the power of ideational factors have 
shown that the implementation process can be characterised as a knowledge­
based process in which domestic actors learn the content of international 
regimes or as a process of socialisation. Whereas I am sympathetic to this 
attempt to expand on material conceptions of power, my objection is that 
constructivists have analysed the targeted domestic actors as powerless re­
cipients without an agenda-setting capacity in their own right. The literature 
on learning sees the targeted domestic actors as ‘willing students’ while 
the literature on socialisation portray them as passive subjects to the social 
pressure mounted by proponents of the international regime. Processes of 
learning and socialisation have thus been juxtaposed by constructivists as 
alternative independent variables set up parallel to the focus on material 
power used by traditional international relations theories. What is missing 
is an account of the power in the hands of the targeted domestic actors, 
i.e. the actors whose practices the international regime sets out to change. 
As Keck and Sikkink (1998) analyse “advocacy networks in international 
politics” they transcend the distinction between international and national 
actors to give an account of how domestic actors can draw on the power 
resources of their network partners at the international level to pressure the 
targeted domestic actors into changing their behaviour (see in particular pp. 
16-32; cf. Klotz 1995; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999). These domestic actors are, 
however, not the actors whose behaviour is targeted by the international 
regime. They are change agents (non-governmental organisations, interest 
groups and alike) linked up in networks with international actors to help 
obtain change among the targeted domestic actors. My objection with this 
analysis is that it does not account for the role of power in the hands of the 
targeted domestic actor. Power is vested at the level of international actors 
and their domestic network-partners rather than in the hands of the actors 
whose practices the international regimes set out to change (such as small 
scale farmers or scientific water officials under pressure of IWRM).
To sum up, traditional theories of international relations have focused 
on how material power at the level of international actors affects the im­
plementation of international regimes. Current constructivists have added 
to this analysis by pointing to the significance of non-material resources 
(knowledge and social pressure) and how domestic actors can be empow­
ered by networking with international actors. Adding to this literature, 
my theory of domestic transformations of international regimes proposes 
a focus on the power of targeted domestic actors. To understand domestic 
transformations of international regimes, we should analyse the targeted 
domestic actors as powerful actors in their own right.
This research should analyse how material and non-material factors are 
combined by targeted domestic actors to exercise power during the imple­
mentation of international regimes. How are material resources combined
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with ideational factors during the transformation of international regimes? 
How can political entrepreneurs with small material resources increase their 
leverage by strategic use of ideational factors? These questions should not 
only interest scholars on international relations, but should be of interest for 
development agencies advocating changed domestic behaviour in a context 
infused by power struggles around material and non-material resources.
Whose norms and ideals? Domestic contexts in the plural
The implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe did not lead to a single 
national response. Rather, Zimbabwe showed great diversity in domestic 
responses to IWRM. In fact, as I ended my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, a 
decade after the initiation of the reform, there were still great differences 
between different domestic actors’ constructions around water, and there 
were no signs of increased convergence around IWRM. This is evident in 
table 9.1., which displays the various transformed understandings of IWRM 
that developed during the water sector reform.
This picture of domestic heterogeneity in constructions of reality is a 
reflection of the vast societal pluralism of Zimbabwe. Assume that an 
international development agency wanted to make a renewed effort to 
further implement IWRM in Zimbabwe. Whose norms and ideals should 
they target? Or, to phrase the same question in a more generic form: In a 
domestic context hosting a wide variety of constructions of reality, which 
one should be the target of international regimes?
The answer given by the vast majority of scholars of international politics 
would be that the targeted construction should be that of the government. 
The unitary state represented by its government is given primacy as an ac­
tor in theories and models of international political theory and scholars of 
domestic implementation of international regimes traditionally focus on the 
implementation at the level of the state (see e.g. Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 
1997). While this limited perspective has spurred a literature that focuses 
on the role of non-state actors, be they non-governmental organisations, 
market actors, trans-national networks, civil society, etc this research none­
theless typically sees the role of these other actors only in relation to the 
government. Non-state actors are brought into the analysis to the extent that 
they are thought to influence how governments accommodate international 
regimes (cf. Wapner 1995; Ruggie 2004). As Landolt (2004) points out, 
the focus is on “unitary states” as the target for acceptance of international 
regimes, forgetting the political processes taking place in society at large 
(p. 585; Checkel 1998:244).
The results presented in this study call for analysis of the domestic response 
to international regimes that includes non-state domestic actors as the prime 
targets of international regimes. The government in Zimbabwe did not 
represent the sole construction of water, nor perhaps the most important 
in terms of popular local support (cf. Water as a Gift from the Gods) or the
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economically most viable (cf. Water as Gold). This is partly due to the fact 
that the state of Zimbabwe, like many of its African peers, is a weak state 
where the government has not been able to diffuse its norms and ideals 
throughout its polity. Zimbabwe society has a huge variety of alternative 
political agendas with implications for how to organise society in general 
and natural resources management in particular, some of which are more 
or less oppositional to the government’s project of a unitary state.
Questioning the primacy of governments as the target for international 
regimes is not only a consequence of, and relevant to, the weak state structure 
in Zimbabwe (and similar African states). The primacy of the government 
is also brought into question by the policy area under review, i.e., natural 
resources management. Based on her extensive research on natural resources 
management, Elinor Ostrom (1998) states that “national governments are 
too small too govern the global commons and too big to handle smaller scale 
problems” (p. 17). While the small scale of national governments requires 
international cooperation to solve such problems, their limited capability to 
act at the micro-level makes sustainable resource use contingent on norms 
and ideals practiced by local actors on a daily basis. To the extent that it 
is desirable to push domestic behavioural change in the direction of more 
sustainable resource use, the government should not a priori be regarded as 
the primary target of international regimes, but attention should be paid 
to actors throughout society as actors in their own right.
Don’t (always) support domestic transformations of international 
regimes
The rationale for implementing international regimes is typically to prompt 
change in domestic actors’ constructions of reality and behavioural patterns 
in a direction supportive of sustainable development. The underlying ration­
al is that adherence to international regimes leads to increased sustainable 
development. From this assumption it follows that as international regime 
are transformed in the direction of targeted domestic actors’ constructions 
of reality, the change-potential of the international regime may decrease. 
Domestic transformations may counteract efforts for sustainable develop­
ment. The more targeted domestic actors redefine the international regime 
in relation to domestic constructions of reality, the less chance there is that
64 It has been argued that increased local involvement creates a sense of “ownership” conducive 
for effective resource use. Similarly, engaging local actors in the development and execu­
tion of reform processes can increase the level of “trust” among concerned actors (Ostrom 
1991 ; 1998). These effects should not be confused with the effects of local systems of knowl­
edge. Whereas ownership and trust are used to determine how local actors will conceive of 
their relation to the project and each other, involving local systems of knowledge implies 
that the content and behavioural implications of a proposed project will be changed.
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the implementation of the international regime will lead to sustainable 
development.64
65 In the liberal scenario this is often combined with institutional decentralisation of the 
state and subsequent devolution of power. Post-Marxists envisage a similar distancing from 
capitalist movements and hegemonic power.
This conclusion stands in contrast with the emphasis made by scholars 
and policy makers alike on the need to integrate local knowledge in develop­
ment strategies to obtain sustainable natural resource use. Drawing on a vast 
amount of empirical field work and controlled social experiments, Elinor 
Ostrom has argued that building institutions and systems of governance on 
local knowledge vastly increases the likelihood of long term sustainability in 
use of both social and natural resources (e.g. Ostrom 1990; 1997; 1999). 
Similarly, policies for international development organisations advocate 
adaptation to local knowledge systems rather than the other way around. 
UNDP points to adoption to local knowledge-systems as part of its core 
strategy to meet the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 2002; Sida 
2003; Sida 2004).
Two lines of thought lie behind this call among scholars and policy makers 
to adjust to local knowledge systems. First, local knowledge is celebrated 
in its own right as representing the locus of intense insights and wisdom 
on sustainable resource use. Local problems associated with sustainable de­
velopment often involve complex considerations about sensitive ecological 
and social systems. Local knowledge is developed though lengthy processes 
of trial and error and provides appropriate strategies to cope with local 
problems. In addition, Mohan and Stokke (2000) have pointed out that 
local knowledge is frequently associated with a moral superiority based on 
the idea of self-determination and an approach to development that is free 
from the normative biases of “non-locals”. This view is shared by theorists 
with diverse normative standings—from (neo-)liberals to (post-)Marx- 
ists—who envisage that increased leverage for local knowledge will produce 
a multiplicity of local development trajectories in tune with local needs and 
environmental conditions (Mohan and Stokke 2000:252).65
The second line of thought behind the celebration of local knowledge 
is that this will be the ingredient in a collective learning process aiming at 
sustainable development. Allowing increased influence from diverse local 
knowledge systems will maximise the input of views and alternatives in a 
collective learning process that will, in turn, generate strategies for a more 
encompassing institutional level (such as the national, regional, or interna­
tional level). This will, so the reasoning goes, produce a better approach to 
sustainable development than the one dictated by any single group of experts 
or policy makers (such as the ones writing up international regimes).
Both of these pictures celebrating the role of local knowledge are contested
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by my empirical results from Zimbabwe. Consider first the view that local 
actors’ represent approaches supportive of sustainable development. The 
construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods presented a “spiritual sys­
tem approach” to water, characterised by the idea that the state of nature is 
determined by the will of the gods and how the gods assess humans moral 
conduct. This construction undermines the most fundamental rationale 
for natural resources management: Why should people mind their actions 
towards water in hope of better access and quality if this is ultimately de­
termined by the gods?
Similarly, consider the second line of thought presented above, i.e., that 
local knowledge will be an ingredient in a collective learning process opti­
mising collective solutions for resource management. Again, my empirical 
analysis offers scant support for such an argument. The racial constructions 
held by the CFU and the government respectively (i.e. local knowledge of 
the “Other”) drove actors in these groups further and further apart. Like­
wise, the very conception of what constituted knowledge (as opposed to 
beliefs) lead the scientific water officials in the official water administration 
to alienate local stakeholders during the stakeholder campaigns (chapter 
seven).
Throughout this study I have called attention to domestic transformations 
of international regimes. This should however not be mistaken for a call to 
support such transformations. Domestic transformations may increase the 
influence of local knowledge, which in turn may undermine reforms for 
sustainable development incited by international regimes.
This conclusion calls for scholars and policy makers alike to be more atten­
tive to the potential negative effects of local participation and influence from 
local knowledge. It is clearly reasonable to question the assumption, made 
above, that international regimes represent the correct way of approaching 
domestic policy problems, and to acknowledge that domestic actors can 
represent important knowledge on sustainable resource use. Nevertheless, 
the question that must be addressed is what local knowledge is supportive 
of sustainable development? How do we determine which local actors 
represent sustainable approaches to natural resource usage?
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International regimes are developed by international experts and policy makers 
to encourage specific behavioural changes at domestic levels. With the aim of 
understanding and promoting the implementation of international regimes, 
this book presents a theory of domestic transformations of international re­
gimes. Patrik Stålgren argues that the domestic implementation of interna­
tional regimes is a process in which their meanings are transformed in ways 
that may result in behaviours that are different than originally intended.
This argument complements existing scholarship in International Rela­
tions which assumes that the understanding of international regimes during 
the implementation process is constant rather than constructed, and regards 
targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of external reform rather than 
subjects of change. Stålgren combines theories on international relations with 
social psychology and sociology to account for how actors in the targeted do­
mestic policy area reconstruct international regimes.
At the heart of the analysis is a case study of the implementation of the 
international regime on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
in Zimbabwe. IWRM was developed to address global water crises which 
cause the death of millions each year. IWRM resembles other international 
regimes in that it builds on the norms and ideas of ecosystem management, 
market economy and democratic participation. The United Nations and the 
European Union alike have recommended its members to adopt IWRM, and 
it is the foundation for most international development agencies supporting 
sustainable water use in the developing world.
Zimbabwe, setting out to reform its water sector in the early 1990’s, was 
one of the first countries to explicitly engage IWRM as a template for the re­
form. The theory of domestic transformation of international regimes is used 
to analyse how the impact was contingent on transformations in relation to 
four specific constructions of reality: Water as Zimbabwe; Water as Gold; 
Water as Science; Water as a Gift from the Gods.
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